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Abstract 
 
The history of pensions tends to bookmark the nineteenth century. It either focuses on 
the pensions associated with placemen, sinecurists and the Civil List, elements of ‘Old 
Corruption’ targeted by the early nineteenth-century reformists. Or, the focus is on the 
emergence of old-age pensions towards the end of the century—the different schemes 
and ideologies that ultimately culminated in the pivotal 1908 Old Age Pensions Act. 
However, over the course of the nineteenth century occupational pensions were growing 
across a number of industries.  
This thesis aims to focus on those pensions, drawing out the motivation behind their 
creation and implementation. Using the theories of new economic sociologists as a 
methodological framework the thesis looks closely at the definition of pensions and 
how this was changed and manipulated by the government, other organisations and 
workers. 
In 1859 the British government passed the Superannuation Act. This Act entitled all 
civil servants who had served for ten years or more and were unable to work due to old 
age or infirmity to retire on a fraction of their final salary. The Act was an important 
part of the reform of the Civil Service but in many ways it was also a watershed for 
retirement remuneration. It built on previous regulation that had established the 
condition of a retirement payment to be based on age, as well as evidence and ideas of 
loyalty. But it importantly made this form of payment without the need for employee 
contribution. Pensions were now part of the employment contract and standardised 
across the Civil Service, including the lowest paid letter-carriers and rural messengers 
of the Post Office. 
This system was extremely influential. The thesis examines its impact not only on Post 
Office workers within the Civil Service but also on pension provisions in related 
industries, including the East India Company, Bank of England and two railway 
companies. Through examination of this range of institutions, the variation in ideology 
and practice behind nineteenth-century pensions become apparent. By the end of the 
century, the civil servant and the aged pauper were portrayed both as equals and as polar 
opposites. Both perspectives rested on whether pensions were viewed as deferred pay or 
as remuneration solely due to service and loyalty. The end of the nineteenth century saw 
a tug of war between civil servants and the government over the definition of the Civil 
Service superannuation. This thesis argues that the government maintained control over 
the provision by refusing to define superannuation as deferred pay, but it gave Civil 
Servants the concession of including provisions for families within the superannuation 
system. Civil servants were forced to concede their claim of entitlement to ensure their 
demands for families were met.  
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Introduction: 
Rethinking Pension Reform in the Long Nineteenth 
Century 
 
‘What is a pension? No doubt a “pension”, strictly constructed, is an 
annuity; ... As the word is generally understood, it means a reward or 
retiring allowance, granted in pursuance of a contract of service, or in 
consideration of long or special employment, or of injury therein, of by 
way of compensation for the abolition of a public post which a person 
rightly expected to continue; or, more generally and correctly, it is 
deferred pay, arising either from specific reservations from salary or wage, 
or general reservations by those salaries or wage having been less by 
reason of such stipulated deferred payments or pensions.’  
L. C. Alexander, Industrial Superannuation versus Pauper Pensions, 
1899 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, pensions were a controversial topic: debate raged 
over what a pension was, who should benefit from one and who should pay for it. 
Addressing a meeting of the National Liberal Club’s Political and Economic Circle in 
1899, L. C. Alexander set out his definition of a pension to be a reward or deferred 
payment in exchange or as compensation for something. It was part of a contract of 
mutual understanding, a reflection of a relationship.1 By contrast, the various proposals 
for old age pensions, which involved some contribution ‘by the state or parish’, were not 
pensions but a ‘qualified or thinly disguised form of out-door relief’; even if it was partly 
funded by the working man, it carried the ‘stigma of the semi-pauperism’. Furthermore, 
even an annuity or superannuation that was acquired by the working-man’s ‘own 
unassisted providence’ was something different to a pension since it was the result of 
‘perfect independence’, with ‘thanks to nobody’.2 The purpose of Alexander’s paper was 
to argue for the establishment of an industrial superannuation to support the aged poor, 
and consequently he was not arguing for the creation of a pension, but for a system that 
                                                          
1 L. C. Alexander, Industrial Superannuation versus Pauper Pensions (London, 1899), p.1.  
2 Ibid., p.2. 
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would support the ‘legitimate self-reliance, self-help and self-respect’ of the working 
population.3 It was in effect a tax that would pay an annuity, enabling the working man 
to look ‘the taxpayer and ratepayer proudly in the face’.4 Alexander suggested calling it 
the ‘superannuation tax’, but conceded to it being called a pension, if the working-man 
desired— an indulgence to what he perceived was an unjustified attachment to the word. 
Unfortunately, no further details survive to tell us more about Alexander, his background 
or what brought him to publish his views on the old age pensions debate. He was certainly 
not a central or influential figure within the movement, and, in many ways, his scheme 
was flawed. It casually neglected women, lacked actuarial approval and would not have 
been able to make its first payment for fifteen years. Nevertheless, Alexander’s paper did 
articulate carefully crafted definitions of payment where relationships were central. In 
these definitions the true meaning of a pension rested on a relationship of exchange, 
reward or compensation, whereas superannuation was focused on the responsibilities of 
the individual, with any money from the state being seen as charity, representing a 
shameful reliance on others. Industry and the individual were set in opposition to the state 
as preferred payee, which would enhance the status of the recipient. He was not the first 
to declare that using the word ‘pension’ for a government payment did not change the 
meaning of the act.5 Yet, his paper is useful for highlighting clearly the importance of the 
identity of payee and recipient and the nature of their relationship in determining the 
meaning of a financial exchange.  
This focus on the relationship between payee and recipient is important when thinking 
about pensions in the long nineteenth century—this is a central theme of this thesis. There 
has been substantial work on pensions at the beginning and end of the century, locating 
the relationship between the state as payee and recipient as either aristocratic or an elderly 
pauper. The historiographies of ‘Old Corruption’ and old age pensions bookend the 
nineteenth century: they appear to stand at polar opposites; but by examining the 
development of occupational pensions, and particularly Civil Service superannuation, 
some continuities can be identified. Superannuation schemes for civil servants—which 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p.23. 
4 Ibid., pp.23 and 17. 
5 A good example of this is the paper written by Edmund Fitzmaurice, one of the committee members for 
the 1899 Select Committee on Aged Deserving Poor. He argued using the word ‘pension’ within the 
debates of providing welfare for the aged poor was using the word in a ‘new sense’, and, instead, 
associated the word with work and conditions of service in employment. PP 1899 [296] Select Committee 
on Aged Deserving Poor together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence and 
appendix, p.218 
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included thousands of middle- and lower-middle-class employees of the Post Office as 
well as the highly paid departmental secretaries—were frequently justified and defended 
not simply as an important part of their remuneration or deferred pay, but also as a 
fundamental responsibility of the state. Consequently, this thesis will ask why they were 
installed and developed in this period, what role the employee played in their 
development and how definitions and perceptions of occupational pensions changed over 
the century. In order to answer these questions, ideas about pensions and pension reform 
in the nineteenth century need to be reassessed, putting relationships and cultural meaning 
at the heart of the analysis.  
Money, Power and the State 
In order to reassess pensions in this way, this thesis draws on the recent history of 
economic culture and sociology. Economic relationships and transactions have been of 
interest to sociologists for a long time, most recently culminating in a field of scholarship 
called the new economic sociology.6 This field of study may have been around since the 
1980s but it has had limited influence on the work of historians.7 There is evidence of a 
broader analysis of social relationships through monetary transactions seen in Margot 
Finn’s The Character of Credit and Rebecca Spang’s Stuff and Money in the Time of the 
French Revolution, and Spang’s assertion that ‘money works only as a relation between 
people’, has been particularly influential to this thesis.8 Yet, the application of the new 
economic sociological interests related to economic relationships, power and inequality 
have not been fully utilised, and anthropology has had a much more distinct influence on 
historians’ analysis of credit, trust and gift exchanges.9 Looking more closely at the 
                                                          
6 The ‘Introduction’ to M. Granovetter and R. Swedbeg (eds.), The Sociology of Economic Life (Oxford, 
1992), pp.1-22, provides a short history of economic sociology, placing the origins with the ‘first 
sociologist’, Auguste Comte, as well as Emile Durkheim and Max Weber who all saw fault with 
economics being studied in isolation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, most of the 
twentieth century saw a divergence of the two disciplines. In the 1950s anthropology began to see the 
benefits of incorporating economic theory and Karl Polanyi’s work on pre-industrialised society was 
pioneering. Although it was not until the 1980s that the ‘New Economic Sociology’ emerged, stemming 
from shared interests between economists and sociologists in labour markets and financial networks. 
More recently economic sociologists have turned their interest to globalisation, post-industrial societies 
and the ‘end’ of class in forming identities, demonstrated by F. Tonkiss, Contemporary Economic 
Sociology: Globalisation, Production, Inequality (London, 2006). 
7 An exception to this is G. C. Gosling, Payment and Philanthropy in British Healthcare, 1918–48, 
(Manchester, 2017), Chapter 1: Payment in the history of healthcare. Available from: 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK441620/ [Accessed 14 December 2018] 
8 R. L. Spang, Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution (Harvard, 2017), p.4. 
9 Rebecca Spang’s work on the French Revolution does not directly reference new economic sociologists 
but has been influenced by similar thinkers. The work emphasises the importance of looking at how ‘debt, 
debris, memories and tax arrears’ were managed in this time of great upheaval, mixing analysis of 
material and more abstract notions of money. Asserting that ‘money’s value is conventional and socially 
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theories of new economic sociology pioneers, such as Viviana A. Zelizer, offers 
increasing range to consider financial relationships based on exchange and money. 
Through this work a new lens for the assessment of pensions becomes available, one that 
is not simply focused on the definition of pensions as a monetary exchange but that 
examines where the power in that relationship between recipient and payee lies and what 
that payment could mean for both parties. 
Over the past few decades new economic sociologists such as Zelizer have refuted 
theorists who have treated and described money as a transferable quantity with no greater 
meaning than its quantifiable currency. Instead, Zelizer suggests that ‘people make every 
effort to embed money in particular times, places, and social relations’.10 The reason for 
money being paid out is just as important as where it has come from and the payment 
itself in helping to determine or assign meaning. Focusing more closely on the 
relationships derived from payment Zelizer has identified three main types: compensation 
as a form of direct exchange; entitlement as the right to a share, and a gift when one 
person voluntarily bestows upon another.11 This categorisation is important as each type 
of exchange also denotes an exertion of power: 
‘Money as compensation implies an equal exchange of values and a certain 
distance, contingency, bargaining, and accountability among parties. Money as 
an entitlement implies strong claims to power and autonomy by the recipient. 
Money as a gift implied subordination and arbitrariness.’12 
In the context of this study the significance of the definition of payment for an 
occupational pension focuses on government as the employer and the civil servant as 
employee. Consequently, by looking at occupational pensions we gain greater insight into 
how power was exerted over citizens through the employment structures used by 
                                                          
based’, not fixed but constructed through history and action, Spang is interested in the materiality of 
money alongside its social meaning, and the analysis of both are important in avoiding the ‘fetishization’ 
of money, taking Zizek’s Sublime Objects as an influence. Sociologists such as Webber are cited but in 
connection to how governments regulate money. Spang, Stuff and Money, pp.4-18. 
Finn does make some reference to new economic sociologists including Viviana A. Zelizer but also 
includes an analysis of how anthropological theory has influenced historians of the early modern period. 
M. C. Finn, The Character of Credit: Personal Debt in English Culture 1740-1914 (Cambridge, 2003), 
pp.4-11. 
10 V. A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (Princeton, 1994), p.18. 
11 V. A. Zelizer, ‘Payment and Social Ties’, Sociological Forum, 11 (1996), pp.481-95; reproduced in V. 
A. Zelizer, Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy (Princeton, 2011), p.136. 
12 Zelizer, Economic Lives, pp.136-7. 
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government over the nineteenth century, as well as cultural understandings of pensions 
and these financial relationships. 
Cultural understandings of financial relationships has been a growing area of scholarship. 
The works of James Taylor and Paul Johnson have demonstrated that governance of the 
Victorian financial world was based on ideological attitudes and ideas that are distinctly 
different to what we would understand today. This was a time when economic activity 
was best ‘conducted by individuals or small groups of entrepreneurs’ and companies were 
not a separate entity to these individuals.13 Consequently, government action, where 
company fraud was concerned, exhibited a desire to ‘uphold the traditional regulatory 
roles of participants in commercial activity’.14 The state was deeply involved in economic 
relationships acting as a monitor of property rights, enforcing contracts and governing the 
corporate world.15 Johnson stipulates that the creation of the market could not have been 
a natural thing, but carefully constructed by the key political actors reflecting their 
interests and power.16 Furthermore, laissez-faire individualism was not the prevailing 
characteristic of government and the ideas of morality and character as well as 
collectivism were present. A culture of individual responsibility and the importance of 
trust through familiar and traditional practices were important and the traditional ideas 
and practices surrounding economic relationships lasted longer into the nineteenth 
century than has often been supposed. 
This work builds on that of Searle, Finn and Daunton which has provided new insight 
into the ideologies that shaped economic life in the nineteenth century. A recurrent theme 
is the centrality of relationships in determining economic action, demonstrated by the fear 
of transferring ownership and control from shareholders to a board of directors, or the 
persistence of acts of mutual obligation that provided scaffolding to contractual 
agreements through ‘customs, obligations and expectations’.17 Martin Daunton’s 
Trusting Leviathan exposes the complex relationship between the government and 
taxpayers as economic policy was established. A careful balance of ‘consent, trust and 
                                                          
13 J. Taylor, Creating Capitalism: Joint-Stock Enterprise in British Politics and Culture 1800-1870 
(Royal Historical Society, 2006), pp.12-13. 
14 J. Taylor, ‘Company Fraud in Victorian Britain: The Royal British Bank Scandal of 1856’, English 
Historical Review, 122:497 (2007), p.724. 
15 P. Johnson, Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate Capitalism (Cambridge, 2013), pp.16-
17. 
16 Ibid., p.24. 
17 G. R. Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Oxford, 1998), chapter 5; Finn, The 
Character of Credit, p.95. 
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legitimacy’ enabled the Victorian government, through Gladstone’s fiscal constitution, to 
remove taxation as a contentious issue and create a sense of fairness in the system.18 State 
finances were carefully managed through retrenchment and the construction of ‘norms of 
probity and transparency’ to instil a sense of legitimacy and trust.19  
The creation in 1810 of a formal superannuation scheme for civil servants was part of this 
retrenchment, part of the move away from connotations of ‘Old Corruption’ and 
important in building trust with the public. Sinecurists, placemen and pensioners were 
frequently singled out as examples of a corrupt system of government privilege, evidence 
of the economic inefficiency of the aristocratic elites. The subsequent reforms in the 
1830s have been seen as part of the birth of a more modern bureaucracy, and fixed salaries 
and superannuation provision for civil servants were part of this modernisation, a move 
away from the ‘parasitical and ‘corrupt’’ characteristics of the state.20 Yet, this transition 
from the Civil List to Civil Service superannuation suggests continuity as well as reform, 
as notions of loyalty and service and an expectancy of retirement provision were 
transferred from one type of payment to another. The creation of superannuation schemes 
was part of reforms to prevent officials selling their positions, or taking bribes and to re-
establish public trust in government finances.21 They were important in reshaping public 
opinion, but this study will focus on the way the reforms altered the relationship between 
public servants and government. As the report for the 1857 Royal Commission stated, 
superannuation had been established as civil servants could not be ‘permitted to starve’.22 
There was a sense of obligation and responsibility that rested with the state, and 
consequently became an entitlement for the employee. This was a commitment made at 
the point of employment and there was a sense of duty to fulfil it at the end of 
employment, though within specific regulations based on age and loyalty. However, this 
did not mean that Civil Service superannuation was continually viewed as an entitlement. 
By the end of the nineteenth century there was some uncertainty surrounding how 
                                                          
18 M. Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799-1914 (Cambridge, 2001), 
pp.7-29. 
19 Ibid., p.29. 
20 P. Harling, ‘The Powers of the Victorian State’, in P. Mandler (ed.), Liberty and Authority in Victorian 
Britain (Oxford, 2006), p.26. 
21 See N. Chester, The English Administrative System 1780-1870 (Oxford, 1981), p.131. and Harling and 
Mandler, ‘ “Fiscal-Military” State to Laissez-Faire State’, p.52. 
22 PP 1857 Session 2 [2216] Report of commissioners appointed to inquire into the operation of the 
Superannuation Act, pp. xi. 
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superannuation should be defined. Was it deferred pay or simply a gift? If it was deferred 
pay, was it compensation for a lifetime worked, or money accrued and owned by workers?  
An examination of this relationship and the need to define it more carefully is crucial, 
owing to the impact that the Civil Service superannuation had on various other 
occupational schemes. Leslie Hannah has done much to identify the wide variety of 
occupational pension schemes that developed in the nineteenth century, describing the 
Civil Service scheme as ‘an important model’ for other sectors.23 In a wide ranging survey 
of schemes, Hannah argues that the growth of occupational pension schemes was 
evidence of ‘an expression of new requirements’ in labour relations.24 A move from 
paternalistic ideas and towards a desire to build trust on a basis of ‘mutual interest’.25 This 
thesis takes this analysis a step further. Trust and mutual interest are certainly important 
factors in cultivating loyalty and they were features of the emerging ideas related to 
personnel management. This is not, however, the whole story: by analysing the way 
pensions were defined and what they meant to employers and employees in closer detail, 
continuities can be seen, in addition to the greater influence of the Civil Service scheme. 
The importance of this type of analysis can be seen through the work already achieved on 
old age pensions. 
Old Age Pensions 
In the substantial historiography on old age pension debates of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century there has already been an examination of how ideas about what a 
pension was and who it was for could shift and bend. The 1878 publication of William 
Blackley’s ‘National Insurance’ article tends to be taken as the catalyst for the old age 
pensions movement, although a number of similar schemes had been suggested at various 
times since the eighteenth century.26 Macnicol has shown that despite old-age pauperism 
declining at the end of the nineteenth century, Blackley’s article fast became the centre 
of a debate focused on poverty and poor law reform.27 Associations with charity were 
never far away but neither were attempts to remove this stigma and provide a payment to 
                                                          
23 L. Hannah, Inventing Retirement: The Development of Occupational Pensions in Britain (Cambridge, 
2009), p.9. 
24 Ibid., p.22. 
25 Ibid. 
26 W. Blackley, ‘National Insurance: A Cheap, Practical and Popular Means of Abolishing Poor Rates’, 
The Nineteenth Century: A Monthly Review, 4:21 (1878), pp.834-857. An example of discussions 
regarding poverty in old age can be found in Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791 and 1792) which 
advocated an annuity for those aged over fifty, paid for by the taxation of estates. See J. Macnicol, The 
Politics of Retirement in Britain, 1878-1948 (Cambridge, 1998), p.27. 
27 Macnicol, Politics of Retirement in Britain, p.27. 
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‘which the recipient [was] worthily entitled’.28 Pat Thane’s work on the range of support 
amongst working class groups for old age pensions shows that friendly societies and trade 
unions were initially suspicious: they did not feel workers were entitled to this form of 
welfare, considering that they were, instead, entitled to a fair wage to provide for 
themselves. 29 Jose Harris has also emphasised the role of independent collectivism or 
self-help amongst the working classes, demonstrating how it was used in arguments both 
to increase and decrease state intervention.30 Overwhelmingly old age pensions were seen 
as a gift or form of charity—but one that should only be given to the deserving. The 
overarching ideology of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century provision of 
welfare was to assist those of good character who had attempted to provide for themselves 
and their family but who had fallen on hard times—and not to provide a crutch for poor 
people who were considered to be ‘feckless’.31 It was a gift, but one based on an equal 
exchange of values and morals; it could therefore be conceived of as a form of 
compensation, particularly if a contributory scheme was devised.32 Concepts of morality 
and thrift were evident in not only the ideas of who should receive the pension but how it 
should be paid for. 
However, ideas surrounding entitlement and responsibility for old age pensions changed 
once the Act had been passed and pensions began to be distributed. Martin Pugh has used 
Post Office records and newspaper reports to argue that new pensioners ‘found it 
empowering’.33 The legislation gave the pensioners power so that, rather than making 
them dependent upon it, the government was instead put into a difficult position, as it had 
to manage the responsibility of a popular reform with little opportunity for imposing 
future constraints without facing the wrath of voters.34 Instead, the government had to 
deal with pensioners’ organisations campaigning for extensions of the policy for the 
                                                          
28 From a 1879 publication by R. P. Hookham, Outlines of a Scheme for Dealing with Pauperism, which 
suggests a payment for all classes in a bid to remove any resemblance to a ‘charitable dole’, quoted in 
Macnicol, Politics of Retirement, p.28. 
29 P. Thane, ‘The Working Class and State “Welfare” in Britain, 1880-1914’, Historical Journal, 27:4 
(1984), pp.877-900. 
30 J. Harris, ‘Victorian Values and the Founders of the Welfare State’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, 78:1 (1992), p.170. 
31 Ibid., p.103. 
32 See discussions of the debate amongst reformers such as Charles Booth, who argued for non-
contributory pensions, and William Beveridge who argued for contributory pensions, in P. Thane, ‘Non-
Contributory versus Insurance Pensions 1878-1908’, in P. Thane (ed.), The Origins of British Social 
Policy (London, 1981) pp.95-101. 
33 M. Pugh, ‘Working-Class Experience and State Social Welfare, 1908-1914: Old Age Pensions 
Reconsidered’, The Historical Journal, 45:4 (2002), p.796. 
34 Ibid., p.796. 
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country’s worn-out workers and mothers, with the pension represented ‘as a reward for 
citizenship’.35 The popularity of the reform is explored specifically in Ireland by Cormac 
Ò Gráda, who argues that nowhere else appreciated or exploited the new provision quite 
as much. Compared with the other countries within the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland 
had a higher proportion of elderly poor and low wages meant that pensions went further 
than in the rest of the UK.36 Its popularity, consequently, had implications for the new 
Irish State, founded in 1921, which became as politically constrained around the welfare 
policy as the British government. These works may not explicitly reference Zelizer’s 
definitions of payment, but they can still be seen through the relationships explored by 
Thane, Harris, Pugh and Ò Gráda, as the state pensions went from being a gift to an 
entitlement, which in turn put the British and Irish governments at the mercy of the 
electorate. The power was transferred from the payee to the recipient, a development that 
had not been predicted in the policy debates leading up to the 1908 Old Age Pensions 
Act. As a parallel development, it is consequently unsurprising that views and perceptions 
of Civil Service superannuation and the relationship it represented, between government 
and civil servant, also changed as reforms were made.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century, two parallel systems of pensions had emerged. 
They were aimed at two separate groups of people: old age pensions targeted the poorest 
two-thirds of the population; and occupational pensions covered ‘a much smaller but 
more diverse group of employees’.37 Changes in the labour market had encouraged both 
systems to develop with, as Macnicol has described, technological improvements 
contributing to the ‘shaking out [of] older workers’.38 The debates over old-age pensions 
were often framed as an industrial problem, with an emphasis on problems for male 
workers (though the biggest beneficiaries of the welfare once it was rolled out would be 
women).39 Therefore, it is possibly unsurprising that several parallels can be drawn 
between the design of the two systems, aside from their aim to provide some financial 
assistance in old age. Aspects of character and morality also sat at the heart of the 
administration of superannuation. Civil servants were legally required to have served with 
‘diligence and fidelity’ to be entitled to a pension, encouraging good character and 
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behaviour. Furthermore, through the Post Office pension records it is evident that workers 
could be punished twice, once for misconduct during their working life and again through 
a deduction in their pension. This focus on morality went part of the way to shaping how 
the subsequent old-age pensioners saw themselves when they received a pension. Like 
civil servants, they were deserving and morally entitled to this payment from the state. 
Character, morality and entitlement were just some of characteristic parallels between 
superannuation and old age pensions, though the use of the word pension to refer to both 
is still striking, and it is worth examining how the words ‘pension’ and ‘superannuation’ 
have been used and defined leading up to the twentieth century. 
Meaning of a Pension 
By the start of the twentieth century there was no distinct or clear difference in how the 
words superannuation and pension were used in relation to retirement from work. Both 
words could refer to a retirement payment with no clear indication of how that payment 
had been calculated or decided upon. This was not always the case, and a brief 
examination of how the words have been used enables us to understand why certain 
parties felt strongly about their definitions and potential appropriation. 
The word pension is thought to originate from the Latin word pensio, meaning ‘payment’, 
and it came into use in England in the fourteenth century to mean a regular payment made 
for service or to retain allegiance.40 By the sixteenth century, the word ‘pension’ could be 
used to refer to an annuity or other regular payment to a retired employee, servant or 
citizen, either as a right or due to past services.41 It is this latter definition that appears to 
have had the most resilience and it is the definition of a regular payment to a retired 
employee that is most familiar to modern readers.  
In Gerald Rhodes’ work focused on public sector pensions, he suggests that up until the 
eighteenth century the word pension was associated with a source of income, not 
necessarily connected with old age or retirement but closely associated with the upper 
classes.42 This is aligned with the ideas surrounding the Civil List or Pension List—a list 
of people nominated by the monarch or state to receive an annual payment. By the end of 
the eighteenth century with the heavy financial burden of the Napoleonic Wars, these lists 
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and their placemen and pensioners were severely criticised for giving public money to 
people ‘without either ability, integrity, or National esteem’.43 As one 1793 pamphlet 
concluded: 
‘In short, as the dignity and prosperity of a nation so, according to modern calculation, 
consist in the improved condition of the people, but in the childish and expensive splendour 
of courts, in the pride and insolence of an over-grown nobility, pensioned on the public 
purse, and doubling the necessary taxation: and, above all, in the accumulation of wealth 
in a few hands, by which the prices of all commodities, and consequently the actual poverty 
and wretchedness of the many are increased.’ 
Pensions were then payments to nobility, and not necessarily earned or deserved. This 
was a view promoted and criticised by men such as Thomas Paine and William Cobbett 
who formed an important part of the radical reform movement. By the start of the 
nineteenth century, pensions were most probably understood in this way—as part of a 
corrupt system. However, pensions were already an established part of systems that 
enabled retirement payments. Norman Chester has demonstrated how the idea  that you 
could own a job role meant that state officials could sell their position or use its capability 
to extract fees to enable them to retire.44 In this sense, a pension allowed aged workers to 
stop working and it was something they felt they had a right to through their years of loyal 
service and position.45  
The definition of the word ‘superannuation’ has made the history of pensions more 
complex. The modern meaning of superannuation refers specifically to a work-related 
fund that employees pay into to gain a remuneration in retirement.46 There is a focus on 
a specific fund paid into by the recipient and, unlike pensions, it is directly linked to 
retirement. At the start of the nineteenth century, however, this was not a finite definition. 
A pamphlet from 1816 referred to all retirement payments within the Army or Navy as 
superannuation.47 Additionally, the 1810 Superannuation Act passed by government 
established a non-contributory scheme for civil servants. This Act was used to combat 
some of the criticisms surrounding ‘Old Corruption’ and the pensions given out by 
government, but it was also seen as problematic as it appeared to entitle government 
                                                          
43 Anon., Hog’s Wash: or, Salmagundy for Swine (London, 1793), p.9. 
44 Chester, The English Administrative System, p.25. 
45 Ibid., p.18. 
46 ‘superannuation, n.’, OED Online, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/superannuation 
(accessed 17 December 2017). 
47 Anon., Observations on the Wrongs of the Navy: Chiefly on Those that Most Solicit Redress (London, 
1816), p.11. 
 
18 
 
officers to a retirement payment.48 From this stage the terms ‘superannuation’ and 
‘pension’ were used interchangeably in the House of Commons. In other institutions, such 
as railways, superannuation could often refer to a system involving a superannuation 
fund, and the retirement payments made by the Bank of England were always pensions 
and not a superannuation. The East India Company maintained a dual system, clearly 
defining their pension payments as distinct to superannuation payment, even if neither 
were contributory. Superannuation was the system for employees of the Company, 
whereas pensions could be for employees or anyone else the Company felt deserved one. 
It is, arguably, through the government’s superannuation system that the idea of pensions 
as a retirement payment earned through service becomes the principal definition of a 
pension, simply because their superannuation was presented as an alternative to pensions. 
The problematic nature of the word ‘pension’ has occasionally been avoided by 
historians. C. G. Lewin does not provide a comprehensive definition of the word pension 
in his work Pensions and Insurance before 1800: A Social History, but appears to take 
the understanding that pensions are a provision for the elderly or elderly and infirm and 
describes a ‘pensions culture’ as existing from at least 1300.49 Paul Johnson’s Saving and 
Spending, on the second half of the nineteenth century, does not refer to pensions at all, 
instead focusing on the more easily defined annuities and insurance.50 These can 
obviously be types of retirement or old age provision but rather than being paid for by 
someone else or involving an employer, they are private funds which are paid into by the 
recipient.  
The meaning and use of the words ‘pension’ and ‘superannuation’ will be explored in 
more depth throughout the thesis. As the historiography on old age pensions has shown, 
ideas of entitlement are important in order to distinguish the cultural meaning and 
significance of this type of payment. The discussion in this thesis focuses on how private 
organisations established any distinctions between the ideas about pensions and 
superannuation in order to develop their definitions, the subsequent impact on the 
recipients and how government policy may or may not have influenced this.  
Civil Service and Occupational Pensions in the Nineteenth Century 
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Existing work on occupational pensions has emphasised how employers sought to 
manage a changing workforce in the nineteenth century. Alice Russell’s The Growth of 
Occupational Pensions underlines the complex relationships that grew out of the 
changing labour market of the nineteenth century, arguing that the welfare schemes that 
began to develop in this period were symptomatic of employers maintaining control of 
growing numbers of employees with increasingly specialised skill sets.51 This is 
supported by the work of historians such as Hannah and Macnicol who have demonstrated 
how occupational pensions were a tool in the changing labour market, a way to remove 
inefficient workers, improve chances of promotion and create a ‘sense of mutual interest’ 
which could encourage workers to behave.52 Furthermore, Robert Fitzgerald emphasises 
the influence of the industry’s market in shaping welfare schemes, stating that ‘Industrial 
welfare was clearly more a question of business organisation than one of philanthropy or 
social justice.’53  
The British government was at the forefront of these changes in the labour market and is 
renowned as one of the first employers in Britain to provide an occupational pension—
the result of a growing bureaucratic state that brought about new ideas of how staff should 
be managed. The social scientist Marios Raphael has probably done the most of work of 
documenting its origins and development, tracing a systematic policy for granting 
superannuation awards to a department in the Civil Service back to 1687 with the creation 
of a Public Bank of Charity for Excise officers.54 This fund was for a relatively small 
group of public servants, and consequently Raphael attributes the creation of a 
superannuation fund for landwaiters working the Port of London for the Customs 
department as a more significant development.55 Pat Thane has suggested that it was the 
responsibility of these departments to gather tax that secured this innovation. Due to their 
importance and the increase in full-time salaried staff, the relationship between employer 
and employee was changing. As Thane states, ‘departmental heads increasingly expected 
administrative loyalty and sought to encourage an ethos of public duty and private 
probity’, and this was cultivated by offering greater security at work and in retirement.56 
Raphael argues that it was the experience gained from the management of this fund that 
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formed the basis for the first legislation (passed in 1810) that stipulated all civil servants 
were entitled to a superannuation award, subject to certain criteria.57  
The Civil Service may have been a pioneer, but it was not the only employer to offer this 
type of welfare and Russell and Fitzgerald acknowledge the existence of some sort of 
industrial welfare from the eighteenth century. Fitzgerald cites the cotton mills of 
Lancashire as an area where local welfare services were provided and Russell cites the 
Crowley ironworks at Swalwell and Winlaton as examples of early retirement allowance 
schemes.58 Nevertheless, Russell stipulates that retirement pensions provided by 
employers during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were either discretionary to 
‘deserving’ individuals or through provision of the firm’s benevolent club which covered 
both sick pay and pensions, some of which were provided under legal obligation.59 
Hannah describes these types of payments as ex gratia pensions, they were essentially 
charitable gifts, but significantly they could become part of a ‘system of reciprocal 
obligations’, making these pensions something a community felt they could expect and 
were entitled to.60 One of the earliest known pieces of legislation requiring pension 
provision was passed in 1757. It compelled coalheavers working in the River Thames to 
contribute to a friendly society administered by an alderman of the City of London and it 
appears to have been passed to relieve the burden on the provision of parochial relief.61 
The state had been involved in some form of pension or superannuation administration 
for a long time but intervention, as seen for the coalheavers, was rare: on the whole 
legislation either followed voluntary action by employees or employers, or inadvertently 
affected retirement schemes.  
Contributions have formed an important part of the employment management narrative 
and were a significant part of the pensions debate, even within government. The fifty 
years following the 1810 Superannuation Act saw a number of amendments advised 
through Select Committee reports and enacted through Treasury Minutes and Acts of 
Parliament. 
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Table 1. Changes to Civil Service Superannuation 1810-1859 
Measure Year 
Act of Parliament 1810, 182262, 1824, 1834, 1859 
Treasury Minutes 1821, 1829 
Select Committee reports 1828, 1837, 1856 
Royal Commission 1857 
 
These amendments reflect the changes in attitude prevalent in the government at the time 
in addition to the perceived stability of the economy, since many focused on whether 
pensions should be contributory and how much employees should expect to receive when 
they retired. The 1859 Civil Service Superannuation Act was fundamentally important 
for enforcing uniformity across government departments, but it also set the standard 
framework for superannuation in terms of the scale of payment, conditions for eligibility 
and, importantly, abolished contributions, that would continue well into the twentieth 
century. The removal of contributions was, in part, a way to take complete control over 
the administration of the provision and was a policy advised by some actuaries in the 
twentieth century to give extra freedom in policy design to reduce the need to consult 
staff.63 Nevertheless, it did not put an end to the debates. By the end of the nineteenth 
century, civil servants were campaigning for greater consideration of family, something 
they saw as part of the commercial company superannuation schemes but neglected in 
theirs. Instead of giving the Treasury absolute control, the lack of contributions made the 
Civil Service superannuation ambiguous and debates rested on the differing definitions 
focused around ideas of deferred pay.  
The definition of pensions as deferred pay caused problems for the government and 
Treasury: they did not want civil servants to claim pensions as property or for civil 
servants’ families to have a claim on these pensions. The removal of contributions in the 
1859 Superannuation Act had intended to eliminate the claims of families as it was felt 
this was too strong a link to elements of ‘Old Corruption’.64 In 1903 a Royal Commission 
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was set the task of looking at the superannuation question and appeasing the civil servants 
who called for their pensions to be recognised as deferred pay. The Courtney 
Commission, as it became known, defined the civil servant superannuation or pension as 
‘remuneration for continuity of service contingently payable on the continuity being 
maintained during a defined period and not accruing from year to year as an indefeasible 
interest’.65 It was not deferred pay, and not accumulated money that could be claimed by 
the employee, but simply part of a contract of employment. Despite a definition that 
placed control and ownership of the pension with the Treasury, the Commission advised 
changes that granted payments to dependents in the event of a male civil servant’s death. 
The growing number of female staff members were not viewed as needing this 
requirement and when the possible changes to the pension system were put to the 
workforce, women did not vote to approve it. Civil servants may not have paid 
contributions or had their pension defined as deferred pay, but they did successfully 
campaign for changes to include provisions for male workers’ families. 
Class and retirement remuneration 
By the end of the nineteenth century, there were growing numbers of employers offering 
pension provisions for their employees, but with a clear distinction between the style of 
provisions for manual and salaried employees.66 Working classes were more likely to be 
part of independent funds through trade unions or friendly societies; salaried employees 
were more likely to benefit from provisions established by their employer. This practice 
was echoed even in the Navy where, in 1700, the first employees to receive a 
superannuation were known as warrant or standing staff and they were the only permanent 
staff.67 In addition, the growth of clerical work throughout the nineteenth century also 
encouraged pension provision as ‘office personnel were regarded as especially 
valuable’.68 This is underlined by the decision in 1881 taken by the North Eastern Railway 
Superannuation Fund that allowed salaried women, who were doing clerical work, to 
contribute to the fund under same terms as men if approved by the committee.69 There 
are obviously exceptions, for example the Northumberland and Durham Miners’ 
Permanent Relief Society was the largest private occupational pension scheme in Britain 
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for many years in the nineteenth century but, by the end of the century, even this was 
more of a friendly society as the employer’s support tailed off.70 On the whole, the 
majority of occupational pensions that originated in and were sustained through 
employer’s support were for salaried white-collared jobs. 
Nevertheless, into the second half of the nineteenth century the role of clerk was more 
closely associated with that of the lower-middle class, a social grouping that distinguished 
itself by perceived social standing rather than higher pay.71 This was a group of people 
that were socially and politically marginal: they did not earn enough to be economically 
distinguished from many artisans and skilled working class communities, but they were 
frequently politically conservative, believing their code of behaviour distinguished them 
from manual workers.72 These workers may not have been part of the poorest 
communities but, as Thane suggests, the certainty of receiving a pension would have 
changed their lives and prospects.73  
Amongst the large, bureaucratic, white-collared employers which offered pensions, some 
did offer some provisions to some non-clerical staff. In a letter to the Bank of France, 
dated 1 March 1898, the Bank of England described the pension regulations as applying 
to all officials, clerks, porters and messengers, but not, however, to ‘Agents of the 
Branches’, or mechanics and labourers, although the agents tended to be granted a pension 
(generally half their salary) after a long service, and the mechanics and labourers 
generally received a retiring allowance when old or disabled.74 However, for others a 
pension was something to which they could aspire. The East India Company’s 
superannuation scheme did not apply to labourers, but they could be promoted to the role 
of messenger or writer, both of which roles were granted pensions under the 1813 East 
India Company Act. Additionally, the Civil Service incorporated many types of 
employees, including the humble letter-carrier, a role that sat on an ambiguous boundary. 
At the turn of the century, Charles Booth described the postman as a ‘picked man’.75 Due 
to the physical and written exam required to gain his position, Booth surmised postmen 
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were probably intellectual superiors from the class they originated from even though their 
work was mechanical and monotonous.76  
Occupational pensions were growing over the course of the nineteenth century and, by 
1900, they were a benefit accessible to approximately 5% of the working population.77 It 
was a provision most readily available to clerks and, as a result, these white-collared 
workers are the particular focus of this thesis. Letter-carriers at the Post Office provide 
an exception in that they were a class of workers that was manual but also salaried: they 
provide a valuable insight into the management of the Civil Service superannuation, being 
an exception within the Civil Service. This study may not concentrate on the working 
classes, but there is much that can be taken from how historians have examined working-
class welfare, a system of financial support that tended to rely on self-help through 
friendly and benefit societies.  
Friendly and Benefit Societies 
Amongst the nineteenth-century working classes, a pension was not a high priority. 
Sickness, injury or unemployment presented a much greater risk, and it was for these 
eventualities that workers were most likely to use friendly and benefit societies to save.78 
As a result working-class savings and insurance were shaped by a culture and view of the 
world distinct from those of the middle class. Paul Johnson’s Saving and Spending takes 
its starting point as 1870 and examines the various methods used by many working-class 
people to save and manage their economic lives before the liberal reforms. Chapters on 
friendly societies, building societies and cooperatives explore the various methods used 
by the working classes to provide some financial security, attempts that were continually 
judged as indifferent and inadequate by middle-class critics due to differing priorities and 
opportunities between classes. For example, burial insurance was the most popular form 
of insurance amongst the working classes due to the social significance of a ‘good’ burial, 
however, it was persistently condemned for its ‘inefficiency and expense’ as a form of 
insurance by the middle classes.79 Furthermore, Johnson briefly explores why the Post 
Office life assurance scheme failed when other private firms were relatively successful, 
highlighting the social role of the house calls made by the life assurance agents, something 
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the General Post Office (GPO) did not provide.80 Johnson’s work may not look at 
occupational pensions, but it is useful in demonstrating the culture surrounding financial 
practices for working people. 
The importance of social ties and relationships tangled with social perceptions and notions 
of self-help come up repeatedly through the types of insurance and savings schemes that 
were successful for working people. This can also be seen in Penelope Ismay’s work on 
the Odd Fellows friendly society, an organisation that combined the traditional value of 
social relationships alongside the more modern emphasis on financial reliability and 
accountability through actuarial science.81 Ismay has illustrated how traditional and 
reformist values co-existed within the Odd Fellows Benevolent Society through the 
campaigning work of Charles Hardwick. Hardwick was an Odd Fellows member from 
Preston who became the Grand Master of the entire order, and though he was influenced 
by the growing importance of actuarial science, Hardwick was also a strong advocate for 
the benevolent nature of the Odd Fellows. He promoted the importance of sustaining the 
culture of mutual support and sociability within the work of the Society despite the 
apparent threat from this new science.82 Actuarial science and the life assurance industry 
were expanding in the nineteenth century and have been used as evidence of the success 
of a ‘bourgeois self-help ethic’ in the early Victorian period.83 Yet, even this most 
Smilesian of industries was reliant on personal relationships and emotional obligations.84 
This is particularly true in the second half of the nineteenth century when the industry 
expanded further and became reliant on doorstep finance, a market defined by Liz McFall 
as ‘sentimental in their constitution’.85 
Notably, these features of working-class finance date back further than the late-nineteenth 
century setting of Johnson and Ismay’s work. E. P. Thompson discusses friendly 
societies’ role in the eighteenth century as having a ‘strictly local and self-governing 
character’, combining insurance with social activities and regulation, and producing fines 
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for breaking certain rules.86 Thompson underlines the discipline that was required to 
maintain the friendly societies and the crystallised ethos of mutuality they advocated, 
aspects of social organisation that were carried through into the trade unions.87 This is 
markedly different to how many occupational pensions have been represented when their 
creation and management has been attributed to market forces and managing 
employees.88 However, this thesis aims to explore how old ideas of loyalty, trust and 
entitlement were maintained through occupational pension schemes. Hannah hints at this 
when he describes how motivations for occupational pensions were designed to create a 
‘sense of mutual interest’—but this can be extended, especially when the historic links 
and parallels to the Civil List can be drawn.89 
Many friendly societies did not specifically cater for the retirement of the elderly and, as 
a result, much of the historiography has not focused on this area of provision.90 P. H. J. 
H. Gosden’s The Friendly Societies in England 1815-1875, for example, only engages 
with the topic when discussing the debates surrounding the introduction of old-age 
pensions.91 Johnson notes the alternatives to friendly societies including industrial life 
assurance companies and trade unions that provided provisions for sickness, 
unemployment, burial and in some cases old age. Nevertheless, Johnson argues that 
saving for retirement was simply not a priority for the poorest working families. 
Unemployment insurance or children’s education took precedent when allocating the few 
pence left at the end of the week, particularly when many did not believe they would live 
long enough to see old age.92 For the Civil Service clerical workers there was a similar 
belief that many would not live to receive a pension, but this was used by some as leverage 
to campaign for pension reform.93 The white-collared civil servant had a much clearer 
sense of entitlement as well as a larger wage. 
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It is worth noting that the psychological belief that members of the working classes had 
a short life expectancy is supported by average life expectancies for England and Wales 
in this period. On average a person was expected to live to 41.2 years between 1861 and 
1870, rising to 46.1 years between 1891 and 1900.94 Life expectancy at birth may have 
been significantly lower than the state pension age of seventy or the Civil Service 
superannuation age of sixty, however Pat Thane has expressed caution when using life 
expectancy averages. Life expectancy at birth can be skewed by high infant mortality: 
Thane suggests that if a person survived childhood, they often had a good chance of living 
until old age, and women were likely to outlive men.95 Moreover, figures for the 
nineteenth century suggesting a historically low proportion of elderly people—from 10% 
in the eighteenth century to 7% a century later—was due to the high birth rate creating a 
greater proportion of young people within the population rather than a reduction of the 
elderly.96 There does not appear to be any statistical change that suggests people were 
living for longer or shorter periods of time in the nineteenth century. Consequently, the 
belief that many working people would not live to an old age is unfounded: many would 
have found themselves too old to work but in need of some support. 
The work on benefit societies and working-class forms of welfare has emphasised the 
importance of traditional relationships, mutual aid and community as a framework for 
these forms of economic management and transactions. In contrast, occupational pensions 
have generally been presented as a provision for the middle and upper classes, used to 
prevent corruption and to save money. There has been very little interest in how working-
class or lower middle-class employees received these types of payments, although they 
were growing in prominence towards the end of the nineteenth century. For example, in 
Lockwood’s analysis of class consciousness amongst clerical workers there is little 
engagement with the issue of occupational pensions in the nineteenth century.97 However, 
occupational pensions were based on relationships and social understandings and beliefs 
as much as benefit or friendly societies and other forms of saving or welfare. Frequently 
seen as a reflection of how the employee-employer relationship was defined and 
understood, any change to pension provision could lead to protests and employee 
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agitation was fundamental in the shaping of the Civil Service superannuation. The 
importance of the role of workers and their social and cultural understanding of 
occupational pensions increased over the course of the nineteenth century as the numbers 
of lower-middle-class and working-class employees eligible for these pensions grew.  
The Civil Service (particularly within the Post Office), the East India Company, the Bank 
of England and the railways employed hundreds of thousands of people by the turn of the 
century. The East India Company and the Bank of England were very closely linked to 
the government and had pension systems and traditions making them useful 
contemporary comparisons to the Post Office department of the Civil Service.98 The 
railways, though a new industry in the nineteenth century, very quickly became large and 
bureaucratic institutions with a large clerical workforce making them another useful 
comparison to the Post Office. Each institution had their own pension systems and a 
different relationship with the government and will therefore be the focus of individual 
case studies. Zelizer’s work on the meaning of economic transactions proposes an 
analysis from the top and the bottom as ‘economic actors simultaneously adopt 
universalizing modes and particularizing markers’.99 Where possible, insights into how 
the employees received and viewed their pensions have been taken but this can be a 
challenge where the dominant narrative of the employer is most likely to survive in 
printed sources. However, it is fortunate that the nineteenth century saw a number of 
literary figures and works emerge from the institutions under examination. Consequently, 
writers such as Anthony Trollope, former surveyor of the Post Office, Charles Lamb, 
clerk in the East India Company, Robert Browning, whose father was a clerk in the Bank 
of England and Ernest J. Simmons, a former station master for the Great Western 
Railway, have helped to broaden understanding of working for, and retiring from, these 
large organisations. Each chapter examines how these writers have given us insight into 
not only working life, but what a pension or superannuation meant for them and could 
mean for their contemporaries. Alongside interviews with parliamentary committees and 
newspaper reports the voices of more clerks and other workers can be heard. The record 
may not be extensive but it does demonstrate that even if a pension was part of regulation 
there could still be doubt about how and when it would be granted. Institutions were 
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continually attempting to keep control of their pension systems, but this was not just about 
labour management; it was also an attempt to prevent the growth of a feeling of 
entitlement, one that could grow through the extension of bureaucracy. For workers, the 
value of pensions could be questioned as they frequently did not meet their perceived 
needs, but they were also the focus of agitation and a point of contention used to challenge 
their employers’ values and principles. 
Given the size and history of these institutions it is worth taking some time to look at their 
histories, placing the role and influence of the government superannuation system in the 
context of their diverse organisational cultures. In addition, consideration of the archival 
materials that have survived from these organisations will shed light on the different 
approaches and challenges that shaped this thesis. 
The Post Office, Bank of England, East India Company and Railway pensions 
In November 1856 the British government’s Royal Commissioners newly charged with 
investigating the operation of the Civil Service Superannuation Act began to receive a 
number of letters. Many of these letters were from government departments detailing how 
they adhered to and applied the current superannuation regulation. However, three were 
from external companies giving details of their own pension provisions; this included the 
staff who were eligible, the criteria that were applied when calculating pensions and the 
number of funds operating as part of the provisions. These companies were the East India 
Company, the Bank of England and the London and North-Western Railway Company. 
The report itself did not give much reference to the evidence provided by these 
companies, but their inclusion amongst the hundreds of pages of evidence from within 
the Civil Service suggests an attempt to benchmark government policy with perceived 
similar organisations.  
However, what stands out from the details sent from these companies was the influence 
that the government had exerted upon their pension provisions. The East India Company 
simply supplied a copy of the 1813 Charter Act that stipulated that pensions should be 
provided for employees, but the Bank of England and London and North-Western 
Railway gave more detailed accounts of their pension schemes.100 Both paid out pensions 
to employees who were over the age of 65 or too infirm to work, and the payments were 
based on length of service calculated from the salaries on a fraction of twelfths. This scale 
                                                          
100 PP 1857 [2216], pp.32-34. 
 
30 
 
was based on the Civil Service superannuation scheme established in 1810 and it 
continued with some variation until a different scale was introduced after the 1859 
Superannuation Act, a direct result of the 1857 commission.101 The Bank of England even 
noted that their own system was based on the 4 &5 Will. 4. C.24 or 1824 Superannuation 
Act.102  
By the mid-nineteenth century, the British government had clearly established itself as 
the leader in providing occupational pensions, but to say that these organisations simply 
replicated government policy or, as in the case of the East India Company, followed 
orders, is too simplistic. As separate institutions each had a unique relationship with the 
government; they also had different relationships with their employees. The 
historiographies of the Bank of England and East India Company are extensive and often 
reflect on the relationship between these institutions and the British government. Both 
have been seen as arms of the state, with the East India Company explicitly absorbed 
within the British government after the 1858 East India Government Act, the year after 
the Royal Commission on superannuation was published.103 The situation was more 
complex for the Bank of England: following the Charter Act of 1819 the debate over the 
Bank’s status as a private enterprise or national bank was ignited.104 This was a debate 
that continued to rage over the course of the nineteenth century with well-respected 
economists such as Walter Bagehot on the side of nationalisation and Bank of England 
officials such as Thomson Hankey opposed. Whether a formal affiliation existed or not, 
the two institutions were similar to the British government as employers with large 
numbers of staff often spread over large areas.105 Railways were also large institutions 
with employees in numerous locations and constantly on the move. However, the railway 
industry provides a valuable contrast to the East India Company and Bank of England as 
the railways were not seen to be a government-linked institution. There were many 
railway companies each with its own style and relationship with government. 
Nonetheless, all companies had to get parliamentary approval through an Act of 
Parliament to establish a superannuation scheme. Their unique positions and their 
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relationships with the government make the East India Company, the Bank of England 
and the railway companies all interesting points of comparison to the Civil Service. Yet, 
the Civil Service was a large organisation, and it is vital to focus in on the largest and 
most diverse department for closer analysis.  
The Post Office is an important Civil Service department with which to draw a 
comparison since by the end of the nineteenth century it employed the largest number of 
civil servants in the greatest variety of roles. The history of the department has also 
resulted in its archive being held separately from other Civil Service departments within 
its own dedicated institution, the Postal Museum (formerly the British Postal Museum 
and Archive).106 Part of the department’s archive is a series of letters to and from the 
Treasury.107 Within these files are the hundreds of applications from postal workers to the 
Treasury for a pension. Following the 1859 Superannuation Act the number of pension 
applications rose significantly. In 1841 there were twenty-three applications for a 
pension; twenty years later in 1861 the number of applications had increased over 700% 
to 180.108 This increase could be attributed to the substantial growth of the Post Office 
throughout the nineteenth century. A parliamentary return from 1834 numbered 207 staff 
members in the General Post Office, London. By 1845, this had increased to 459; and by 
the time of the first Postmaster General’s report in 1854 there were approximately 2,500 
staff in the Chief Office in London.109 The London office possibly presents an extreme 
example of the growth of the department, but the type of people applying for pensions 
and how they were applying are notable. In 1841, applications for a pension were in the 
form of a letter from the Post Office’s secretary, occasionally with a letter from the 
applicant stating their case. They also often had a connection to the Post Office’s maritime 
business through packet ships and were more frequently appeals from officers’ widows. 
By 1861 a form had been developed with dedicated sections to enable the Treasury to 
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assess the application properly under the strict criteria. Applications were also being made 
on behalf of all staff members including the lowest paid letter-carriers and mail guards.  
These applications, and the Treasury’s responses, hold a vast amount of detail. They were 
relatively unchanged between 1860 and 1891 and contain information relating to work 
history, reason for retiring, number of days taken on sick leave or holiday, as well as a 
supporting statement from the secretary of the Post Office. This statement could be a 
standard set phrase ensuring the employee met the requirement of the Superannuation 
Act, that they had worked with diligence and fidelity, but it could also include more 
personalised information, ranging from a previous accident at work to indiscretions that 
were punished. It was designed to give a sense of character. These applications were the 
starting point for my doctoral research: in order to analyse them, I created a database was 
created of applications from the years 1841, 1861 and 1891, consisting of 669 records. 
Not all Treasury responses have survived but from those that have, it is evident that the 
secretary’s statement could have a significant impact on the pension received. This will 
be explored in more detail later, but the applications and database were extremely useful 
in giving a sense of how pensions were allocated in practice, outside of formal policy. 
Combined with other records held at the Postal Museum, such as instruction manuals and 
internal reports of superannuation funds or recruitment, a broader picture of policy and 
action can be determined. The Post Office was very good at saving various reports, but 
the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers archives has been most useful in obtaining 
the annual Postmaster General reports that detailed any changes and developments in the 
service, as well as the numerous returns and reports focused on the Post Office and 
comparative institutions. 
The pension applications are a mine of information both on individuals and the 
management of employees. They have been used predominantly by family historians 
who, equipped with an estimated retirement date (based on their relative’s age), can use 
the Treasury letters index to find an individual application and with it a wealth of 
information on their career history. The vast amount of material contained in these 
documents reveal numerous possibilities for historical research.110 Nevertheless, this 
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thesis aimed to answer the simple question of why these records existed at all—why had 
these occupational pensions been created and what did they mean to the Post Office 
employees? 
Occupational pensions are mentioned in the histories of the Post Office: they are referred 
to as part of the wages and benefits awarded to Post Office employees. Alan Clinton 
argues that the pensions were valued by employees: ‘in context of the nineteenth-century 
labour market the uniform, the medical facilities and the pensions helped to create the 
stability and discipline necessary for the laborious and repetitive tasks that kept together 
a system whose like have never been seen since’.111 This is supported by Campbell-Smith 
who lists the 1859 Superannuation Act as adding to ‘a range of privileges scarcely 
available to the working man anywhere else in the economy’.112 Occupational pensions 
may have been a rare benefit outside the Civil Service, the financial sector and the 
railways in the nineteenth century but, as the work of Martin Daunton has shown, this did 
not mean all employees were grateful for them. In the early 1870s, a demand for higher 
wages by employees in Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham was rejected by the 
Treasury ‘which felt “that the forfeiture of Pensions may be relied on to prevent a strike” 
’; however, the Treasury was wrong and strikes followed in Warrington and 
Huddersfield.113 Pensions were a percentage of the wage; they started at a rate of a sixth 
(or ten sixtieths) of retiring pay up to a maximum of forty-sixtieths and, if retiring due to 
ill-health before the completion of ten years’ service, a gratuity of one month’s pay for 
each year of service was paid.114 As a town postman’s wage, in 1890, could range from 
18s to 34s a week, this would have left many postmen in Booth’s bracket of poor or very 
poor.115 These pensions may have been a privilege, but it is important to ask what impact, 
if any, they had on the lives of the recipients.  
Civil servants campaigned over decades for changes to the Civil Service superannuation 
system. Industry publications—notably The Civil Service Gazette and The Post—
championed the campaign, providing editorials and reprinting petitions and other 
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campaign details. The voices of civil servants could also be heard through pamphlets and 
in the witness testimonies given to the numerous Select Committees and Royal 
Commissions. For a group of employees without formal unions, they were extremely 
vocal about their grievances, giving a detailed picture of objections to the superannuation 
system. However, the voices of the women who worked in the Civil Service and Post 
Office and their opinions on the pension system have been more difficult to pin down and 
this is an area that requires further research. For the purposes of this doctoral research, 
the pension application records have been the main source for understanding how women 
interacted with the Civil Service superannuation. 
Like the Civil Service, employment at the Bank of England and the East India Company 
has been portrayed as attractive: the pay was good and came with benefits such as a 
pension. However, recruitment was strictly through patronage and the work could be 
dull.116 Promotion and movement between departments was uncommon and often 
depended on the death or departure of senior colleagues.117 Bowen makes excellent use 
of Charles Lamb’s correspondence and diaries to produce a picture of life in East India 
House: through Lamb we see a culture of habit and institutionalisation, but also long 
hours and hard work.118 Margaret Makepeace has studied the working lives of the East 
India Company’s warehouse labourers and the benefits that were offered to them. 
Company labourers could rely on a more regular wage and fixed working hours when 
there was work to do, and from 1799 there was the possibility of joining a benefit scheme 
that paid men 1s a day when there was no work.119 However, even with over 3,000 
labourers in employment, the system of patronage was not enough to ensure the quality 
of workers and Company warehouse surgeons were employed to examine nominated 
men.120 The lower orders within the Bank of England have not received such close study, 
though both Acres and Giuseppi do refer to the porters at the Bank.121 These staff 
members give us a different perspective of the Bank of England as an employer. From 
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1697, porters were the only uniformed members of staff and in the eighteenth century the 
Gate Porter lived at the Bank alongside some of the Chief Officers, a space they also 
shared with the armed night watchmen.122 Alhough the day-to-day working lives of the 
lower-order employees were different to their better paid colleagues, their positions are 
still portrayed as desirable and they also had access to benefits such as pensions. Bank of 
England porters were not always subject to the pension frameworks for clerks; Acres has 
demonstrated that the directors were sometimes reluctant to retire those under 70 years of 
age, even if physically unable to continue their duty.123 Similarly, labourers in the East 
India Company did not have a formal pension system, but were able to claim them, though 
Makepeace suggests that pensions were granted on a case-by-case basis and never for age 
alone.124 
The dominant narrative with regard to the welfare of staff at the Bank of England and 
East India Company is one of paternalism. Funds were established and payments would 
be given to employees and these were unusual for their time: as Makepeace notes, the 
East India Company and the Bank of England were some ‘of the earliest institutions in 
England to introduce occupational pensions’.125 These pensions have been perceived as a 
generous perk of the job, but they were always at the discretion of the higher management. 
Some of the payments may appear to have been generous—a reward for long and loyal 
service—but, until formalised systems were installed, it was clear these rewards could 
not be expected. By the 1857 report on the Superannuation Act, both the Bank of England 
and the East India Company had some form of pension system in place. However, unlike 
the Civil Service, there was no formal method of applying for a pension and, as a result, 
a comparative database of individuals could not be built. The East India Company had 
formalised their superannuation system in the 1813 Charter Act.126 The records of the 
East India Company, held at the British Library, contain various ledgers related to 
pensions paid and decision books that noted any policy change for certain departments.127 
Decisions related to individual grants of pensions could be referred to in the minutes of 
the Court of Directors, or the Finance and Home Committee, but this was not uniform or 
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necessarily detailed.128 To date, no consistent information on individuals receiving or 
applying for pensions have been found. Consequently, the best source for details about 
how the East India Company developed a superannuation and pension policy resides in 
the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers in the form of returns, reports or Hansard 
transcription. As a result the analysis of the Company’s pensions are very top-down, with 
only Charles Lamb’s account offering some insight to how employees interacted with the 
system. 
The Bank of England did not have a formalised pension system until 1870: this moment 
was marked by an internal report outlining the reasons for adopting this policy and 
aligning it with the Bank’s recruitment strategy.129 Before this date, it supported 
employees and employees’ widows and orphans through a number of funds that had 
origins in the eighteenth century.130 As with the East India Company, no applications 
have survived in the archives, but the Bank did record details of individual cases within 
the minutes of the Court of Directors and the Committee of the Treasury.131 Two ledgers 
were also created listing the Bank’s pensioners between 1735 and 1829, as well as 
between 1800 and 1852.132 Though lacking the level of detail in the applications found in 
the Post Office archives, these lists have been useful in establishing the variety of ways 
pensioned employees were categorised by the Bank, also providing a list that could be 
cross-referenced with the Court of Directors’ minutes. As these sources suggest, the Bank 
dealt with pensions internally and there was little or no interaction with government or 
other institutions The years surrounding the Bank Charter Acts may have coincided with 
changes in staff management and welfare but they were not directly linked and these 
periods appear to mark times of reconsideration and change for the Bank.133 Later changes 
in the 1850s also coincided with times of protest and analysis of government 
superannuation systems.134 However, the influence of the British government may have 
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been limited as a comprehensive Superannuation Act was passed in 1859, but it would 
not be replicated by the Bank of England until 1870. 
For the railway companies, the provision of pensions was diverse, with a mix of 
contribution funds and funds provided by the employer as well as employees. The 1859 
Superannuation Act was an attempt by the British government to remove anomalies but, 
as a 1910 Board of Trade report into railway superannuation schemes demonstrates, many 
private companies operated a range of systems and funds to provide support in 
retirement.135 One of the earliest private companies to make superannuation provision 
was the Chartered Gas Light and Coke Company which started a compulsory contributory 
fund in 1841.136 However, the complexity of creating this type of fund was quickly proven 
as it was abolished in 1851; the reason for its abolition is hinted at with the subsequent 
proposal to start new fund, to which subscription would not be compulsory.137 The 1910 
Board of Trade report on railway superannuation schemes is extremely useful for gaining 
a sense of the variety and divergence of railway superannuation funds in regards to 
contributions, scale of welfare and other regulations. There were so many types of scheme 
attached to the railway companies that the committee decided to define carefully the funds 
they wanted to examine: these were the funds where the cost was ‘only in part’ borne by 
the members, with the ‘balance of the cost being met in one way or another by the railway 
companies’.138 As a result of their enquiry they found thirty-two funds fitting this 
definition, of which fifteen had been established for the officers and salaried staff, and 
the remaining seventeen for the waged staff.139 The Board of Trade had tasked the 
committee with investigating whether it was possible to merge the schemes; it concluded 
this was not possible due to the schemes’ complexity. The evidence in the committee’s 
minutes has been particularly useful in understanding, in the context of this doctoral 
research, how the railway employees and unions viewed the various provisions. 
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Disagreement has tended to be the focus in the historiography of railway pensions, partly 
due to a dominance of interest in the railway unions and their activities and partly due to 
the compulsory nature of most of the funds. This tension can be seen in the evidence 
given by Ludlow during the 1892 Royal Commission on Labour, which ‘cited 
compulsory membership of the railway societies as one of the chief causes of friction 
between the employer and the employees: “the men chafe very much under than 
obligation” ’.140 As a result, railway superannuation funds have been described as part of 
the ‘new form of social contract’, simply a mechanism to ‘bind the railwaymen more 
closely to the service of the companies’.141 Nonetheless, as the 1910 report into railway 
superannuation schemes established, railway workers did want and expect 
superannuation and they were willing to pay for it.142  
The London North-Western Railway Company and Railway Clearing House pension 
schemes are central to the present study: the London North-Western was the first railway 
company with a formal superannuation system and the Railway Clearing House provided 
the first scheme application to all railway companies. The records for both organisations 
are kept at the National Archives and—in addition to the miscellaneous files related to 
superannuation systems, including correspondence, proposed schemes and meeting 
minutes—the minute books for the Railway Clearing House Committee and the London 
and North-Western Superannuation Committee were extremely useful.143 Once again, 
individual applications were absent, though the London and North-Western 
Superannuation Fund Committee minute book included some details of some individual 
cases; on the whole, documents held by the companies were better on policy and the 
development of the schemes. Unlike the Post Office and East India Company, there were 
few parliamentary returns with details on pensions; however, there was government 
interest and so Hansard, alongside the 1910 report, provides useful context. The archives 
related to the railways are vast: it is very likely  that it will be possible to locate richer, 
more detailed information on individuals in a more expansive future research project, 
perhaps focusing on different railway companies. 
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The Civil Service superannuation had a mixed impact on these separate organisations. It 
was often the point of reference when developing a scheme, inspiring a scale, or even the 
principle of basing a pension on salary rather than contributions. However, the differences 
are important too. The Civil Service was an old institution with traditions and mechanisms 
that were partially reflected in some institutions such as the East India Company, but 
totally opposed to practices in more modern companies such as the railways. This thesis 
illuminates these similarities and differences, illustrating how the attitudes and characters 
of institutions could reflect views and cultural beliefs surrounding pensions.  
Structure of the Thesis 
The historiography of the social and cultural context for pensions and employee welfare 
in the nineteenth century has been set out. This has included consideration of a number 
of organisations that offered occupational pensions at different points in the nineteenth 
century. The Civil Service provides a useful measuring stick against which to assess other 
organisations since it was one of the first to provide a comprehensive and structured 
occupational pension that also had far reaching consequences. The first chapter examines 
the most important piece of legislation related to the Civil Service superannuation—the 
1859 Superannuation Act. It asks how the government came to decide on a non-
contributory pension system and how this sits within the framework of cultural 
understanding of pension provisions in the first half of the nineteenth century. It argues 
that this was attempting to satisfy two conflicting employment cultures: the first was the 
traditional government relationship with employees, based on loyalty and position; the 
other was the more radical idea that saw the dismantling of the Civil List and elements of 
‘Old Corruption’, one that focused on efficiency and thrift in government. Through a non-
contributory pension the government could meet both ideals, maintaining the privileges 
of a government position whilst meeting popular demands for economic reform by 
limiting who could receive it and how much they could receive.  
Chapter 2 turns to the East India Company, examining the impact of the changes and 
debates regarding superannuation on a government-linked commercial body. The chapter 
sets out the historical context for pensions within the East India Company and discusses 
how the implementation of a superannuation scheme through the 1813 Charter Act came 
about. It argues that through this Act the government was not only using another 
mechanism to assert its control over the Company but was also sharing its own cost-
effective measures for public benefit. However, despite the legal obligation to use the 
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new superannuation scheme for employees, the Company still maintained its ad hoc 
pension system, consequently maintaining two parallel means of remunerating those it 
considered suitable to receive a pension. The superannuation scheme fitted the 
government needs but did not completely satisfy those of the Company. Furthermore, the 
writing of Charles Lamb makes it possible to examine how the superannuation scheme 
was used in practice and how it was received by employees. 
By focusing on the Post Office in the third chapter, the thesis considers the impact 
pensions had on the cross-section of postal employees, suggesting that, although the 1859 
Superannuation Act was designed to help the lower-class employees as well as the higher-
class officials, it was essentially inadequate in its attempt to meet the needs of all 
employees. Nevertheless, the pensions did provide an element of prestige that was valued 
by the employees; and, although they may have been financially inadequate, the pensions 
provided an identity in retirement that would not have been possible otherwise. 
The next two chapters, 4 and 5, examine organisations that enjoyed some autonomy from 
the state. The Bank of England, though closely tied to the government, showed little 
attempt to replicate how the government operated, being confident in its own systems. 
The Bank prided itself on its paternalism but these were highly discretionary systems: 
although pensions were available, the Bank ensured workers did not feel they could apply 
easily, leaving many working into old age. Finally, the London and North-Western 
Railway and Railway Clearing House superannuation schemes are used to demonstrate 
how these ideas filtered into private companies in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. It is argued that these companies sat in a difficult position, attempting to adhere 
to the growing expectations of the clerking classes by following the example set by the 
government whilst also competing with each other. The Railway Clearing House is 
examined as the only institution to attempt a superannuation scheme that could be joined 
by all railway company employees. In addition, with a workforce permitted to organise 
and protest, railway companies could be quickly informed when these provisions were 
not adequate and, as the 1910 Board of Trade committee demonstrated, negotiations could 
leave both employees and employers dissatisfied. 
The final chapter considers the re-emergence of civil servant-led campaigning in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. It examines how Civil Service superannuation was 
defined by campaigners and the government and how ideas about deferred pay were 
significant, particularly for the families of civil servants. The 1903 Royal Commission 
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(the Courtney Commission), attempted to end the debates surrounding superannuation 
and were careful to define it as a contractual benefit—not deferred pay, but something 
earned through service. Nevertheless, changes were suggested to consider family and 
provide payment to them in the event of a civil servant’s death. It is argued that this debate 
at the end of the century was a power struggle for ownership over the civil servant pension 
and, although concessions were made, the Treasury still maintained a grip on this 
occupational benefit. 
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Chapter 1: 
From Civil List to Civil Service Superannuation 
The 1859 Superannuation Act 
 
‘…it is every day becoming more clearly understood, that the function of 
Government is negative and restrictive, rather than positive and active; being 
resolvable principally into protection—protection of life, liberty and property. 
Hence the chief “reforms” of the last fifty years have consisted mainly in 
abolitions and disenactments. But there is no power of law that can make the 
idle man industrious, the thriftless provident, or the drunken sober…’ 
Samuel Smiles, Self Help, 1859 
 
‘Supposing an assiduous and devoted public servant who has spent the best part 
of his life in the service of the State, to become suddenly incapacitated by 
disease or bodily infirmity, public opinion would not allow that such a man 
should be permitted to starve. Although the want of any provision may be 
attributable to his own improvidence, this would not be considered as 
exonerating the Government from making some special provision for him.’1 
Report of Commissioners On the Superannuation Act, 1857 
 
Samuel Smiles’ 1859 publication Self Help has become the archetypal example of the Victorian 
myth of self-improvement and social mobility without assistance from the state.2 It promoted 
a vision of ‘middle-class utopianism’, born out of the radicalism of the 1830s and 1840s that 
opposed ‘Old Corruption’ and championed self-education.3 The emphasis was on the 
                                                          
1 1857 Session 2 [2216] Report of Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Operation of the 
Superannuation Act, p.xi that led to the 1859 Superannuation Act. 
2 S. Smiles, Self Help; with Illustrations of Character and Conduct (London, 1859), p.2. 
3 For work on the radical origins of Smile’s ideology see T. H. E. Travers, ‘Samuel Smiles and the Origins of 
“Self-Help”: Reform and the New Enlightenment’, Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies, 
9:2 (1977), pp. 161-187; R. J. Morris, ‘Samuel Smiles and the Genesis of Self Help; The Retreat to a Petit 
Bourgeois Utopia’, The Historical Journal, 24:1 (1981), pp.89-109; and A. Tyrrell, ‘Samuel Smiles and the 
Woman Question in Early Victorian Britain’, Journal of British Studies, 39:2 (2000), pp. 185-216. 
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individual and their achievements. However, in the same year this book was published, a law 
was passed that appeared to oppose the ideals of the Self Help. The Superannuation Act, passed 
in April 1859 and maintained well into the twentieth century, established a pension scheme for 
all civil servants with a scale of payment that increased with every year in service, after ten 
years, and, crucially, removed employee contributions.4 Civil servants would earn their 
retirement through loyalty and long service, not through any contributory scheme and not based 
on any actuarial calculations. This was not a new idea. The first Superannuation Act had been 
passed in 1810, and just as Smiles’ ideology had its origins in early nineteenth-century 
radicalism, the Superannuation Act had its origins in the financial relationships based on 
loyalty and prestige more clearly associated with the Civil List. Smilesian codes and methods 
were undoubtedly influential and can be seen in the rise of life insurance as well as the 
superannuation schemes developed in private industry such as the railways.5 However, through 
the Civil Service example we see the persistence of an alternative approach to welfare. The 
formalised system moved pension payments away from the discretionary gift of the Civil List 
in an attempt to create an efficient, trustworthy Civil Service. However, as the report into the 
government superannuation in 1857 suggests, a quotation from which appears above, there was 
an expectation of compensation through superannuation. The Civil List was portrayed as a way 
to repay loyalty and service that had been corrupted; the superannuation maintained the ability 
to reward servants financially after a long service through a legitimate, regulated system, but 
the ideological basis of the payments continued.  
A formalised system of superannuation for civil servants had first been established through an 
Act of Parliament in 1810.6 As part of the reform movement aimed to remove forms of ‘Old 
Corruption’ such as sinecures, the first superannuation scheme introduced scales of payment 
and, although not based on actuarial calculations, it did not initially involve contributions from 
civil servants towards a central fund.7 In the next twenty years the civil service superannuation 
scheme underwent several reforms and alterations, with employee contributions often 
becoming the focus. For two years from 1822, and then again in 1829, a contributory scheme 
                                                          
4 22 & 23 Vict. c. 26 Superannuation Act 1859. 
5 T. Alborn, ‘Quill-Driving: British Life-Insurance Clerks and Occupational Mobility, 1800-1914’, Business 
History Review, 82:1 (2008), p.33. See Chapter 5, below, for further discussion of railway superannuation funds. 
6 There were Acts passed in 1822, 1824 and 1834, Treasury Minutes in 1821, and 1829 and a select committee 
report in 1828 listed in the PP 1857 Session 2 [2216], p.v. 
7 Examples of works that discuss superannuations as a way to combat ‘Old Corruption’ include N. Chester, The 
English Administrative System 1780-1870 (Oxford, 1981); M. Raphael, Pensions and Public Servants: A Study 
of the Origins of the British System (Paris, 1964); and P. Harling, The Waning of ‘Old Corruption’: The Politics 
of Economical Reform in Britain 1779-1846 (Oxford, 1996). 
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was established but, from the 1840s, when the first employees would have begun to retire under 
the conditions of this scheme, an ardent campaign from civil servants emerged, calling for 
change and the removal of contributions. A Select Committee in 1856 and a Royal Commission 
in 1857 followed and a new superannuation scheme for all Civil Service employees was 
established. This chapter examines the ideas behind the 1859 Superannuation Act and the 
campaigns that led to its creation in the context of attempts to move towards a reformed and 
more efficient government machine. 
It also highlights the continuity of attitudes that saw the use of pensions and superannuation 
schemes as a way of ensuring loyalty and longevity of service. First, it considers the use and 
application of pensions in the eighteenth century through the Civil List and other methods, 
evaluating how these were handled in the first half of the nineteenth century. The chapter then 
concentrates on the 1859 Act, its origins and aims, demonstrating aspects similar to those of 
the Civil List that focus on loyalty, negotiation and service. The role of actuarial science will 
also be examined: as a rising field of scientific analysis it began to play a larger role in many 
industries and within government; however, for Civil Service superannuation, its role was 
secondary to that of achieving the conditions desired by government for their employees’ 
retirement provision. 
Establishing a Superannuation  
In the eighteenth century, the most common way for civil servants to receive a payment in 
retirement was through the Civil List, which was also known as the Pension List. There were 
separate lists for England, Ireland and Scotland and they contained the names of people 
favoured by the monarch who were granted an allowance that could be passed on to family 
members after their death. It was considered to be a way of rewarding loyalty or gaining 
influence. The system of remuneration had a long tradition stretching back to the medieval 
period: Sir Norman Chester described it as being part of ‘distinctly pre-modern modes of 
thought’.8 The independence of these positions was installed through the ideas of property, 
positions could be sold or deputised as the holder felt fit, and in addition to their salary they 
could also charge a number of fees. 9 Fees were normally in return for a service performed in 
the capacity of that office; they gave the holder the ability to employ others and—importantly 
for the present topic—retire. As Chester puts it: 
                                                          
8 W. D. Rubinstein, ‘The End of “Old Corruption” in Britain 1780-1860’, Past & Present, 101:1 (1983), p.59. 
9 Chester, Administrative System, p.18. 
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‘The holder still needed an income in his old age and if he had given the main years of 
his life in faithful public service it was considered just that he should continue to be 
provided with the wherewithal on which to live, and where necessary, make provision 
for his family.’10 
Along with sinecures, reversions, useless posts and granting of contracts to allies, the Civil 
Lists came to be seen as part of ‘Old Corruption’, a distinctive feature of government that was 
becoming less acceptable.11 By the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth 
century, radicals such as William Cobbett started campaigning against these distinctive and 
reprehensible features of government, targeting ‘Old Corruption’ and its characteristics such 
as the Civil List and the idea that positions were property. The annual publication of the Civil 
Lists was used by pamphlets (such as George Kearsly’s Thoughts, English and Irish, on the 
Pension-List of Ireland, and John Wade’s Black Book) as evidence of abuse.12 Kearsly’s 
pamphlet looks specifically at the Irish Civil List calling it a ‘heterogeneous catalogue of 
English, Dutch, French, German, Scotch and Irish names’, suggesting that many of the 
recipients were not based in Ireland; to underline the burden of the cost of the pension he 
describes the money as being squeezed ‘out of the bogs, or extracted chymically from potatoes 
of that unfortunate country’.13 Wade was critical of all the ‘irregular’ emoluments given by the 
government, including the Civil Lists, and although Philip Harling is sceptical of his 
calculations, seeing them as ‘exaggerated and misleading’, Wade promoted a view that nothing 
but the total abolition of these practices would do.14 Support was gained from gentlemen 
landowners and radicals such as Admiral Cochrane, who believed that the war against France 
was right, but that it was hindered by financial mis-management. Cochrane argued that:  
‘wartime financial and administrative practices were not only bleeding taxpayers dry, but 
actually hurting the war effort itself, by wasting much public money on greedy political 
insiders, and converting many of the peoples ostensible representatives in the Commons into 
the pawns of the government.’15  
Cochrane had enjoyed successes during the French Revolutionary war; he blamed the lack of 
British military success on a system of corruption, singling out individuals such as Lord Arden 
                                                          
10 Ibid., p.18. 
11 Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, p.1. 
12 G. Kearsly, Thoughts, English and Irish, on the Pension-List of Ireland (London, 1770). Also Wade’s Black 
Book, discussed in Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, pp.143-147. 
13 Ibid., pp.3 and 12. 
14 Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, pp.144-147. 
15 Ibid., p.102. 
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whose sinecure, he claimed, was worth as much as compensation pensions for 1,022 Captains’ 
arms or 488 pair of Lieutenants’ legs.16 The arguments against these payments were not just 
about class or taxpayers, but emotive ones concerning national pride and winning the war 
against France. Unsurprisingly, it was the argument for a more efficient war machine that made 
the Pitt ministries start to consider reform.17 Harling attributes the 1807 Committee on Public 
Expenditure to a shift in the elite’s attitude towards the use of public office, and the period 
between 1806 and 1815 saw the gradual reforms of sinecures, reversions and pensions.18 The 
Tory ministries combined the English, Scottish and Irish Civil Lists and put restrictions on the 
maximum amount that could be paid. Similar to the restrictions put on to the sinecures and 
reversions, they could no longer be passed on to family members upon death. 
Yet, through the arguments in favour of sustaining aspects of the Civil List, it is clear that, for 
many in government, the List alongside sinecures and reversions was seen to perform an 
important social function. These features of ‘Old Corruption’ were not only used to secure 
power and influence for the propertied classes, but a mechanism to reward loyalty and help 
support those who had fallen on hard times, without humiliating them. This function was 
deemed so important that part of the reason the Perceval ministries initiated the 1810 
Committee on Public Expenditure was to defend sinecures on this principle.19 Nevertheless, an 
alternative solution was provided through the Superannuation Act of 1810. Harling sees this as 
significant in that it solved two problems: it stopped the older, fragile workers from having to 
work until they died, freeing up roles for younger, energetic officers; and it also made the role 
of other ‘irregular’ emoluments untenable.20 However, despite the changes of 1810, criticism 
of the Civil List persisted as, in many ways, the principles instilled within the Civil List had 
been defended through the reform. The radical newspaper Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register 
regularly listed the recipients of pensions and grants: in 1817, the newspaper adamantly 
protested that it had ‘not included here one single person, who has any pretention to public 
merit of any kind whatsoever’.21  
The desire not to provide a crutch for people who should be capable of self-help can be seen in 
the arguments surrounding reforms of the government pension or superannuation schemes in 
                                                          
16 Letter from Lord Cochrane to the Westminster Electors in Political Register, 22, Col. 605 (7 November 
1812), p.599. Referenced in Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, p.102. 
17 Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, p.107. 
18 Ibid., p.108. 
19 Ibid., p.110. 
20 Harling, Waning of ‘Old Corruption’, pp.118-119. 
21 Cobbett's Weekly Political Register (London), Issue 22, 30 August 1817. 
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the first half of the nineteenth century. Reforms in the 1820s and 1830s sought to adjust the 
misconception that an Act passed in 1810 gave officers an absolute right to a pension. The 
1828 Select Committee was particularly concerned that the Superannuation Act ‘assumed the 
character of a right rather than of an application for a favour, and they could not be resisted by 
the executive authority, except upon the ground of positive demerit’.22 The committee clearly 
felt that pensions should be considered on a case-by-case basis and consequently they 
suggested the adoption of stricter medical conditions that included the need to provide a 
medical certificate, and also that the Treasury’s discretionary powers should be exercised.23  
Pensions were a contentious issue with many negative connotations in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Through the Civil List the idea of a payment or support from government 
in old age or ill-health was seen as burdening society. These ideas fed into other uses of the 
word pension, related to the workhouse and charity, but they also impacted upon the 
development of government superannuation.24 Employee contributions remained central to 
how these pensions were defined by government with clear confusion over whether employees 
should financially contribute to the scheme in a similar way to principles seen in friendly 
societies. However, by the 1850s there was growing concern surrounding the Civil Service 
superannuation scheme and protests led to a Royal Commission which investigated the issue. 
The next section will look at these protests and the inquiries into superannuation more closely. 
Campaign for change to Civil Service Superannuation 
On 26 March 1844, an exchange between Sir George Staunton, MP for Portsmouth, and the 
Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, was to spark a civil-servant campaign that would eventually 
lead to the 1859 Superannuation Act. Staunton appealed to Parliament to provide a pension for 
the female relatives of the Revd Dr Robert Morrison and his eldest son John Robert Morrison, 
two men who had ‘rendered eminent public services’ in China and had died in service.25 His 
                                                          
22 PP 1828 [490] Third report from the Select Committee on the Public Income and Expenditure of the United 
Kingdom Superannuations, &c., p.13. 
23 Ibid., p.13. 
24 The negative use of the word ‘pension’ can be seen in nineteenth-century pamphlets: for example in 1823 the 
Revd C. D. Brereton went even further, describing a ‘system of pensions’ through the provision of ‘flour 
money’ to a number of labourers in his parish. See C. D. Brereton, A Practical Inquiry into the Number, Means 
of Employment, and Wages, of Agricultural Labourers (Norwich, 1823), p.6. A 1828 pamphlet described 
prisoners and people in poor houses as ‘pensioners on the public bounty’: see Anon., Use of the Dead to the 
Living (London, 1828), pp.51-52. 
25 Hansard House of Commons Debate, 26 March 1844, vol. 73, cc1574-87. 
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appeal listed the extraordinary achievements and merits of both men including the value their 
negotiations and translations had brought the British government.26 He concluded: 
‘These two individuals had performed eminent services, had sacrificed their lives in the cause of 
their country. Their family, therefore, it appeared to him [Staunton] that they had a most powerful 
claim upon Parliament’ … ‘although not in a state of destitution, he considered that their means 
were totally inadequate to maintain them in the station which they ought to occupy in the 
country’.27  
This call for support was not an appeal to the sympathies of Parliament for a poor and destitute 
widow but it was based on the sacrifice and work of the men in public service. Sir Robert Peel 
was quick to respond and, although he acknowledged the remarkable high character of both 
men, he clearly set out that ‘Parliament had allotted no means of making provision for their 
widows or female relations’.28 He continued that ‘the principle held was that it was their duty, 
out of those [liberal] salaries, to make provision for their widows or relatives’.29 Peel’s position 
may appear to have been clear as the matter was quickly dropped. However, his rebuttal was 
not strong enough and some interpreted Peel’s argument as projecting regret that the 
government made no provision for the widows and orphans of public servants, in contrast to 
the policy towards military families.30  
The expectation that civil servants should make provision out of their salaries for their families 
through private insurance provoked anger amongst many, because they were already paying 
proportions of their salary to the government. Since a Treasury Minute of 1829 and subsequent 
Act of Parliament in 1834, many civil servants appointed after 1829 were expected to pay 
towards their superannuation through a deduction from their salary. The system that resulted 
saw a variety of provisions in place. Those employed prior to 1829 did not pay deductions and 
                                                          
26 Revd Dr Robert Morrison had gone to China as a missionary but was later employed by the East India 
Company, transferring to the Crown as Chinese secretary when the Company’s Charter had expired. He worked 
as an interpreter and negotiator but he also authored a voluminous Chinese and English dictionary, as well as 
translations of the New Testament into Chinese. John Robert Morrison took up his father’s role as Chinese 
secretary after his death and was considered to have an important role in the Treaty of Nanking (1842), which 
ended the first opium war, due to his knowledge and understanding of the Chinese language and people. See R. 
Douglas, ‘Morrison, Robert (1782–1834)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/19330 (accessed 31 March 2018); J. Starr, ‘Morrison, John Robert’. Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/19327 (accessed 31 March 2018); and HC 
Deb, 26 March 1844, vol. 73, cc1574-87. 
27 HC Deb, 26 March 1844, vol. 73, cc1574-87. 
28 Ibid. c.1582. 
29 Ibid.  
30 PP 1856 [337] Report from the Select Committee on Civil Service Superannuation, together with the 
proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index, p.78. 
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could look forward to a superannuation; those employed after 1829 could face a deduction from 
their salary of 2.5% when earning up to £100 a year, and 5% thereafter, though a few classes 
could claim a pension without suffering deductions (including London letter-carriers and mail 
guards in the Post Office, as well as Lords of the Chancery). In addition, the introduction of 
income tax in 1842 could see a further deduction to salaries. Consequently, in 1846, a 
Committee of civil servants was formed to campaign for the reform of the Superannuation 
Fund.31 Richard Madox Bromley, a civil servant in the Admiralty, was appointed chairman and 
the membership included representatives from thirty government departments.32 
Through Bromley the committee had a formidable and efficient chairman. Bromley had joined 
the Admiralty in 1829 and was quickly acknowledged for his financial skills and efficiency. 
The same year in which he became chairman of the civil servants’ committee, he was appointed 
by Lord Auckland to investigate the economic management of dockyards and shortly 
afterwards he was named as accountant to the Burgoyne Commission on the Irish famine.33 
These roles cemented his reputation within parliament and he was frequently called upon 
during special commissions of inquiry into public departments.34 Outside of his official work 
Bromley was just as efficient regarding enquiries into the Civil Service superannuation scheme, 
leading his committee in agitation through meetings and the printing and circulation of papers. 
By 1856, he could claim the support and signatures of between 3,000 and 4,000 civil servants 
on a petition to the Chancellor of the Exchequer calling for further investigation into the 
operation of the superannuation system.35 
In 1853 the activities of the civil servants against the superannuation system took a new 
approach with the launch of their own newspaper, the Civil Service Gazette. The Gazette did 
not champion one topic, but superannuation was deemed so important it became the focus of 
its first issue. The leading article, titled the ‘Superannuation Fund’, declared that this grievance 
was the greatest proof of the need for a journal like the Gazette.36 The opening address of the 
new weekly publication set out the aims of the journal to ‘give force and expression to the 
voice of our clients’, a class of people forced by their employment to be ‘tongue-tied’ and 
‘silent’, stopped even from voting and having their grievances taken to Parliament on their 
                                                          
31 Ibid., p.78. 
32 Ibid., p.78. 
33 M. C. Curthoys, ‘Bromley, Sir Richard Madox (1813–1865)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 (https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/3511, accessed 30 September 2015). 
34 Ibid. 
35 PP 1856 [337], p.79. 
36 Civil Service Gazette, 1 January 1853, p.10. 
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behalf—the journal hoped to provide a gateway to the House of Commons and a mouthpiece 
to air troubles as well as joys.37  
Bromley’s committee and the Civil Service Gazette’s criticism against the Superannuation 
system was that it was unfair, the scale of pensions was not sufficient and the deductions from 
salaries were ‘oppressive’.38 Of these grievances it was the deductions and their neglect to help 
provide for civil servants’ widows and orphans that provoked the greatest distress. In 1848, the 
committee had sought the advice of William Farr, a civil servant in the General-Registrar office 
who was well known for his statistical skills. That year, based on information supplied by the 
committee, Farr presented a paper to the Statistical Society of London entitled ‘Statistics of the 
Civil Service of England with Observations on the Constitution of Funds to provide for 
Fatherless Children and Widows’ which suggested that the deductions from salaries would be 
better used in establishing a fund not for retiring employees, but for the families left after the 
death of the civil servant.39 Using Farr’s findings, the committee organised a petition and a 
deputation on Prime Minister Lord Russell calling for a ‘Civil Service Provident Fund’.40 The 
importance of this line of argument was such that the first issue of the Gazette published in 
1853 reprinted the 1848 petition from civil servants asking for the deductions from salaries for 
the superannuation fund to be put towards a provident fund for widows and orphans of civil 
servants.41 Included with the petition were a number of important ‘facts’ that lay at the heart of 
the argument, they reasoned that ‘according to the ordinary laws of mortality’, only ten out of 
one hundred men would receive any superannuation at all as men had to be aged sixty-five or 
over to retire.42 Moreover, a return from 7,964 civil servants demonstrated the great cost of 
neglecting their dependents. The vast majority were married, with the number of wives totalling 
5,369, and the number of dependents was more than trebled when the civil servants’ 16,331 
children, including 10,506 who were under 15, were counted. They calculated this would have 
potentially left over 20,000 women and children without any assistance in the current system.43 
                                                          
37 Civil Service Gazette (CSG), 1 January 1853, pp.8-9. 
38 PP 1856 [337], p.79. 
39 W. Farr, ‘Statistics of the Civil Service of England with Observations on the Constitution of Funds to provide 
for Fatherless Children and Widows’, Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 12 (1849), pp.7-52. 
40 W. Farr, Remarks on a Proposed Scheme for the Conversion of the Assessments Levied on Public Salaries 
Under Act 4 & 5 Will IV. Cap. 24. into a ‘Provident Fund’, for the Support of the Widows and Orphans of Civil 
Servants of the Crown (London, 1849), pp.3-4. 
41 CSG, 1 January 1853, p.7. 
42 Ibid. By 1843, the first English Life Table was published based on the returns of births, marriages and deaths 
in England, and a committee of actuaries had also produced an insured life table using statistics from seventeen 
life assurance companies. See C. Walford, ‘History of Life Assurance in the United Kingdom 1825-1843 VI’, 
Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, 26 (1886), p.310. 
43 CSG, 1 January 1853, p.7. 
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As evidence that there was still support for this view, the issue also carried a letter calling for 
the deductions to go towards an insurance company rather than a superannuation fund.44  
For these civil servants it felt very unfair that provision was given from the public purse to the 
widows and orphans of the country’s most numerous holders of pensions—military and naval 
personnel—whilst their own deductions did not. In his evidence to the 1856 Select Committee, 
the statistician and civil servant William Farr presented the case of the widow of J. L. Smith, 
former surveyor of taxes at Worcester, who had been left destitute following his death. Mrs 
Smith was able to find relief from her deceased husband’s colleagues, but felt strongly that the 
‘government ought to make some allowance for the widow and infant children of civil as well 
as of military officers’.45 Army and navy personnel had been eligible for a pension due to long 
service or disability from the mid-seventeenth century with the establishment of the Chelsea, 
Killmarnoch and Greenwich hospitals. These institutions, based in London and Dublin, 
administered pensions for thousands of soldiers and sailors who were both out-pensioners, as 
well as residents of the hospitals. In the 1720s, Chelsea Hospital was managing the pensions 
for over 25,000 men; by 1842, when the War Office took over administration of out-pensioners, 
they totalled 80,000.46 Widows were also eligible for certain benefits upon application to the 
War Office, however, this was severely restricted to the ‘on the strength’ wives, which 
amounted to only 4-6% of the total military marriages.47 To have this status a soldier had to 
gain approval from his regiment before getting married, and without it his wife and children 
were not officially recognised and illegible for any benefits. Two years before the Select 
Committee on Civil Service Superannuation in 1856 the lack of support for the majority of 
military widows and orphans who were ‘off the strength’ resulted in the establishment of the 
Patriotic Fund.48 Mrs Smith, whose situation was used by Farr in his evidence, was certainly 
referring to the provision made for the ‘on the strength’ widows, but he may also have been 
aware of the growing public concern for all military widows and may have considered civil 
widows needed greater recognition.  
                                                          
44 Ibid., p.11. 
45 PP 1856 [337], pp.185-6. 
46 C. Nielsen, ‘The Chelsea Out-Pensioners: Image and Reality in Eighteenth-Century and Early Nineteenth-
Century Social Care.’, PhD Thesis, (Newcastle University, 2014), p.98 & J. E. Cookson, ‘Alexander Tulloch 
and the Chelsea Out-Pensioners, 1838-43: Centralisation in the Early Victorian State’, English Historical 
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47  J. Lomas, ‘ “Delicate Duties”: Issues of Class and Respectability in Government Policy towards the Wives 
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Families of civil servants had also been a key feature of the Civil List pensions, and the small 
number of families still receiving payments in the mid-nineteenth century provided proof that 
these provisions had frequently been achieved by civil servants through bargaining and 
negotiation. The 1837 list of pensioners on the Civil List included a number of cases where 
individuals had secured provision for their family from government at the cost of their own 
financial remuneration. For example, Robert Jennings, a chief clerk to the auditor of the 
Exchequer, ensured his family was given a pension by refusing a pay rise.49 As a result, in 1837 
his widow Ann Jennings received £252 a year and his son Robert John Jennings, who was 46 
years of age, received £151 a year. In another case a public servant took a temporary 
appointment at the cost of their permanent public appointment to secure a Civil List pension. 
The husband of Harriet Margaret King had been a barrister who had accepted a position under 
the Secretary of State on the condition that provision was made for his wife; as a result, in 
1837, Harriet King was receiving £431 a year at the age of 72.50 One of the central criticisms 
of the Civil List was its tendency to be extended to wider family but, through the 
superannuation reforms, deductions from salaries without a provision for families provoked 
widespread resentment amongst civil servants. 
Provisions for family members following a civil servant’s death and the use of contributions 
were the central concerns during the civil servants’ superannuation campaign in the 1840s and 
1850s. Influenced by provisions made for the military, as well as the Civil List system, they 
were able to agitate and provoke discussions on how a pension should be administered and 
distributed. Through the work of the Civil Service Gazette and the committee led by Richard 
Bromley their grievances were published in The Times, which described the 1834 
Superannuation Act as ‘a gigantic swindle’ and also presented to the Statistical Society of 
London.51 This two-pronged attack shone a light on the large discrepancies in salary within the 
Civil Service and advocated that government servants should be viewed as, and work together 
as, one body of employees. It may not have been a widespread popular movement, but the civil 
servants knew who to target and their voices were loud. The agitation was eventually answered 
in 1856 when the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Cornewall Lewis brought a bill to the 
House of Commons to alter the scale of pension payments. This attempt to change a small part 
of the superannuation provision resulted in a Select Committee in 1856, a Royal Commission 
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in 1857 and a new Superannuation Act in 1859 that eventually removed contributions. The 
Gazette continued to follow the discussions on superannuation, but Bromley’s committee was 
dismantled in February 1856 when the Select Committee was called, considering their aim had 
been achieved. They were not a challenge to the establishment; they just wanted their 
grievances acknowledged. 
Indeed, the place of civil servants within the establishment meant that they never questioned 
their entitlement to a pension from their employers. As Bromley stated in his evidence: ‘We 
consider that the State itself ought to provide for its worn-out servants’, but the system they 
presently toiled under did not provide that support.52 Far from creating a system on the principle 
of mutuality, the deductions suffered by civil servants were based on ‘the principle of a tontine, 
that a great many gentlemen shall put in a certain sum, and the longest liver shall derive the 
benefit’.53 As a group of employees they were part of the government system that had 
traditionally given a pension to employees. Reforms meant that how these employees were 
managed was changing and pensions were part of the reform, but it was the civil servants 
themselves that pushed for a reassessment of how superannuation should be viewed and 
administered. This chapter now turns to focus on the discussions that formed the 1859 
Superannuation, an Act that would establish the principles of Civil Service pensions for almost 
a hundred years. 
Debates surrounding the 1859 Superannuation Act 
‘I am sure that every Member of this House, casting aside those old prejudices which 
used to be entertained against placemen merely as such, will admit the great importance 
to the due conduct attributed to the Government of the country’s permanent civil 
service… The civil service connected with the administrative departments at home is 
equally important to the due conduct of our public affairs; and those Gentlemen who 
give an unpaid attention to the business of the State as Members of this House, will, I 
am sure, be not slow to recognise the valuable assistance which the stipendiaries in the 
civil service render to them in the discharge of their public duties.’54 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis, House of Commons Debate, 15 February 1856 
Addressing the House of Commons in February 1856, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir 
George Cornewall Lewis, asked its members to listen to the grievances of their civil servants. 
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He emphasised that the permanent Civil Service was not the same as the numerous sinecures, 
placemen and pensioners the reform parliaments of the 1830s had worked hard to diminish and 
there was value in giving financial support to this ‘so respectable, and so public-spirited a body 
of men’.55 By 1856 this ‘respectable’ body of men had been agitating for change in how 
superannuation payments were administered and paid for nearly a decade. Many MPs were still 
committed to tight economic controls on administration and any change to superannuation in 
the 1850s was a slow process. Nevertheless, a radical Act was passed in 1859 that combined 
the ideas of the reforming Civil Service with older ideas based on payment for loyalty and 
service.  
The 1850s had seen a shift in attitudes towards the Civil Service, culminating in the creation 
of the Civil Service Commission in 1860 which transformed how civil servants were recruited, 
examined and promoted. Following an influential report written by Sir Stafford Northcote and 
Charles Trevelyan in 1853, the Civil Service was moving from an institution built on patronage 
to a burgeoning meritocracy. This change in emphasis, alongside persistent concerns over the 
government’s economic management due to the Crimean War and financial crisis, kept debates 
on deductions from employees’ salaries towards their pensions at the forefront. However, the 
desire to enforce this rule was softening as pensions, as a principle, were argued to be more 
important. Almost all MPs and civil servants acknowledged that civil servants needed and 
deserved pensions but, speaking in 1856, the Chancellor of the Exchequer still felt it was 
important to create a distinction between the placemen and pensioners of the Civil List and the 
professional Civil Service. The complexity of issues, and the balancing of new and traditional 
values alongside questions of finance and a growing and varied Civil Service, meant that both 
a Select Committee of MPs and a Royal Commission (of civil servants, MPs and the Governor 
of the Bank of England) were needed to examine the question.  
The deductions made to civil servant salaries because of the 1829 Treasury Minute and 1834 
Superannuation Act were central to the debates on Civil Service superannuation in the 1850s, 
but the government took a different viewpoint to that of the civil servants. The activities of 
Bromley’s committee of civil servants and the Civil Service Gazette demonstrated that the issue 
of families and financial support for widows and orphans were the employees’ main concern. 
However, the families of civil servants were not seen as important to MPs: for them the issue 
of deductions had more to do with the cost of superannuation and salaries. In numerous 
                                                          
55 Ibid., c.871. 
 
55 
 
parliamentary debates the history of superannuation was recounted and it was often reiterated 
that deductions were introduced ‘so that the public may not eventually have to bear any part of 
the expense of these allowances’.56 The importance of this was repeated throughout the debates, 
particularly by MPs who had been serving at the time of the 1834 Act. This included Sir Francis 
Baring and Sir James Graham who argued that employees post 1829 must have known about 
the conditions of service, which included salary deductions, and cautioned against the removal 
of deductions without due consideration as many salaries had been calculated with the 
deductions in mind.57 Another MP who opposed any change to the pension system was Henry 
Rich, MP for Richmond and Liberal Party whip from 1846 to 1852. Rich argued that the Civil 
Service was better paid than the Army, the Navy or the Church and that MPs should not be 
‘swayed by the clamour or complaints’.58 He felt that the agitation originated from the change 
of the class of people taking public office: the middle-class gentlemen who were formally 
holders of sinecures were now seeking employment in the Civil Service but taking positions 
below an older class of officers on higher salaries. This older class, having been in position 
before 1829, paid no contributions towards superannuation and Rich saw the agitation as a 
symptom of natural envy excited within the new class combined with their growing numbers.59 
Nonetheless, there was a growing number of MPs who advocated the removal of deductions, 
following the civil servant rhetoric that it was a tax. Speaking in 1856 Benjamin Disraeli 
described the history of superannuation as ‘the history of spoliation’, suggesting that every 
piece of legislation that had been passed concerning superannuation in the preceding fifty years 
had been inadequate.60 The injustice of deductions from some employees was articulated by 
John Arthur Roebuck stating that ‘one class was now taxed for the benefit for all three’, 
referring to the higher and lower class employees who were exempt from deductions but 
entitled to pensions.61 Furthermore, Sir Stafford Northcote challenged the notion that new 
employees would know about the deductions or how they were being managed, stating that 
‘civil servants generally were not aware of what had taken place in Parliament in 1834’.62 As 
                                                          
56 Ibid., c.876. 
57 Ibid., cc888-890 & cc.892-894. 
58 Ibid., c.886. 
59 Hansard, HC Deb, 29 June 1857, vol. 146, cc557-63. 
60 Hansard, HC Deb, 15 February 1856, vol. 140, c.887. 
61 Ibid., c.890. 
62 Ibid., c.891. 
 
56 
 
one of the authors of the 1853 report on the Civil Service, Northcote was also quick to highlight 
the importance of pensions ‘to get good servants … as a matter of true economy’.63 
The Select Committee appointed to look at the superannuation question was formed in 
February of 1856 and produced their report in July of that year. Between 25 February and 7 
May they examined twenty-one witnesses ranging from members of the Treasury to 
representatives of the Civil Service Committee, as well as actuaries from private insurance 
companies. The committee members included those of varying opinions, notably Sir Stafford 
Northcote and Henry Rich, as well as Sir Francis Baring who was both a member of the 
committee and a witness due to his role in the 1834 Act.  The focus of the Committee was to 
examine a Bill proposed to amend the 1834 Superannuation Act and it concluded that 
deductions should be abolished followed by a revision of salaries. The Committee also made 
it clear that it was their belief that civil servants had a right to a pension. Lord Stanley suggested 
a resolution that stated ‘that it is the duty of Government to provide adequate pensions for 
superannuated Civil Servants’, though caution led to an amendment to the wording that was 
less forthright in its suggestion of entitlement.64 The committee agreed ‘that the practice of 
providing Superannuation Pensions for Members of the permanent Civil Service is based on 
sound principles of policy’. 65 By replacing ‘duty’ with ‘policy’ the Committee was attempting 
to maintain control over the provision, using ambiguity to give future parliaments room to 
manoeuvre—but it also demonstrates the Committee’s indecision. 
The lack of clear and practical conclusions from the Select Committee, despite the large range 
of evidence gathered, resulted in a new tactic from the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Royal 
Commission was appointed in November 1856.66 This Commission had six members, 
including Charles Stanley Viscount Monck, the Queen’s cousin, Edward Lord Belper, Sir 
Edward Ryan, Sir Alexander Young Spearman (Baronet), and Thomas Matthias Weguelin 
Esq., the Governor of the Bank of England. Viscount Monck was the only member to have also 
been a part of the Select Committee, which may have been useful considering no new witnesses 
were called. Additional evidence consisted of reports from government departments, additional 
statistics, copies of various laws, and correspondence with the Bank of England, the East India 
Company and the North Western Railway as to their pension provision. The men had a range 
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of backgrounds, but strong connections to government and the Civil Service; even Weguelin 
who had been serving as Governor of the Bank of England from 1855 would later stand as MP 
for Southampton in 1857.  
Two notable civil servants within the Commission were Sir Edward Ryan and Sir Alex Young 
Spearman. They could easily have been of the older class of civil servant Henry Rich had 
described, employed before 1829 and in respectable positions, however they brought 
interesting and differing perspectives. Sir Edward Ryan had started his career as a judge in 
India, eventually rising to the appointment of Chief Justice in Calcutta.67 In 1843 he returned 
to England due to ill-health and in 1855 he became one of the first unpaid commissioners of 
the new Civil Service Commission. This position was secured through Trevelyan and 
Macaulay, old friends from his time in India, and it placed Ryan at the forefront of reform 
within the Civil Service.68 Spearman had also been part of Civil Service reform but from an 
alternative standpoint. He had entered public service in 1808, aged just eighteen, and his career 
trajectory included the positions of Chief Clerk, Auditor of the Civil List, Controller of the 
Stationery Office and then Assistant Clerk of Revenue in the Treasury.69 In February 1831 
Spearman was appointed Auditor of the Civil List and in 1836 he was promoted to Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury. This would have given Spearman extensive knowledge of workings 
of this old system of remuneration as well as the reforming attitudes towards pensions.70 
Though Spearman had also experienced first-hand the value of a supportive employer when he 
fell ill due to over work in 1840, he spent the subsequent ten years in virtual retirement but was 
able to return to public service in the National Debt Office in 1850.71 Though the membership 
of the Royal Commission did not stray far from government and the Civil Service, they did 
represent the changing and reforming character of public service over the previous fifty years. 
There was also extensive legal experience amongst the members with at least half of them 
having trained in law or served at the bar.72 
Due to the members’ experience and expertise the Royal Commission expressed their findings 
with less caution than the Select Committee and they stated that deductions should be removed 
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without salaries being altered. This was justified through the large number of anomalies they 
found stretching across the Civil Service. It appeared that across and even within departments 
employees were paying different rates of deductions, with the Post Office given as a specific 
example where officers based in the  
‘establishments of London, Edinburgh, and Dublin, are charged with deduction, and 
are entitled to superannuations. The similar officers in the Post Officers of Liverpool, 
Manchester, and Glasgow, neither pay deduction nor receive superannuation, though 
the Post Office establishments in these towns are not less important, in point either of 
business or revenue, than those of Edinburgh and Dublin.’73  
There was an even bigger problem regarding the lower classes of officers who made no 
contribution to the pension they were entitled to. Their wages were so low that any deduction 
made towards a pension would deem that wage as inadequate. Wages were not within the remit 
of the Commission, and there had even been a preceding Select Committee that had examined 
and adjusted salaries, particularly at the Post Office salaries.74  Unable to increase the wages 
of the lower orders, the logical step was to remove contributions for all employees, but this was 
not the only reason. 
By removing deductions, the Commission aimed to end the civil servant’s sense of property 
over the superannuation award. This would remove any claim on the award from an employee 
who left the service or from his family if the employee died.75 The reluctance to pay out to 
relatives was probably another money saving policy, but there was also confidence that public 
opinion would not go against the government if deductions were removed. 
‘It is true that sympathy has of late years been excited in favour of some claims for 
assistance made by the widows of deceased Civil Servants; but in these cases the 
applications were grounded, not upon a general claim for provision as widows of Civil 
Servants, but on the fact that their husbands had made large contributions under the 
name of dedications to a supposed fund, from which they had themselves received no 
benefit, and on which it was, therefore supposed that their families might have an 
equitable claim.’76 
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For some members of the Commission, such as Spearman, the connection between passing 
‘irregular’ emoluments to family members was too closely aligned to ‘Old Corruption’ and 
great expense to the government. It was felt that the majority of civil servants were paid enough 
to set up life insurance policies to safeguard their family in the event of death, and this should 
be further assisted as they were no longer expected to pay contributions into their 
superannuation. However, there was no discussion of what the lower-class workers, whose pay 
was only just adequate, were supposed to do for their widows and orphans. 
Government was not perceived to be responsible for the welfare of its employees’ families; 
however, the Royal Commission carefully set out why it was accountable for civil servants’ 
welfare in retirement. They gave three reasons: first was the need to relieve the civil servant of 
‘anxiety respecting his future’ by providing support should he become too old or infirm to 
work; secondly, a long service should be rewarded as ‘public opinion would not allow that such 
a man should be permitted to starve’; and, finally, it would be to the government’s advantage 
that a civil servant should not continue to work after he has ‘become incompetent to perform 
his duties’.77 Interestingly, the use of a pension as a means of ensuring the application of a 
particular quality of servant was not reiterated here, despite Sir Edward Ryan’s experience with 
the Civil Service Commission and its focus on recruitment. Instead, pensions were tied into the 
system of promotion that was another cornerstone of the Civil Service reform and wider ideas 
of keeping the government machine working efficiently and economically. 
The Royal Commission concluded in May 1857, but a new Superannuation Act did not follow 
until 1859. The delay was partly due to parliament waiting for a supplementary report from 
actuaries, but also due to continued debates within the House of Commons. The proposals from 
the Royal Commission were estimated to bring a bill of £70,000 for the immediate end of salary 
deductions and an additional annual increase of £30,000 to the salary bill. Henry Rich MP was 
furious and before the government could put forward a Bill he raised the matter in the 
Commons, accusing the Commissioners of pandering to ‘importunate’ civil servants and 
provoking further agitation for salary increases.78 When a Bill was eventually brought to the 
Commons at the end of June 1857, Lord Naas defended the Commissioners findings, stating 
he was confident that the ‘ultimate advantage of the public will be much more than a 
compensation for any possible temporary loss’, and that there was a precedent through changes 
made with regard to the Chelsea Pensioners in 1847 that had brought an additional cost of 
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£60,000 a year to the public purse.79 However, even the Chancellor of the Exchequer could not 
bring himself to support the Bill, especially as the report from the actuaries had not arrived, 
and the Bill failed to proceed. 
There appeared to be a stalemate in government, and progress was only made with a new 
Conservative minority government in power from 1858. At this point the new Chancellor of 
the Exchequer Benjamin Disraeli and his financial secretary of the Treasury Sir Stafford 
Northcote took charge of the subject pushing for an Act to be passed in 1859. Considering 
Northcote’s background with the reform of Civil Service recruitment it is perhaps unsurprising 
that it took someone of his skill and vision to push through the legislation. Like his 
predecessors, Northcote met opposition in the Commons who wanted to know the cost and 
implications across departments, but Northcote’s objective was clear. Addressing the 
Commons in March 1859, he stated: 
‘What the country really wanted was not to save so many pounds, shillings, and pence 
in the superannuation of its civil servants, but an adequate supply of good, cheerful, 
and willing servants, and the adoption of measures which would enable those in its 
employment to retire at the proper time without a feeling of hardship.’80 
He put the men and the condition of their service before the cost, convinced that a good and 
fair pension system was integral to ensuring a good, efficient and loyal body of workers. 
Through the numerous debates, committees and commissions, the view of the role of Civil 
Service Superannuation had come full circle. As long as civil servants were loyal and long 
serving they had a right to a pension and the government had a duty to provide it as part of a 
mutually beneficial relationship. 
Role of Actuarial Science 
The development of the 1859 Superannuation Act was a reflection of the changing attitudes of 
government to the provision of pensions for civil servants. The focus so far has been on the 
debates and discussion within government and amongst civil servants regarding what a pension 
was and who it was for. However, another important aspect is the role of actuarial science 
within the development of the Act. This was a field that was emerging from the eighteenth 
century and professionalised in the nineteenth century, becoming particularly important as the 
insurance industry grew. Principles and characteristics of actuarial influence in the insurance 
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industry can be seen in the nineteenth-century civil servant superannuation schemes through 
the use of scales of payment and age limits. However, its involvement was limited in sculpting 
the legislation and featured little in the debates, suggesting that the management of risk was 
not as important as the relationship with workers the pensions would represent.  
Various elements of the 1859 Superannuation Act can be seen as having their origins in 
eighteenth-century ideas surrounding old age and increasing attempts to document age. The 
Act stipulated that to be entitled to a pension the civil servant must be over sixty years of age, 
which by the nineteenth century was an administrative indicator of old age. Pat Thane has 
argued that the age of sixty or seventy has been used in discourse in England from at least 
medieval times to signify the onset of old age.81 Though old age was not legally defined, the 
age of sixty was often the time people were expected, by law or custom, to withdraw from 
public activities, on the grounds of old age.82 Through the work of  Susannah Ottaway and 
Lynn Botelho, amongst others, we can see the eighteenth century as a period that gave more 
importance to chronological age in determining the onset of old age, as opposed to physical 
ability or appearance and behaviour.83 This was the result of the ‘increasing administrative 
structure of the eighteenth-century local and national bureaucracies’: no matter how lowly or 
illiterate, most people could expect to have aspects of their lives become part of a written 
record.84 In 1761 a superannuation fund for Customs officers, which had started in 1713, added 
a new requirement: officers had to be sixty or over to be eligible for a pension.85 In 1788 
Commissioners lowered the minimum age to fifty-five, but over the course of the nineteenth 
century this minimum age varied between sixty and seventy.86 In addition, many friendly 
societies that paid out support to the elderly had a requirement that ages between sixty and 
seventy were the minimum for a claim, though sometimes lower for women, and Defoe and 
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Dowdeswell proposed that old age pensions should start at fifty.87 Increasingly, chronological 
age of a person was being seen as a qualification for being old and being treated accordingly.  
The emphasis on chronological age was only part of this shift and as the nineteenth century 
progressed friendly societies and insurance companies became increasingly influenced by the 
calculations and practices of actuarial science. The close ties between the development of 
actuarial science and friendly societies is demonstrated by the fact that the term ‘actuary’ was 
not used in a legal sense until the Friendly Societies Act of 1819. Moreover, the Act dictated 
that no tables should be adopted by friendly societies unless approved ‘by two persons, at the 
least, known to be professional actuaries skilled in calculation’.88 The life assurance industry 
facilitated the development of actuarial science and through the legal restrictions on friendly 
societies the government was able to monitor the progress of the field.89 The emergence of this 
discipline encouraged and facilitated the increasing obsession with statistics in the first half of 
the nineteenth century. The Statistical Society of London was founded in 1834; by 1836 the 
government’s interest in statistics had led to a law that all births, marriages and deaths should 
be registered.90 By 1843 the first English Life Table was published based on the returns of 
births, marriages and deaths in England, and a committee of actuaries had also produced an 
insured life table using statistics from seventeen life assurance companies.91 The field of 
actuarial science was becoming so broad that in 1840 the first journal dedicated to life 
assurance, Post Magazine, was published and in 1847 the Institute of Actuaries was 
established.92  
The influence on government was not only seen in the Friendly Society Acts, but also in the 
development of superannuation schemes. The Actuary of National Debt and Government 
Calculator, John Finlaison, had been employed to calculate payments on the pension list and 
consequently gave evidence to the 1837 Select Committee on Pensions.93 The 1859 Act was 
also inclusive of a more cautionary use of scale moving from fractions of twelfths to sixtieths. 
This new scale meant that if a civil servant had served between ten and eleven years he could 
receive a minimum annual allowance of ten sixtieths of his annual salary and emoluments. This 
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amount increased by a sixtieth every year corresponding to the length of service up to a 
maximum of forty years of service, when the annual allowance of forty sixtieths, or two thirds, 
could be granted. 
However, despite this perceived caution and use of smaller fractions, the reason for this change 
was not motivated by informed statistics. The change in fractions was motivated by the desire 
to change the type of scale from a ‘jumping’ system to a ‘sliding’ system; this meant that the 
pension available to an employee would be increased annually rather than after a gap of seven 
years. As Sir Stafford Northcote explained, the scale gave an ‘advantage to those who had 
served long periods [and] it diminished the allowances of those who had been engaged in the 
service of the State for shorter ones’.94 It still encouraged employees to work for as long as 
possible by removing the pressure to stay when incapable of reaching a seven-year milestone 
and rise in pension. The decision to use sixtieths probably had more to do with the ease of using 
the sexagesimal numerical system in calculations than actuarial calculation of risk.95  
Furthermore, though consulted, actuaries were not central to the formation of the 1859 Act or 
the debates leading up it. Richard Bromley, chairman of the Civil Service Committee, had 
enlisted the help of fellow civil servant and statistician Dr William Farr to look at the 
contributions paid by employees towards their superannuation. Farr had concluded that a 
pension provided by an insurance company would be of better value to civil servants than the 
superannuation provided by the government and he subsequently presented this evidence to the 
London Statistical Society, printed it in a pamphlet and gave evidence at the 1856 Select 
Committee.96 The 1856 Select Committee did call actuaries from private insurance companies, 
including Thomas Rowe Edmonds from the Legal and General Insurance Office, Charles 
Ansell of the Atlas Insurance Office and Peter Hardy of the London Insurance Office. These 
men were questioned on Farr’s calculations, specifically as to whether the contributions 
currently paid should cover the cost of pensions. Most agreed with Farr, to the extent that they 
believed that the current system of deductions was not fair for civil servants and the payment 
of contributions exceeded the amount needed to pay pensions.97 However, Edwards made it 
clear that he believed an insurance company would only pay a pension or annuity if the 
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recipient was suffering from ill-health and on a lesser scale to that offered by the government.98 
Hardy also criticised the pension system suggesting that the current Act was not being enforced 
strongly enough to ensure that civil servants were not retiring before they were incapable of 
working in their departments.99 Both demonstrate some of the clear differences between the 
principles of pensions paid by a commercial enterprise and the government. Due to the 
government’s need for a standardised practice across grades and departments, as well as its 
desire for a younger and efficient workforce, retirement was enforced at the age of sixty-five 
which put the pension on shaky actuarial grounds. A similar system would be deemed too risky 
by a private company but fitted the government’s aims. 
Most of the questioning of actuaries focused on deductions, their value and how they believed 
they could be managed. Yet, since the Select Committee and the Royal Commission concluded 
that deductions were unfair and should be abolished, the evidence given by the actuaries 
appears to be somewhat redundant. Nevertheless, Sir George Lewis, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, insisted on delaying any legislation on superannuation until full reports had been 
received from the actuaries based on their own calculations rather than those of Dr Farr.100 This 
delay occurred for both the Select Committee and the Royal Commission, but in both cases the 
findings of the reports were presented and debated in parliament without the actuarial 
calculations. Even when the information arrived, its findings were not formally reported and 
discussed in parliament. When presenting a Bill to remove deductions in June 1857, Lord Naas 
openly dismissed the value of actuarial opinion, convinced ‘that the most delicate calculations 
of all the actuaries in the world could not persuade the six out of the seven who never received 
any allowance that they were fairly treated’.101 Once opinions had been formed and deductions 
condemned the importance of the financial cost of pensions appeared to lose it potency, this 
enabled Northcote to present his Bill with little emphasis on ‘pounds, shillings, and pence’ and 
more on the ‘good, cheerful, and willing servants’ his Bill would bring.102 
 
 
                                                          
98 Ibid., p.308. 
99 Ibid., p.326. 
100 Lewis mentioned a delay in getting a report from the actuaries  in June 1856 following the Select Committee 
(Hansard, HC Deb, 9 June 1856, vol. 142 c1163), and again in June 1857 after the Royal Commission 
(Hansard, HC Deb, 8 June 1857, vol. 145 cc1319-20). 
101 Hansard, HC Deb, 30 June 1857, vol. 146 c.695. 
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65 
 
Conclusion 
The Superannuation Act of 1859 was distinctive as it removed employee contributions, rejected 
actuarial analysis and removed any reference to family. Even though the government portrayed 
an ethos of reform and efficiency, it is possible to see these changes in a different light. The 
removal of contributions was an attempt to give the Treasury greater control over the pension, 
removing any legal claim of property on the pension. For the Treasury, superannuation was, at 
best, a gift their employees should be grateful for or, at worst, compensation—an equal 
exchange of financial security in return for loyal service.103 However, the decision to ignore 
the issue of wages left the perception that wages were kept lower due to the pension paid at the 
end of service; the pension became a form of deferred pay and it did not remove the sense of 
entitlement. By the end of the century, many civil servants felt their contract of employment 
and loyal service entitled them to a pension and it was something they had paid for indirectly 
due to lower wages. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Civil List and other aspects of ‘Old Corruption’ 
had tainted the idea of a pension, associating it with living at the expense of others. However, 
by the 1840s there was the beginning of a shift in the perception of what a pension could mean. 
This was partly instigated by protests from civil servants themselves who publicised the unfair 
system to which they were subjected, a system that had been a product of the old prejudices. 
Instead, they called on the traditional relationship between the state and its servants that had 
been cultivated through the Civil List and suggested the government had a duty to support its 
workers. The important definition of this payment as providing support in later life, not out of 
need but as a reward for good service, made the use of deductions and actuarial practice 
redundant. Many MPs may have objected to the apparent lack of financial concern for 
providing pensions to the growing Civil Service advocated by the 1856 Select Committee and 
1857 Royal Commission, but they could not deny the force of the growing belief that, as stated 
by the actuary Peter Hardy during his evidence in 1856,  
‘the nation ought to be as well prepared to pay the pensions of its civil servants as to 
pay their salaries.’104  
It was upon this belief that the 1859 Superannuation Act was based.
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Chapter 2: 
Where Two Worlds Collide: The East India Company’s 
Pensions and Superannuation Systems  
 
‘… on the evening of the 12th of April, just as I was about quitting my desk to go home 
(it might be about eight o’clock) I received an awful summons to attend the presence 
of the whole assembled firm in the formidable back parlour. I thought, now my time is 
surely come … I am going to be told that they have no longer occasion for me … when 
to my utter astonishment B____, the eldest partner, began a formal harangue to me on 
the length of my service, my very meritorious conduct during the whole of the time … 
He went on to descant upon the expediency of retiring at a certain time of life … and 
asking me a few questions as to the amount of my own property, of which I have a 
little, ended with a proposal, to which his three partners nodded a grave assent, that I 
should accept from the house, which I had served so well, a pension for life to the 
amount of two-thirds of my accustomed salary—a magnificent offer!’ 
Charles Lamb, ‘The Superannuated Man’, 1825 
 
In April 1825, Charles Lamb, the poet, playwright and essayist, retired from his day job at the 
East India Company on a pension of £450 a year. He was fifty years old and had worked for 
the company for thirty-three years.1 The following May, he published an essay titled ‘The 
Superannuated Man’ in the London Magazine under the alias ‘Elia’.2 In this essay Lamb recalls 
the drudgery of work, the long hours and the anticipation of holidays, which included Sundays 
and a week in the summer. He suggests that an illness was starting to affect his work and was 
consequently called to the company boardroom. Worried that he was about to be dismissed, 
Lamb describes his surprise at being granted a pension for life and immediately released from 
service. Traditionally, this essay has been examined for Lamb’s discussion of life after 
retirement, his initial enthusiasm quickly falling away as he missed his colleagues and the 
structure of work. This is partly due to the perception that retirement was not good for Charles 
Lamb. He may have lived on his pension for nine years, but these years were not as prolific as 
                                                          
1 P. Swaab, ‘Lamb, Charles (1775–1834)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 
2004, https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/15912, accessed 29 March 2017. 
2 C. Lamb, ‘The Superannuated Man’, printed in London Magazine and Review, 2 (1825), pp.67-73. The essay 
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those he spent working at the East India Company. This is attributed partly to his descent into 
alcoholism, an addiction that was seen by his friends and family as contributing to his death.3 
This essay may appear to be the sad prelude to the slow deterioration of an acclaimed writer, 
but it is also a valuable insight into the life of an ordinary office clerk in the East India Company 
in the early nineteenth century. Lamb was an extraordinary and accomplished writer, moving 
within Romantic literary circles and well known for his poetry, children’s literature and essay 
writing; he was also a great friend of literary radicals Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Leigh Hunt. 
Nevertheless, Lamb was also a dedicated office clerk. He did not let his writing career interfere 
with his day job and, although it appears he did not pursue promotion in order to be able to 
have time to write, he was a committed employee willing to work ten-hour days.4 Through 
reading The Superannuated Man we are able to gain an understanding of the feelings of 
anticipation and gratitude that could be experienced by an East India Company clerk in receipt 
of a pension, as well as the emotional impact of the perceived freedom that a pension could 
give an employee. 
By the time Charles Lamb received his pension in 1825, the calculation and regulation of 
Company superannuation for staff on the home establishment had been standardised by the 
British government. The 1813 East India Company Act outlined a clear scale of payment based 
on age and length of service that was not officially altered over the course of the Company’s 
life span. Yet, the Company resisted full government control over how it remunerated its staff, 
continuing to maintain two contrasting systems of pension, paying out ad hoc pension 
payments to temporary and permanent staff as well as the official system dedicated by 
government. The ad hoc payments were called pensions and the structured systematic payments 
were called superannuation, giving clear names and definitions to the traditional and more 
modern styles of payment. 
Through their pension and superannuation payments, the East India Company was ensuring 
they maintained their power and sense of control over their staff. With these two contrasting 
systems in place, Lamb’s surprise to be offered a pension regardless of his long service, ill-
health and government attempts at standardisation appears reasonable. Lamb’s essay may be a 
mixture of ‘fact and fancy’; indeed, he attributes his work to an unnamed insurance firm, rather 
than the East India Company, and does not mention two medical certificates he had previously 
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presented to the Company in the hope of retiring on the grounds of ill-health.5 Still, there is no 
reason to suggest that the emotional reaction to the retirement process was not genuine. 
Consequently, Lamb’s shock at being granted the relief he had already petitioned twice for 
demonstrates that, despite a strict and clearly outlined regulation on retirement, the Company 
reinforced their authority through an element of uncertainty and apprehension. Moreover, once 
received, even to Lamb’s great relief, the reality of retirement was not necessarily all he had 
wanted—this is a recurrent theme in the pensions examined in my doctoral research. 
Notwithstanding the testimony of one of the most famous East India Company clerks, 
historians of the East India Company and its workers have generally presented the pension as 
a simple benefit of working for the Company, the result of a generous and benevolent employer. 
For one of the earliest historians of the Company, William Forester, the early pensions of the 
eighteenth century were made ‘as an act of charity’: they were a gift and to be granted one was 
the exception rather than the rule.6 For more recent scholars of the Company, the giving of 
these pensions was slightly more calculated than that: pensions have been portrayed as the 
result of a paternalistic management system, born out of a ‘sense of responsibility’ and a 
reputation ‘for looking after its own’.7 Margaret Makepeace has conducted the most in-depth 
research into the Company’s pension system to date, in her work on the warehouse labourers. 
This work has led to an association of the Company’s pension system with an ‘ethos of 
benevolence which underpinned the management’ of these workers.8 For Makepeace, pensions 
were representative of two of the Company’s objectives. Firstly, the pension system was part 
of a number of activities undertaken by directors and senior Company officials to project an 
‘image of paternal benevolence both in India and at home’, in order to counteract any negative 
criticism of the Company’s work.9 Secondly, it was a reflection of the ‘deep rooted notions of 
paternalism in British Society’.10 Paternalism may have been useful as a public relations 
exercise but they were also part of the culture of the merchant community of the City of 
London; Company directors were, for example, often philanthropic in their own right.11 This 
                                                          
5 W. Foster, The East India House: Its History and Associations (London, 1924), p.190. 
6 Ibid., p.89. 
7 H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain 1756-1833 (Cambridge, 
2006), p.140. 
8 M. Makepeace, The East India Company’s London Workers: Management of the Warehouse Labourers, 1800-
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9 Ibid., p.73. 
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11 J. S. Taylor, Jonas Hanway, Founder of the Marine Society: Charity and Policy in Eighteenth-Century 
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appears to be particularly important for the warehouse labourers as their pensions were not 
altered by any changes to the Company’s charter. 
However, the Company’s other workers in London, who included clerks and doorkeepers, were 
managed and viewed quite differently. In contrast to the warehouse labourers, the first 
comprehensive pension scheme for the Company’s salaried home establishment was imposed 
on the East India Company by the British government through the renewal of the Charter in 
1813. The interventionist role of the British government in regulating the pension system has 
generally been explained by historians as part of its broader moves towards the ‘retrenchment 
and rationalisation of the Company’s financial affairs’.12 Despite this attempt to control the 
Company’s finances, in light of the regulations that were to come for the Civil Service, this 
system is also noted for its generosity.13 Unsurprisingly, any focus on the 1813 Act has 
principally been through the lens of its impact on the Company’s control and power in India 
and China, and how much it contributed to the complete removal of the Company’s monopoly 
and commercial activities when the charter was renewed in 1833 through the Government of 
India Act. Reflection on how these superannuation and other pension payments were managed 
or viewed by the staff has hitherto been absent from discussion. 
The focus on the economic management of the Company, its trade and its role in building the 
Empire has been reflected in a concentration of work on the directors and senior employees 
based in East India House.14 Other works have utilised the life and writing of the number of 
literary clerks, such as Charles Lamb, to produce a fleeting glimpse into life as a clerk in East 
India House.15 In the small body of work on how the East India Company managed their  
salaried employees in England the emphasis has been on how the employees were managed 
through systems of contracts or how the salary structures reflected their cost of living.16  
                                                          
12 Bowen, The Business of Empire, p.140. 
13 Forster was a clerk in the Company’s successor, the India Office, so may have felt the change in policy more 
acutely. Foster, The East India House, p.227. 
14 See Bowen, The Business of Empire; C. H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834 (Manchester, 1940); 
and Foster, The East India House. 
15 Nick Robins looks briefly at Charles Lamb, Thomas Love Peacock, James and John Stuart Mill as examples 
of East India Company clerks in N. Robins, The Corporation that Changed the World: How the East India 
Company Shaped the Modern Multinational (London, 2012), pp.9-10. William Forster also dedicates a chapter 
to Charles Lamb and James and John Stuart Mill in The East India House, pp.175-225. 
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This chapter will address an important gap in the literature on the East India Company and 
examine the pension provisions made for all the East India Company employees based in 
England at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Although the growing encroachment of the 
British government into the affairs of the East India Company is not a new finding, by 
examining the pension provisions for the salaried employees it is possible to see the 
relationship between the government and Company in a new light. The pensions of employees 
were only directly handled by legislation once, in 1813, even though government policy 
towards the Company became increasingly interventionist. Additionally, as Makepeace has 
demonstrated, government legislation had little impact on how the labourers were managed 
and administered. Labourers may have been at the bottom of the East India Company hierarchy, 
but they could be promoted to the role of messenger or writer, both of which roles were granted 
pensions under the regulations outlined in the 1813 East India Company Act, making it notable 
that they were excluded. Furthermore, it was the only part of an employee’s remuneration that 
was legislated for. The government did not interfere with any other part of the recruitment or 
pay of Company employees. This is exemplified by the continued use of traditional ad hoc 
pensions alongside the new superannuation system. 
Through consideration of the pension and superannuation systems that ran simultaneously in 
the East India Company, it is possible to see how different styles of retirement remuneration 
were useful for different types of people and varying circumstances. Superannuation payments 
were solely for employees and pensions were for circumstances outside the realm of regularly 
employed and salaried workers, which could include workers’ families or temporary 
employees. Using Zelizer’s categorisation of payment, the superannuation system could be 
seen as a form of compensation, or even entitlement, earned through service, whereas pensions 
were a gift, one off payments.17 However, the Company ensured that their workers did not feel 
entitled to retirement payments and, despite the regulations laid out within the 1813 Act which 
were used by the Company to justify the superannuation payments, the system was never used 
by employees as a bargaining tool. This contrasts with the many changes and challenges to the 
identical superannuation system enforced through the 1810 Superannuation Act in the British 
Civil Service. By the renewal of the charter and the Government of India Act 1833, the 
government superannuation system had changed significantly but there was no attempt or 
discussion of changing the East India Company system. This may have been due to too many 
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other distractions and important issues, including the Reform Act in 1832 and the need to 
remove the Company monopoly, but there was still no change once the government took over 
administrative control of India in 1858 or officially dismantled the Company in 1874. There 
would be no formal change to how superannuation payments were administered for former 
East India Company employees until 1896, over eighty years after the 1813 Act.  
1813 East India Company Act 
The attempt to regulate the East India Company’s pension payments through a system of 
superannuation was not just the result of the government’s increasing attempts to control the 
Company’s finances: it was also a reflection of the wider changing attitudes. The 1813 Act was 
able to regulate retirement remuneration as there was an increasing belief inside and outside of 
government that this type of reward should not be an unequivocal right, but something 
earned—compensation for loyal service. 
By 1800, the East India Company was a large and complex commercial organisation but 
since the mid-eighteenth century it had been forced to succumb to increasing scrutiny from 
government. The first concessions were given following several financial crises and from the 
mid-1760s the Company was expected to send detailed accounts to Parliament.18 This only 
sparked greater interest and between 1767 and 1784 a succession of political interventions 
resulted in reform, followed by regulation and concluded in Pitt’s 1784 India Act.19 This Act 
established a Board of Control which had the power to overturn any decision made by the 
Court of Directors at the East India Company. Bowen has described it as a sharp break from 
the recent past, but also the result of the gradual attempts by the state to assume more control 
over the commercial aspects of the Company.20 The power the stockholders had held for the 
previous century was greatly diminished, and Court activities, which were previously raucous 
debates over policy and action, became by the 1820s more subdued where votes of thanks or 
approval for grants of money or amendments to Company policy were approved.21 The 1784 
India Act had brought about a new system of working between government and the East 
India Company. Communication increased and policies were formed through the continual 
toing and froing of despatches. On most occasions policy was devised by directors and 
officials at East India House and then subsequently amended by the Board of Control. As 
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Peter Auber, Company Secretary, noted in 1828, what developed was ‘a system of checks’.22 
This new way of working could be quite collaborative, but it marked a considerable shift in 
power that would only be extended further after 1800. The 1813 Charter Act’s attack on the 
East India Company’s monopoly has received a lot of focused attention from historians. The 
Act originated from industrial pressure for trade to be opened up alongsidethe Company’s 
rising Indian debts, which had called for a £2.5 million loan.23  However, it was also the first 
attempt by government to monitor and regulate the remuneration of employees in East India 
House. This inclusion was not only a comment on the Company’s financial management but 
another, more encroaching way to assert government control. 
Of the thirteen propositions contained within the first drafts of the 1813 East India Company 
Charter only one was solely concerned with the Company’s activities at home. This was the 
proposition for ‘limiting the granting of gratuities and pensions to officers, civil and military, 
or increasing the same, or creating any new establishments at home’.24 The proposition 
appeared in both the initial propositions for the Charter, published in March and May with 
identical wording. Framed around an attempt to ‘protect the funds of the said Company’ and 
read alongside the propositions regarding the Company’s debts it is easy to see this 
proposition as solely related to the government’s belief that the Company was spending too 
much on pensions.25 However, financial responsibility was not the only reason and, during 
the decades preceding these propositions, there had been increasing dissatisfaction 
surrounding the administration of pensions within government and within the East India 
Company as public opinion of what a pension was and who it should be for was changing. 
Public criticism and financial pressures had seen radical reform of the pension system within 
government. Edmund Burke’s Establishment Act to limit the pensions of the government and 
Crown’s Civil List to £95,000 had been passed in 1782, and by 1809 it had reduced the cost by 
£63,000.26 However, limitations on the Civil List were not enough and there were further calls 
for reform in 1809 and 1810. In response to a report on public offices and in anticipation of a 
report into public expenditure, Henry Martin, MP for Kinsale, discussed the areas he felt 
needed further attention. Amongst criticism for the needless sinecures and useless reversions 
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was the call for a ‘regular system of superannuation’.27 This was supported by the resolutions 
of the Committee on Public Expenditure that followed in June. It did not set out the terms of a 
superannuation system, but for the first time suggested a superannuation system separate from 
the Civil List for all persons in public offices or holding civil employments in public service.28 
These pensions were being singled out for the employee, the person who worked for their 
remuneration in retirement. 
Later in 1810, the Public Salaries, Pensions and Allowances Act was passed, establishing for 
the first time that a pension was earned through the length of service and was not a form of gift 
or charity through the Civil List or other previous system.29 The scale of pensions outlined in 
the Act had been in use since an 1803 Treasury Minute, but at that time a previous Treasury 
Minute of 1802 was also in operation and appeared to differ on some fundamental principles 
of a pension system.30 The 1802 Treasury Minute had been targeted at certain key officers and 
made payments from a superannuation fund; in contrast, the 1803 Minute established the 
principle that superannuation should be paid out of public funds and included a scale of 
payment based on length of service and age for the first time.31 The scale and belief that 
superannuation should be paid for by central funds and not a contributory fund had persisted, 
and despite the pressure on public finance it became law in 1810. Ultimately, the 1810 Act was 
a combination of attempts to regulate the pension system and the belief that making it into a 
clear system with conditions and limitations was enough to make it an economic and fair 
arrangement. Importantly, it established a legal precedent that the responsibility lay with the 
employer—the state—for meeting the cost, with employees earning it through length and 
loyalty of service. 
At the same time as politicians were becoming interested in pension payments through the Civil 
List and other means, they were also alert to how the East India Company administered its 
pension payments. In 1806, the House of Commons had asked for a list of all of the pensions 
and gratuities granted by the East India Company between 1793 and 1805. The list included 
civil and military officers from a variety of ranks on a broad scale of payments, including the 
Marquis Cornwallis who was given a pension of £5,000 in June 1793 for his services as 
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Governor General of Bengal, as well as William Carr, a former book-keeper who was granted 
a pension of £40 in April 1797.32 It also included the widows, children and even mothers of 
civil and military officers, for whom the pensions were usually considerably lower. For 
example, Mary Denton, widow of the late commander of the Earl Spencer was granted a 
pension of £20 in April 1799, and the two surviving children of I. Millington, a former clerk, 
received a pension of £30.33 The total amount that had been granted and was still being paid 
amounted to over £36,600.34 In addition, the number of gratuities varied greatly each year, 
peaking in the financial year 1804-5 with over £92,200 paid out.35 The recipients of gratuities 
were even more varied than pensions but also more strongly linked to the Company’s maritime 
interests. In 1804-5, captains were compensated for the loss of an arm or rewarded for their 
conduct, clerks and seamen were granted gratuities for extra work performed; even a Dr P. 
Russell was granted £400 for his ‘work on serpents’.36 As this government return demonstrates, 
the Company was paying out a large variety of sums to a wide range of people for a large 
number of reasons. 
However, politicians were not the only group of people interested in the cost of pensions at the 
Company. In September 1806 at the quarterly General Court of Proprietors at East India House, 
the Court of Directors had put forward a suggestion for the creation of the office of ‘Recorder 
of Prince of Wales Island’, and as part of this office would come a pension of £1,000 a year 
after ten years of service.37 At this time many of the stockholders did not feel the Company’s 
finances warranted the creation of this office, let alone the promise of a substantial pension, 
and Mr Johnstone argued a pension should not be granted ‘for services which had not yet been 
performed, and … [should] … alone be due after a laborious, faithful and honourable discharge 
of the duties of the office’.38 Others agreed with him and the resolution was narrowly negated 
by 27 votes to 24.  
The hostility towards granting a pension before the work had been performed, and even the 
association between a pension and the absence of work, was part of a growing antagonism 
towards the pensions, sinecures and placements of the establishment. It was this critical view 
that fed into the proposition related to ‘gratuities and pensions to officers, civil and military’ in 
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1813. Despite the presence of some reform of the Company’s ad hoc and unregulated pension 
provision in the early propositions for the Charter, a formal clause was not included until the 
second issue of the Bill in which a third amendment outlined how the Court of Directors would 
be able to grant their employees in England a superannuation.39 This clause included a proposed 
scale based on age and length of service. It stated that if a servant was under sixty, but incapable 
of discharging their duties due to ‘infirmity of mind or body’, with ten years of service 
performed ‘with diligence and fidelity’, the Company could grant a pension that did not exceed 
one-third of their salary and emoluments of their office.40 If they had served over ten years but 
below twenty they could receive a sum not exceeding two-thirds of their salary and 
emoluments. Similarly if they were above sixty years of age, having served fifteen years or 
more, they could receive a sum not exceeding two-thirds of their salary and emoluments.41 If 
over sixty-five, with a service record of forty years or more, they could receive a 
superannuation not exceeding three-fourths of their salary and emoluments. Finally, if aged 
over sixty-five, with fifty or more years of service, they could receive a sum not exceeding 
their whole salary and emoluments.42 This scale of payment was an exact copy of the scale 
formalised in the 1810 Superannuation Act and it consequently reinforced the ideas put forward 
by that Act.43 That pensions were a right that was earned through length and loyalty of service, 
but they were a payment that was the financial responsibility of the employer.  
Managing Pensions after 1813 
Despite the legislation enforcing a system of superannuation, the East India Company 
continued to grant large pensions to the employees, family members and others that the 
Company and its Proprietors considered were deserving of them. In the returns produced for 
Parliament, the Company would set out within one list the individuals who had been granted 
an increase in salary and those who had been granted a pension. In a separate list were the 
former employees who had been granted an allowance, compensation, remuneration or 
superannuation as set out within the East India Company Act of 1813 (53rd Geo III. Cap. 155 
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Superannuation Act, p.v. 
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sec 93). Any grant of a pension over £200 had to be approved by the Board of Control but this 
appeared to be a formality. 
Far from creating a new and dominant superannuation system, the 1813 Charter had in fact 
established a two-tier system. In May 1822, almost ten years after the East India Company Act, 
the Company was paying out over £39,200 in pensions, compared with £23,550 in 
superannuation payments under the 1813 Act.44 Forty-four out of 156 pension payments had 
been agreed prior to the 1813 Act, which accounted for the much larger pension bill in 
comparison to the superannuation payments. Nevertheless, when looking at the grant of 
pensions compared to superannuation payments in the eleven years after 1813 the totals granted 
were very similar, with approximately £39,883 granted in pensions compared to £37,100 in 
superannuation.45 Additionally, as Table 2 and Figure 1, below, demonstrates, there was no 
clear pattern of one type of payment consistently exceeding the other. 
  
                                                          
44 PP 1822 [260] Return of Pensions, Allowances and Superannuations payable by East India Company in 
Europe. 
45 Totals taken from annual returns of PP Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into 
Great Britain; Account of Allowances and Superannuation to Servants of East India Company 1815-1825. 
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Table 2. Total Pensions and Superannuation Payments Granted by the East India Company46 
Year 
Ending 
Pension Total 
(£) 
Superannuation Total 
(£) 
May 1815 4,490 4,020 
May 1816 2,733 910 
May 1817 3,533 5,264 
May 1818 2,624 4,020 
May 1819 2,632 4,359 
May 1820 5,325 2,398 
May 1821 3,809 3,805 
May 1822 5,081 5,876 
May 1823 356 1,130 
May 1824 4,709 100 
May 1825 4,591 5,218 
Total 39,883 37,100 
 
                                                          
46 PP 1814-1815 [323] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; PP 
1816 [381] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; Account of 
Allowances and Superannuations to Servants of East India Company 1815-16; PP 1817 [310] Account of 
Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; Account of Allowances and 
Superannuations to Servants of East India Company 1816-17; PP 1818 [362] Account of Proceeds of Sale of 
Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; Account of Allowances and Superannuations to Servants of 
East India Company 1817-18; PP 1819 [469] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into 
Great Britain; Account of Allowances and Superannuations to Servants of East India Company 1818-19; PP 
1820 [91] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; Account of 
Allowances and Superannuations to Servants of East India Company 1819-20; PP 1821 [596] Account of 
Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; Account of Allowances and 
Superannuations to Servants of East India Company 1820-21; PP 1822 [446] Account of Proceeds of Sale of 
Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; PP 1822 [260] Return of Pensions, Allowances and 
Superannuations payable by East India Company in Europe; PP 1823 [406] Account of Proceeds of Sale of 
Goods of East India Company into Great Britain; PP 1824 [460] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East 
India Company into Great Britain; PP 1825 [354] Account of Proceeds of Sale of Goods of East India Company 
into Great Britain. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of Total Pension and Superannuation Payments Granted by the East 
India Company 1815-182547 
 
If part of the aim of the 1813 Act was to restrict or diminish Company spending on ad hoc 
pensions, it does not appear to have worked. Instead, both systems were maintained as they 
served different purposes and the superannuation system based on the 1813 Act did not replace 
the well-established system of pension granting. The superannuation system was reserved for 
employees ranging from porters to chief clerks and the Company physician, whereas the older 
pension system was used for military and maritime officers, as well as widows and other ad 
hoc payments to employees including clerks.  
On the whole, the double system did not meet much criticism. However, the growing 
discomfort over the ill-defined and ad hoc style of pension system and its relationship to 
corruption can be seen through a debate that arose concerning the granting of pensions and the 
relationship between East India Company and the Board of Control. On 17 May 1814 the MP 
Thomas Creevey introduced a motion to the House of Commons for the reproduction of the 
letters from the Earl of Buckinghamshire, President of the Board of Control, to Robert 
Thornton, chairman of the East India Company, regarding the continuance and increase of 
pensions.48 He was concerned that the Earl had acted in violation of the ‘spirit and letter of the 
Act for continuing the charter of the East India Company’.49 The main point of objection was 
the belief that the letter from the Earl of Buckinghamshire had suggested that the Company 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 Hansard, HC Deb, 17 May 1814, vol. 27 cc924-8. 
49 Ibid., c.924. 
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grant a pension of £20,000 to Lord Melville, the son of the deceased former president for the 
Board of Control. The grounds for the suggestion rested on the fact that the late Lord Melville 
had served the Company well and that his son had now inherited his debt. It was the father’s 
long and faithful service that evoked the sentiment that the son deserved some assistance.50 
Creevey stated that it was the function of the Board of Control simply to approve or disapprove 
the increase of a pension and that the Board should not be using its position to propose increases 
or grant pensions. The debate that ensued followed a course that questioned whether the letter 
was written in a public or private capacity, considered the merit of the late Lord Melville’s 
work in relation to his family needing financial assistance, and assessed the level of power or 
influence the role of the president of the Board of Control had over the Court of Directors. A 
vote did not support Creevey’s motion and the letters remained unpublished as the House of 
Commons appeared to side with the idea that the letter was indeed private and the suggestion 
not unwarranted given the service of the late Lord Melville.  
Nevertheless, a year later the matter arose again. By this time the subject of Lord Melville’s 
pension had been brought to the General Court and a motion had been put to the East India 
Company’s proprietors. The original motion from May 1814 that had included a reading of the 
Earl of Buckinghamshire’s original letter, sent in January 1814, had eventually been put to a 
secret ballot in June of that year. As a result, 455 proprietors had voted to support 
Buckinghamshire’s suggestion of a pension of £20,000 to Lord Melville in light of his father’s 
debts and the service his father had performed for the Company.51 The pension was to be spread 
over ten years with an annual payment of £2,000. This was not the only pension or annuity that 
the correspondence between Buckinghamshire and the Court of Directors reveals was later 
voted for and approved by the General Court, but by July 1815 it had become a matter of 
concern for the House of Commons. This time, as the General Court had approved of the 
payment of the pension, the central argument rested on the relationship between Parliament 
and the Company. It was argued that, if the necessity of the pension was accepted, Lord 
Melville ‘should have received it by a vote of Parliament as a servant of the Crown, and not 
from the funds of the Company’.52 The merits of whether Lord Melville should receive the 
pension for his father’s work was touched upon but it appeared to be dismissed quite quickly 
by the House. Additionally, many felt it hypocritical of the Board of Control to suggest the 
                                                          
50 Ibid., cc925. 
51 PP 1814-1815 [211] Minutes and Proceedings of East India Company on Grants and Pensions. 
52 Hansard, HC Deb, 24 May 1815, vol. 31 cc371-90. 
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payment of a pension worth £20,000 when the Company had come to Parliament for money 
just two years earlier. For Lord Milton, the exchange demonstrated that the relationship 
between the Board of Control and the East India Company was not working in the public 
interest, and he felt resolutions of censure should be moved against Buckinghamshire as the 
president of the Board of Control. However, the mood of the Commons was against Milton and 
the arguments against his motion suggested that the advice from Buckinghamshire was not 
outside of his remit and, given the conduct of the late Lord Melville and financial situation of 
his son, it was justified.  
In the years after the Act, the Company persisted and was encouraged by the Board of Control 
and its stockholders to continue to provide these ad hoc pensions for people who were not 
directly employed by the Company but considered to be deserving of the Company’s thanks. 
They represent the dominance of a culture surrounding these financial gifts that were deemed 
to have been earned through the conduct of an individual but had little structure or system 
around their length of service or salary and no connection to a contract of employment. Despite 
attempts to set up a system of checks and measures through the creation of the Board of Control, 
and the passing of the 1813 Act, there was not a strong political will to prohibit the practice of 
giving pensions rather than the structured superannuation scheme.  
However, there were signs that opinions were slowly changing. In April 1817, when the Court 
of Directors presented a motion for a grant of a pension of £500 to Captain Earle, radical MP 
and proprietor Joseph Hume objected, arguing that the pension was not in line with the scale 
of superannuation as set out in Sec 93 of the 1813 Act.53 Hume went even further and moved 
for a motion that stated the Court’s concern for the ‘large and increasing pension list of the 
Company’ and pledged the directors’ ‘utmost vigilance and economy in every application of 
pensions brought before them’ with little deviance from the ‘act of the 53rd of Geo III cap 155 
sec 35, which directed pensions to be granted according to the length of service of the servants 
of the Company’.54 The Times report of the General Court meeting detailed that Hume’s motion 
caused much discussion, a discussion not recorded in that newspaper or the Company’s Court 
Minute Books, but Hume’s motion was rejected and the original resolution regarding the 
pension for Captain Earle passed unanimously.55 The belief in the Company’s traditional role 
                                                          
53 British Library, IOR/B/165 16 Court Minutes, April 1817, pp.32-4, also reported in The Times, 17 April 1817, 
p.3. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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and ability to grant the pensions they felt appropriate was dominated,  but the 1813 Charter Act 
as well as a number of challenges to pensions in the General Court meetings, from Lord 
Melville to Captain Earle, demonstrate that opinion was slowly changing. Unlike government, 
the East India Company did not face public criticism for their pension provision and 
administration, but the reformers in parliament were keeping a close eye on the Company. 
1833 Charter Act 
Through the creation of the two separate tiers of payment, pension and superannuation 
payments represented the power struggle between the East India Company and government. 
All lists and tables of superannuation payments always made note of the Act that was used to 
authorise and calculate the pension, a reminder of government power; but at the same time the 
Company continued to grant one-off or ‘special’ pensions.56 According to previous legislation 
the Company needed approval from the Board of Control for any pensions or salaries that were 
over £200 or gratuities that were over £600, although as has been demonstrated the established 
culture in the early nineteenth century meant that any real objection to the size of pensions or 
deviation from the prescribed scale was the concern of a minority. Nevertheless, the radicals 
were having increasingly influence in government, marked by the passing of the Reform Act 
in 1832. Change was in the air. 
In December 1832, Charles Grant, President of the Board of Control, wrote to the Chairman 
and Deputy Chairman of the East India Company listing some of the leading points for 
consideration ahead of the imminent charter renewal.57 The list started with the fundamental 
changes that Grant and the Prime Minster Earl Grey wanted: the end of the China monopoly 
and the transfer of the Company’s commercial and territorial assets to the Crown.58 However, 
towards the end of the list were points that dealt with how the government wanted the 
relationship between the Company and Board of Control, or India Board, to continue, and this 
included the handling of pensions. The Board proposed an extensive increase in its powers, 
including having final approval of all grants of pension and salary and total control over the 
Company’s home establishment.59 The Court objected, stating that they considered ‘a 
continuance of the independent power which they now possess, of rewarding service and 
                                                          
56 These types of pensions made from 1838 to 1854 are listed in BL IOR/L/AG/30/10, entitled ‘Home 
Establishment of the East India Company: Statements of special pensions granted’. 
57 PP 1833 [126] Papers Respecting the East India Company’s Charter, pp.3-5. 
58 Ibid., p.5. 
59 Ibid. 
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conferring pecuniary benefits, to be essential importance to the efficient exercise of their 
functions’.60 The transfer of the power over the Company’s home establishment would, in their 
eyes, simply make them into a Government Board.61 The Court of Directors and Secret 
Committee of Correspondence had been called to examine the government proposals: they saw 
this as an intrusion of power. However, Grant attempted to defend the measure as merely a 
financial and administrative matter. If the Company’s commercial revenues were removed, out 
of which the remunerations of the home establishment and other pensions were paid, then how 
would the Company meet this cost?62 Grant’s offer of a compromise, an annual grant of funds 
to meet the cost of the home establishment, was not met with enthusiasm by the Court.63 The 
directors could only interpret this removal of their ability to remunerate their own staff as the 
result of an abuse of ‘the power in question’, otherwise there was no good reason for it.64 
Nonetheless, they agreed to the compromise of paying for their home establishment through a 
grant from the Board, as long as the Board could not change the amount at their discretion and 
did not interfere with the ‘scale of remuneration generally’.65  
In the space of twenty years the British government had used the issue of pension payments to 
assume greater administrative power over the East India Company and its employees. The 1813 
Charter Act had imposed a system of superannuation modelled on the Civil Service 
superannuation, establishing a set of fundamental ideas about what a superannuation was as 
opposed to a pension. It was economically efficient since it was based on a scale of payment, 
but it was also a reward for loyalty of service that was not funded through employee 
contributions. The payments were strictly for employees and were the responsibility of the 
employer. However, the Company had resisted total compliance with this new system of 
remuneration, supplementing the superannuation payments with additional pension payments 
that were not calculated on a scale and were for a range of people—some directly employed, 
some not. As a result, despite the small but growing number of challenges to the use of ad hoc 
pensions or spending outside the superannuation scale, the superannuation system did not 
curtail spending and was not prioritised by the Company as the main form of retirement 
payment. By 1833, the government was taking a more critical look at its own superannuation 
system and wanted greater action to be taken at the Company. By 1828, civil servants were 
                                                          
60 Letter to Rt Hon C. Grant, 27 February 1833, in PP 1833 [126], p.39. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Letter from Rt Hon C. Grant, 14 March 1833, in PP 1833 [126], pp.51-52. 
63 Ibid., p.52. 
64 Letter to the Rt Hon C Grant, 18 March 1833, in PP 1833 [126], p.58. 
65 Ibid. 
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expected to pay contributions towards their superannuation but, rather than change the 
superannuation system in the 1833 East India Company Charter, the government proposed 
taking direct control of the payments. The significance of this request is illustrated through the 
Company’s outright rejection and then reluctant compromise. By this stage, so much of the 
Company’s power and control over its business had been chipped away that the act of 
administrating their two pension systems was of even greater importance. To maintain this 
right the Company had one major factor on their side: they were the employers and, as the 
principles for the new superannuation systems had established in 1810 (in government) and 
1813 (in the Company), this meant the responsibility of providing and administering 
superannuation payments was theirs. 
The relationship between employer and employee does not appear to have been an important 
feature within the 1833 Charter negotiations. Instead, it was another power relationship—the 
one between the Board of Control and the East India Company—that was at a critical point. 
Grant was keen to emphasise that the Company’s independence would remain but at the same 
time he was advocating the removal of the Company’s income and the source of its 
independence for granting salaries and pensions. However, it was the Company’s relationship 
with its own employees that effectively enabled the Company to keep some control over 
remuneration. They stated that the Government’s plan provided that ‘the Board shall have 
power of control over the home establishment, the very officers and servants employed by the 
Court’.66 There was a hierarchy of power: the Board at the top, followed by the Company and 
its employees. Putting the employees under the direction of the Board removed any apparent 
need for the Company and, as the directors suggested, it would convert ‘the Court into a 
Government Board’.67 The government clearly did not want the responsibility of administrating 
more staff; since it wanted the Company to maintain political control in India it required the 
Company to handle the day to day management of its staff. A reminder of this was the fact that 
the Company had to prompt Grant to ensure that provision would be made for employees who 
were let go as a result of the change of system.68 It was such an important point that it was 
included in the Charter Act that followed in 1833. The Act set out that the Company would 
have to take into consideration the ‘claims of any person now or heretofore employed by or 
under the said Company, or the Widows and Children of any such Persons, whose interests 
                                                          
66 Letter from Rt Hon C. Grant, 14 March 1833, in PP 1833 [126], p.52. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Letter to Rt Hon C. Grant, 27 February 1833, in PP 1833 [126], p.49. 
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may be affected by the Discontinuance of the said Company’s Trade’.69 Unlike the restricted 
superannuation scheme, compensation could also be claimed by families making this new 
pensioning system more akin to the ad hoc pensions the Company had persisted in giving. 
However, perhaps in a bid to give the Company a great feeling of autonomy the Act did not 
stipulate what the amount or scale of compensation and other allowances, including 
superannuation rewards, that could be given. This was left to the discretion of the Court of 
Directors, though it was outlined that any decided scale should be approved by Parliament. 
There may have been a desire to exert greater control over the Company through the 
commandeering of its pension and superannuation systems; however, the government was not 
ready for the full administrative responsibilities that came with that. Through the negotiations 
the Company demonstrated that it was best placed to maintain this responsibility, both as the 
direct employer, and also by dint of the fact that its knowledge and understanding of the 
workforce was better than that of the government or Board of Control. 
East India Company’s Management of Employees 
Throughout the nineteenth century the way the Company managed its employees was dictated 
by the financial pressures it was under. Increasing economic demands from the start of the 
nineteenth century were reflected in greater restrictions on and scrutiny into the working lives 
of its employees. In May 1817, four years after the 1813 Charter Act, the number of holidays 
was reduced to just Christmas Day, Good Friday, general fast days and general thanksgiving 
days, and there were stricter rules regarding extra pay for attendance during the sitting of 
Court.70 Clerks had to record and report their attendance to receive the payment, and Chiefs of 
Departments could not claim the allowance at all. Furthermore, dinner was no longer made 
available to clerks who attended the General Court, but those who earned under £600 a year 
were to be given ten shillings in lieu of that privilege.71 The 1820s and 1830s saw further 
measures to cut costs. Staff numbers were reduced in 1829, but in 1831 there was a report 
examining ways to restrict the numbers of extra clerks, a temporary role that was not on the 
establishment but able to claim a superannuation. 72 The Company had decided to reorganise 
the distribution of duties and pay for writers and extra clerks, increasing the numbers of writers 
                                                          
69 3 and 4 Will 4 Cap 85 Sec 7. 
70 BL L/AG/30/12 Organisation of the Home Establishment, 14 May 1817, p.105. 
71 Ibid., p.105. 
72 Boot, ‘Real Incomes of the British Middle Class, 1760-1850’, p.640; BL L/AG/30/12 Organisation of the 
Home Establishment, ‘A Report from the special Committee appointed to examine and report upon the Home 
Establishment’, 9 March 1831, pp.107-108 and 491-492. 
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since they were not able to claim a superannuation allowance unlike the extra clerks.73 After 
the 1833 Charter Act this slow, creeping policy increased tenfold. The 1813 East India 
Company Act had started to force the Company to open up trading for private interests but with 
the renewal of the charter and the 1833 East India Company Act all trading principles were 
removed.74 The 1833 Act stipulated that the Company should close its commercial business 
and sell off all property that was not to be retained by government.75 The reduction in staff 
numbers was dramatic, with the clerical establishment cut from 200 in 1828 to just fifty-six in 
1844.76  
With the prospect of compensating so many employees and, potentially, their families, the 
difficult decision regarding the scales of pensions had to be finalised. From the decisions made 
it is possible to understand how the Company viewed its relationship with employees. For 
example, in 1821 the Bank of England reduced its number of clerks by 174, granting employees 
one half of their salaries, or three-quarters if they had served for twenty years or more.77 
Through a basic level of compensation, that increased in relation to length of service, the Bank 
was able to reward those who were considered to deserve more due to long service. In this 
sense it replicated the superannuation system created for civil servants. The East India 
Company may have had a similar number of clerks to release but with the loss of all trade they 
also had thousands of labourers and maritime staff to consider.78 It was a daunting task and a 
duty the Company’s directors found difficult: 
‘Acting on the one hand as the guardian of all who have served the Company with zeal and 
fidelity, it became the Court of Directors to respond to the liberal disposition expressed towards 
their Servants, by the Proprietors throughout the discussions regarding the Charter, whilst on the 
other hand the Court feel themselves equally bound as Trustees for the Indian Territory to restrict 
liberality within the limits of what should appear to be due in justice to the pretentions of the 
respective claims.’79 
The Company wanted to appear benevolent and to be able to use a level of discretion, as they 
had with their ad hoc pensions for relieving their staff. However, they also had at least to appear 
fiscally responsible. The Board of Control and the government now held the purse strings and, 
                                                          
73 Ibid., p.492. 
74 Boot, ‘Real Incomes of the British Middle Class, 1760-1850’, p.640. 
75 4 and 4 Will 4 Cap 85 Sec 4. 
76 Boot, ‘Real Incomes of the British Middle Class, 1760-1850’, p.640. 
77 W. M. Acres, The Bank of England From Within 1649-1900, Vol. II (London, 1931), p.438. 
78 Makepeace, The East India Company’s London Workers, p.157. 
79 BL L/F/1/53, no.232 Finance and Home Committee, 5 August 1834. 
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although the Act allowed the Company to decide on the scale of compensation, it had to be 
approved by government. By February 1834, a scale of compensation pensions was decided 
upon for established clerks, extra clerks, writers, and a number of other grades, which paid 
two-thirds of their salary and emoluments for those who had served for ten years or more. 
Those who had served for less than ten years would receive a gratuity of between one and four 
years of service.80 The Company’s maritime commanders, mates, surgeons and other staff were 
granted a range of lump sums, and the remit of the Poplar Fund was extended to included 
officers who could not find employment as well as those who were sick.81 For the thousands 
of labourers a scale based on length of service was devised, ranging from 7s 6d a week for a 
labourer with under twenty years of service to 11s 6d for a labourer with thirty-five or more.82 
In a similar way to the Bank of England, compensation payments involved a scale that allocated 
greater reward to those who had served for more than ten years. It is notably more generous 
than the Bank of England and considering the differing regulations for different grades, more 
complex. 
In its simplest form the Company now had three types of pension: the ad hoc pensions, the 
1813 superannuation and the 1833 compensation pensions. These were all listed in the returns 
to the British government, and it is striking how costly the compensation pensions were. Table 
3 and Figure 2 below includes the compensation pensions for established home staff and 
labourers but not for the maritime staff. In 1835 over £50,000 was granted in compensation 
pensions to established staff and, although the cost reduced every year, it would be ten years 
before they were paid off. 
  
                                                          
80 BL B/187 Court Minutes, 26 February 1834, pp.469-470. 
81 Makepeace, The East India Company’s London Workers, p.158. 
82 Ibid., p.161. 
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Table 3. Amount of £s granted in pensions.83 
Year 
Ending 
Pension (£) Superannuation 
(£) 
Compensation 
Pension for Home 
Establishment (£) 
Labourers 
Compensation 
Pension (£) 
 
May 1835 463 3240 54653 12431 
 
May 1836 932 1873 8669 14344 
 
May 1837 3019 1906 4930 10769 
 
May 1838 1580 1740 5757 3887 
 
May 1839 1283 900 4701 5573 
 
May 1840 3027 1440 452 0 
 
May 1841 2879 220 995 0 
 
May 1842 2832 1123 200 0 
 
May 1844 1151 1445 0 0 
 
                                                          
83 PP 1835 [427] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1836 [379] Return of Home Accounts of 
East India Company; PP 1837 [460] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1837-8 [585] Return 
of Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1839 [342] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; 
PP 1840 [421] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1841 [405] Return of Home Accounts of 
East India Company; PP 1842 [319] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1844 [391] Return of 
Home Accounts of East India Company; PP 1845 [406] Return of Home Accounts of East India Company; 
Accounts of Total Gross Revenue of India. 
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Figure 2. Amount of £s granted in pensions.84 
 
In July 1834, it was resolved that compensation pensions could be commuted into a gratuity 
upon an application to the Court. To be able to convert a pension into one lump payment the 
application would have to include: 
‘first by the testimony of two persons of respectability to the effect that there is a 
reasonable prospect of the sum of money being more serviceable to the applicant & his 
family than the annual allowance, and secondly by such medical certificates as are 
usually required to satisfy the messenger of insurance offices that the person wishing 
to insure their lives are in good health, and have no chronic or other disease tending to 
shorten the duration of life.’85 
As a result of this change in the rules, William Baker, a labourer in the Private Trade 
Warehouse was successfully granted a lump sum in order to move his family to Canada.86 For 
Baker the compensation was an opportunity for a new, hopefully better life and he was able to 
work through the Company’s elaborate system to do this. The request for references on 
respectability and good health could be seen as the extension of the Company’s increasing 
control and restrictions over employees. They had to be trusted to spend the money wisely and 
not swindle the Company out of more money than it would have paid through a pension by 
                                                          
84 Ibid. 
85 BL L/AG/30/12 Organisation of the Home Establishment, p.123. 
86 Ibid., p.123. 
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dying early. However, it also demonstrated a level of concern for the employee’s family and 
dependents, and these requirements insured some level of security for them. This concern may 
have been real but it was not motivated purely out of benevolence. The 1833 Act had also left 
the Company open to claims fromfamilies of those officers affected by the loss of trade, and 
they were concerned about having to pay out twice. Families may have been frequently 
included in the ad hoc pensions in the Company’s traditional pension system, but they were 
not keen on having to make these payments out of obligation rather than discretion. 
The 1833 Act may have instigated a new scale of payment for pensions and compensation for 
the redundancy or early retirement of employees, but it did not replace the formal scheme of 
1813. In contrast, the British government had passed further Superannuation Acts in 1822, 
1824 and 1834 that had introduced employee contributions, removed them and introduced them 
again respectively. By the mid-1850s, the government was once again considering the system 
of superannuation provision but, as the 1857 Royal Commission into Civil Service 
superannuation demonstrated, the East India Company was still operating a system under an 
Act passed more than forty years earlier.87 The East India Company’s superannuation scheme 
was extremely generous and, possibly due to the reduced number of employees, it was a system 
that could continue to be applied. Additionally, the 1834 compensation pensions had given the 
Company the option of choosing a different scale if they decided they were removing 
employees due to a reduction in service rather than their ability to work due to ill-health or old 
age. The Civil Service, on the other hand, had continued to grow in size and was subject to 
calls for reform as a way to combat ‘Old Corruption’ as well as increase efficiency.88 
1858 and the Government of India Home Establishment 
Through the Government of India Act which was passed in 1858, the East India Company was 
absorbed into the British government and the Company was officially dissolved in 1874. Yet, 
despite the 1858 Act and the subsequent creation of the Government of India department within 
the Civil Service, the Company’s former employees and clerks were not included within the 
1859 Superannuation Act. This legislation standardised Civil Service superannuation 
administration and scales of payment for the rest of the century, and work leading up to it had 
even examined the pension provisions made within the East India Company home 
establishments part of the Select Committee and Royal Commission created to advise Civil 
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Service superannuation reform.89 Any new recruits to the department could retire under the 
terms of the 1859 Superannuation Act but the officers who had been transferred remained under 
the 1813 East India Company Act.90 
The fact that this government department was paid for out of the revenues from India appears 
to mean that the department’s pension provisions went under the radar and it was not until 1875 
that the issue was dealt with directly. In 1874 there had been a Select Committee examining 
how the revenues of India were being spent, but the Committee’s remit was restricted to the 
more pressing military matters. As a result, it recommended further enquiry into the issue of 
pensions, but was principally concerned with the civil departments based in India.91 
Nevertheless, in 1875, a Bill was constructed with the aim of providing a pension for ‘certain 
persons’ who did not come under the 1858 or 1869 Government of India Act.92 The Bill was 
to combat the perceived extravagant pensions and was a formal attempt to regulate to some 
degree by applying the 1859 Superannuation Act to the department.93 Yet, even this met with 
opposition. Henry Fawcett, MP for Hackney and later Postmaster General, demanded a more 
rigorous inquiry into the cost of pensions on Indian revenue; he suspected the cost was larger 
than Parliament realised and deserved closer attention rather than a rushed Bill.94 However, 
there was not the support for further inquiry and the rushed nature of the Bill led to its failure. 
Lord George Hamilton, Under Secretary for India, later declared to the Commons that the Bill 
was being re-evaluated, but it did not see a further reading.95 
Problems with pensions within the home establishment for the India Office were encountered 
again in 1892 after a rule had been adopted forcing civil servants to retire at the age of sixty-
five. It was found that this could disadvantage the officers who had transferred from the East 
India Company due to the different scale of payment stipulated by the 1813 Act. The 1859 Act 
allowed a pension increase of a sixtieth every year but, under the 1813 Act, if an employee was 
                                                          
89 Objection from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hansard, HC Deb, 15 February 1856, vol. 140 cc870-95. 
References to the East India Company in the evidence of R. M. Bromley and William Farr in PP 1856 [337]. 
Report from the Select Committee on Civil Service Superannuation; together with the proceedings of the 
committee, minutes of evidence, appendix and index pp.82 and 235, Appendix IV of 1857 Royal Commission 
on the Operation of the Superannuation Act, p.32. 
90 PP 1896 [8258] Royal Commission on Administration of Expenditure of India. First Report, Volume I. 
Minutes of Evidence, Evidence of Sir Waterfield, p.346. 
91 PP 1874 [329] Select Committee on Finance and Financial Administration of India Report, Proceedings, 
Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index. 
92 PP 1875 [74] Bill to provide Pension or Superannuation Allowance for Persons employed in Home 
Government of India. 
93 Hansard, HC Deb, 15 March 1875, vol. 222 cc1852-5. 
94 Ibid., cc.1852-3. 
95 Hansard, HC Deb, 18 March 1875, vol. 223 c70. 
 
91 
 
aged sixty-five and upwards with fifty or more years of service they could receive a sum not 
exceeding their whole salary and emoluments. The new rule was deemed unfair as it prevented 
these now aged employees from earning the highest scale of the pension available to them and 
at the same time prohibited them from obtaining the full proportion of pension relevant to their 
length of service.96 At the time a resolution was passed to exempt the former East India 
Company employees from the new rule, and in 1897 the East India Company Officers’ 
Superannuation Bill was passed to ensure there was no confusion over what these officers could 
claim.97 By 1897 there were only twelve officers left in the service to whom the old rule 
applied, and it was unclear where the pressure had come from to clear any doubt and ensure 
that these officers would receive pensions. The matter received national press coverage in The 
Times but passed through parliament with little comment.98 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, the government was no longer unique in providing a superannuation for employees 
and in the same year the House was also debating Bills and subjects related to superannuation 
for railway companies, teachers, ordnance factories, and poor law officials, to name a few. MP 
for Flint Boroughs, Herbert Lewis, stated there were at least fifteen or sixteen under 
consideration during the second reading of the East India Company Bill and, by comparison, it 
must have appeared relatively straightforward.99 
The East India Company superannuation scheme, despite having its origins in government 
interference, was generally considered to be at arm’s length from the 1870s onwards. It was 
considered to belong to another time, part of an older age, when extravagant pensions were 
acceptable. The number of officers were so few and the perceived cost on India revenue was 
so little that there was no urgency to curtail the superannuation rewards and, instead, the end 
of the century saw an affirmation of the remaining officers’ rights to a pension.  
Conclusion 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the East India Company established and maintained 
several generous pension schemes, some more systematic than others. These different schemes 
met different needs of the Company and were more than a simple act of benevolence: they 
were also an exercise in retaining control and power in the face of increasing encroachments 
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from the British government. Legislation was used to wield control over the Company’s trade 
and financial interactions with the outside world but, through the pension payments for its 
employees, the Company managed to maintain some degree of autonomy and control.  
Since the 1859 Superannuation Act met the need for the British government to have a system 
that brought traditional and modern ideas together, the East India Company’s multiple systems 
met their multiple needs to satisfy government but maintain their traditional ways of working. 
The 1859 Civil Service superannuation promoted new ideas aligned to radical reform and 
rejected notions of ‘Old Corruption’ and the Civil List, but it also reaffirmed the role of loyalty 
and service for financial reward. The move for change had come from radicals within 
government but also from the civil servants themselves. Matters were markedly different at the 
East India Company: change was initially enforced through government legislation to regulate 
pension payments, but simultaneously resisted through the sustained use of ad hoc pension 
payments. The Company would gradually install money saving measures through how it 
managed it staff, but it did not fully embrace the superannuation system for employees as a 
replacement for all pensions. It did not even manage the new superannuation system as an 
entitlement for staff as demonstrated by the experience of Charles Lamb. In a letter to a friend, 
Charles Lamb described his anxiety surrounding his pension application: 
‘The grand wheel is in agitation that is to turn up my fortune; but round it rolls, and will turn up 
nothing. I have a glimpse of freedom, of becoming a gentleman at large, but I am put off from 
day to day. I have offered my resignation, and it is neither accepted nor rejected. Eight weeks am 
I kept in this fearful suspense. Guess what an absorbing state I feel it. I am not conscious of the 
existence of friends, present or absent. The East India Directors alone can be that thing to me, or 
not. I have just learned that nothing will be decided this week. Why the next? Why any week?’100 
The Company had a formal system of superannuation, imposed by government, but it still 
wielded its power over employees to make the process appear discretionary. They may have 
had formulas to determine the scale of superannuation payments, but the decision still lay with 
the Court of Directors in a bid to disguise an entitlement as a gift and to ensure workers 
remained subordinate. The importance of managing its own pension systems was reinforced in 
the 1830s when an attempt by the Board of Control to take over the administration of pensions 
was rejected, but yet another type of payment was added to the Company’s pension lists 
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through compensation pensions. At every hurdle the Company fought to maintain its control 
and autonomy in the administration of pensions.  
By the end of the nineteenth century, even though the Company had been dismantled in 1874, 
a level of autonomy had been maintained for the few remaining employees who had transferred 
from the East India Company to the Civil Service. These civil servants were viewed as too few 
and too old to alter their pension allowances and the Act in 1897 removed any doubt and 
concern over the provision of pensions for the former East India Company officers. Becoming 
civil servants gave them greater certainty that they were entitled to a pension, but their status 
as East India Company men made them an anomaly within the Civil Service. The Civil Service 
superannuation may have brought together old and new ideas of what a pension was, but the 
East India Company fought to maintain older traditions by using multiple systems and keeping 
control of when and how they were granted.   
 
94 
 
Chapter 3:  
The Challenges of Government Standardisation:  
Pensions and the Post Office in the Nineteenth Century 
 
‘In 1867 I made up my mind to take a step in life which was not unattended with 
peril, which many would call rash, and which, when taken, I should be sure at 
some period to regret. This step was the resignation of my place in the Post 
Office … I had determined some years previously, after due consideration with 
my wife, to abandon the Post Office when I had put by an income equal to that 
pension to which I should be entitled if I remained in the department till I was 
sixty. That I had now done, and I sighed for liberty.’ 
Anthony Trollope, An Autobiography, 1883 
 
Anthony Trollope is possibly the most famous employee of the Victorian Post Office. Over the 
course of his thirty-three-year postal career he published many popular literary works, 
including the Barchester Chronicles, whilst also building a reputation as an acclaimed public 
servant. In his role of surveyor, he oversaw and improved the postal networks in Ireland and is 
credited with introducing the letterbox to Britain. However, despite his long service Trollope 
left the Post Office without a pension. In 1867, at the age of fifty-two and in good health, 
Trollope took the decision to resign his position to focus on his literary career. The extract from 
his autobiography above illustrates the difficulty in making this decision and the years of 
planning it had taken.1 The loss of a pension was both a great financial and emotional burden. 
Trollope was a vocal critic of the shift from patronage to merit in the recruitment and promotion 
of civil servants.2 With regard to this view, Patrick Joyce describes Trollope as being part of 
the ‘old mentality’, working and writing at a time of ‘conflict, and rapprochement, of old and 
new rationalities of governance’.3 It is therefore notable that Trollope did not pass any 
comments relating to the new superannuation system enacted in 1859. In a 1861 lecture 
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delivered at the General Post Office on the subject of the Civil Service as a profession, Trollope 
heavily criticised the use of examinations and the prospect of older loyal servants being left 
behind due to the promotion of their younger, more knowledgeable, counterparts.4 In his 
lecture, Trollope also criticised the sinecurist, as ‘a contemptible fellow’, but was careful in 
how he defined him.5 For Trollope a sinecurist was a man who took pay without giving 
anything for it; however, if he was receiving payment following past services, he was a 
‘pensioner’, a status that did not receive any criticism.6 With pensions, Trollope also appeared 
to sit between the two worlds of aristocratic and efficient government. He did not support the 
ad hoc unaccountable payments to the aristocracy but he did believe loyal service deserved 
remuneration. He therefore appeared to support government policy that had evolved over the 
early nineteenth century and, despite his sadness at not receiving a pension for his time in the 
Post Office, his autobiography still described the system as just and fair.7 
Trollope’s review of the operation of the Civil Service pension system within the Post Office 
has been echoed in the historiography. Superannuation in this period has tended to be combined 
with other aspects of welfare including paid sick leave, holidays and access to a medical 
officer—in other words, portrayed frequently as an important and rare benefit for workers. 
Martin Daunton celebrates these provisions, suggesting that the welfare conditions at the Post 
Office ‘freed the worker from the worst insecurities of existence: irregular employment at low 
wages, old age and ill-health’.8 Duncan Campbell-Smith lists the 1859 Superannuation Act as 
adding to ‘a range of privileges scarcely available to the working man anywhere else in the 
economy’.9 It is true that few nineteenth-century employments offered these types of 
provisions, particularly for the range of employees found in the Post Office and, as Alan 
Clinton notes, this would have helped to ‘create the stability and discipline necessary for the 
laborious and repetitive tasks that kept together a system whose like has never been seen 
since.’10 Clinton’s analysis not only focuses on the use of these benefits to improve the health 
and wellbeing of the workforce, but also as a mechanism to control it.  
Nevertheless, Daunton’s work makes it possible to appreciate a more ambivalent attitude from 
postal employees towards their pension, particularly when utilised by the authorities in an 
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attempt to regulate employee behaviour. For example, the Treasury rejected a call for higher 
wages in Manchester, Liverpool and Birmingham in the early 1870s since they believed ‘that 
the forfeiture of Pensions may be relied on to prevent a strike’. They were proved wrong: strikes 
followed in Warrington and Huddersfield.11 Despite the importance attributed to many of the 
employment benefits by officials, the Post Office employees’ priorities were nearly always 
higher wages and workers may have been sceptical of these extra benefits. 
In Chapter one it was established that the creation of the 1859 Superannuation Act was an 
attempt to realign two worlds and rebalance the relationship between government and civil 
servants for the modern world. By removing contributions and creating a pension system based 
on loyalty and service MPs were advocating a financial relationship that had greater similarities 
to the Civil List than the ideologies of self-help. However, as the parallel pension and 
superannuation schemes seen in the East India Company in Chapter two demonstrate, the more 
modern superannuation system did not meet all the needs of the employers who found value 
and flexibility in more traditional methods. Furthermore, as Charles Lamb demonstrated, even 
receiving this generous pension provision did not guarantee an employee’s happiness in 
retirement. 
In this chapter, an examination of the pension and superannuation provisions of what was to 
become the government’s biggest department clarifies the limitations of the 1859 
Superannuation Act. The Post Office had always operated under a centralised administration, 
but until 1859 the provision of pensions was generally very localised and funded in a variety 
of ways. These earlier systems were not necessarily as stable as the one introduced by the 
Superannuation Act of 1859, nor did they produce a sense of entitlement amongst employees. 
However, they were more often based on employee relationships and they could empower 
employees by giving them a greater role in their administration. The Act of 1859 not only put 
pension provision at the mercy of the faceless Treasury, where decisions were a mix of 
systematic equations with discretionary deductions with no room for negotiation, but it also 
installed a system that left the lowest paid workers with very small pensions. The 1859 Act 
may have intended to encourage traditional relationships based on close ties between 
government and loyal servants but, in practice, across large and low paid departments, this was 
not possible. As a result, many of these government pensioners became reliant on their families, 
charitable organisations or insurance schemes for support into old age. For the many workers 
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who fell through the net, a system based on loyalty and service was not appreciated or useful, 
and systems based on need were still important to fill the gap, seen through the development 
of the Rowland Hill Benevolent Fund. Potentially, the biggest benefit of these pensions was 
the status that came with them, as employees could list themselves as a ‘superannuated 
postman’ at a time when occupational identities were of increasing importance. The 1859 Act 
was a mixed blessing for Post Office employees, but it did achieve one aim—sustaining a 
relationship between employer and employee post-retirement, providing a title for those no 
longer working and a sense of respectability.  
Pensions before the 1859 Act 
Prior to the 1859 Superannuation Act the majority of Post Office employees were not able to 
claim a pension from their employer. The previous superannuation Acts had entitled only those 
employees based in London, Edinburgh and Dublin to a pension, and even this regulation 
varied according to grade. As a result, a variety of schemes that tended to be localised and 
financed through a variety of fees charged to the public or another employee were the 
predominant feature of postal pension provision in the early nineteenth century, if any existed 
at all.12 The nature of these arrangements makes them hard to trace and document, but the 
records do reveal some details. Many of these systems of financial provision were reliant on 
the relationships between employees or with the local administration. This meant that 
discretion could be used as a basis to distribute money, with decisions based on the details of 
a person’s need. They could be ad hoc or a defined system with distinct incomes but, without 
central government backing, most of these systems were limited and could not survive the 
changes to Post Office administration in the nineteenth century or the introduction of the 1859 
Act. 
One of the oldest methods of providing financial support in pensions came from a direct 
arrangement between two employees. The Commission on Fees in 1785 demonstrated that 
some roles in the eighteenth- century Post Office were filled by the succeeding person paying 
his predecessor part of his salary—in effect replacing any formal pension.13 This practice had 
been formally condoned by the government in 1684 when the Treasury installed a similar 
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provision for landwaiters in the Port of London who had to retire due to illness.14 Sir Norman 
Chester argues that prior to 1780 it was accepted that an office ‘constituted a form of property’ 
and consequently it could be used to provide an income in old age.15 Notably, he suggests that 
the practice was more persistent in the Post Office, where officers continued to make ‘private 
bargains’ with their successors to provide for their old age, even when the practice had become 
unpopular.16  
This persistence can be seen within a superannuation fund specifically for the London letter-
carriers, established in 1807, and maintained from fees accumulated from a new early morning 
delivery as well as Christmas gratuities and other sources.17 From a short history of the fund 
written by Post Office Secretary Francis Freeling in 1831, it is clear that these fees and 
payments were effectively paying the wages of the letter-carriers with the surplus being used 
to supply them with a superannuation fund. Trouble for the fund came when the delivery of 
letters in the metropolis was reorganised, the fees were no longer being collected but the 
superannuation expenses still needed to be paid. Freeling noted that in 1831 there were twenty-
four superannuated letter-carriers on the fund, but there were also two additional letter-carriers 
plus the inspector of letter-carriers to be compensated for managing the administration of the 
fund.18 In the 1830s, the fund was running in deficit and by the 1840s the letter-carriers were 
petitioning to stop paying into the fund. It is unclear if contributions from their salaries were 
introduced to keep the fund afloat, or if letter-carriers saw the use of Christmas gratuities and 
other such payments as deductions from their wages.19  
From 1793, the government had begun to introduce reforms to move away from fees to a 
system of salaries; yet this hostility to fees did not apply to this source of revenue for the Post 
Office letter-carriers. It is easy to believe that similar funds may have existed in other parts of 
the country prior to the introduction of the uniform penny post in 1840. Previously, people 
were expected to pay on the receipt of a letter, which meant that letter-carriers and messengers 
were often taking money or ‘fees’ from the public. The penny post fundamentally changed how 
people paid for post and quite possibly removed opportunities for this type of fund. 
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Furthermore, these types of funds allowed a level of involvement and management from even 
the lowest paid and lowest ranking staff. Although decisions were taken by the Postmaster 
General and communication maintained with the Treasury, the early nineteenth-century 
London letter-carriers assisted in the management and administration of their fund, and this 
provided a supplement to their wages. This was criticised in 1836 by the inspector of letter-
carriers, Frederick Kelly, as he argued that they were paid too much and this payment was 
‘instrumental to the exhaustion of the Fund’.20 The financial management and administration 
of the fund may have been a focus for criticism, but essentially the superannuation fund was a 
secondary product from surplus revenue of fees and, consequently, following changes to the 
operation of the Post Office in the 1830s and 1840s, the fund was no longer sustainable. Despite 
this, the central administration attempted to maintain the fund for as long as possible—that is, 
until the letter-carriers themselves petitioned for its removal. 
The letter-carriers’ superannuation fund was not the only fund maintained by fees. This method 
was also used to provide support for widows and orphans. In 1841 there were several 
applications to the Postmaster General and the Treasury on behalf of widows, including Mary 
White, widow of a letter-carrier from Dublin, whose husband had been receiving a pension 
from the ‘Fine or Suspensions Fund’.21 According to the Secretary of the Post Office, this Fund 
had originated forty years earlier under the sanction of the then Postmaster General of Ireland. 
It was maintained by fines imposed upon mail coach contractors, mail guards, letter-carriers 
and others in the office for irregularities and was used to make small payments to the widows 
of this inferior class of officers. The fund had run smoothly until approximately 1828, when 
receipts of fines started to fall and many payments were discontinued, including that to Mrs 
White. The consolidation of the British and Irish offices in 1831 brought an end to the Fund 
altogether. It was felt that ‘the petitioners has no claim on this Department’ and, consequently, 
Mrs White was refused her plea.22 Unlike the case of the London letter-carriers fund, there was 
little attempt from central administration to keep this fund alive. The abandonment of women 
like Mrs White illustrates the increasing reluctance to support employees’ families as the 
government tried to move away from ideas associated with the Civil List and ‘Old Corruption’. 
Furthermore, as the fund was financed through fines and not through the work of employees, 
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like that of the London letter-carriers, there was little workers could do to sustain or champion 
the fund, even if they wanted to. 
Nevertheless, workers and families were also able to find financial support through unofficial 
funds and collections arranged by postal staff. Civil servants were not officially allowed to 
organise benefit societies or unions, but by studying investigations related to disciplined 
officers, it is clear that postal employees would band together to help those they perceived to 
be in need. This attitude was exemplified in the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the 
sub-sorter Thomas Mitchell in 1846 and the letter-carrier Robert Grapes in 1847, in addition to 
a subsequent investigation into the Post Office letter-carriers and sub-sorters.23 The 
investigation was designed to determine if a conspiracy existed among these lower levels of 
the Post Office; far from uncovering anything sinister, however, it revealed that a number of 
collections or raffles had been organised for the benefit of Thomas Mitchell and other workers 
who were suspended or dismissed without pay. The report concluded that no conspiracy 
existed, but postal and government officials were displeased that workers were organising ways 
to support colleagues in times of need, since it discredited their attempt to punish them by 
removing pay.24 Due to the hostility towards this type of behaviour, it is not surprising that 
there is no concrete evidence of Post Office benefit and friendly societies in the UK, yet, this 
small episode suggests that postal workers were organising small and unofficial groups similar 
to the large benefit and friendly societies to provide similar assistance for workers and their 
families.25 This example obviously focuses on an employee being disciplined, but it is possible 
that workers would have done something similar for an elderly colleague or deceased 
colleague’s family in need of help.  
Alongside the various unofficial and small-scale funds and financial relationships, there were 
a small number of employees that were permitted to apply for a government pension prior to 
the 1859 Superannuation Act.26 Employees based in London, Edinburgh and Dublin could pay 
contributions towards a fund as stipulated in the 1829 Treasury Minute, and later formalised 
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through the 1834 Act. One exception to this rule concerns the letter-carriers based in these 
cities who were deemed to earn too little to pay a contribution but could still claim a pension. 
No-one outside of London, Edinburgh and Dublin was eligible and the number of applications 
to the Treasury was very low. The 1856 Select Committee included evidence of every post 
office clerk who had been appointed after August 1829 and left before April 1856. Out of 491 
employees the vast majority resigned of their own accord or were dismissed. Remarkably, only 
ten were pensioned, whereas eighty-five had died in service.27 This trend was echoed for the 
lower paid officials, where the ‘mechanical’ workers (including letter-carriers and sorters) from 
London, Dublin and Edinburgh were predominantly recorded to have resigned or died in 
service rather than receiving a pension in the five years prior to December 1853. In London, 
206 ‘mechanical’ staff resigned or left by other means, whereas only thirteen received a 
superannuation and 106 died in service.28 The figures were less dramatic in Dublin and 
Edinburgh as there were less staff members, yet it was still evident that a worker was far more 
likely to resign from service—forty-two from the Dublin office and nineteen from Edinburgh—
when compared to those who were pensioned—only eight from Dublin and four Edinburgh.29 
The deaths in service were also quite low with only eight deaths in the Dublin office and five 
from Edinburgh reported.30 In the majority of cases, whether staff paid into the superannuation 
system or not, it appeared that many were more likely to resign, or, if in London, work until 
their death, rather than seek a pension. Of those clerks who applied for a pension all of them 
had worked for over twelve years, even though the 1834 Act only asked for a minimum of ten 
years, and half of them worked for over seventeen years which took them up the scale to four-
twelfths of their salary rather than the minimum of three-twelfths.31 The unfair nature of this 
jumping scale is seen through the example of an employee pensioned after sixteen years and 
eleven months. W. S. Cox, from the Circulation Office, was on the cusp of moving up the 
pension scale. However, due to ill-health or a lack of knowledge of the regulations, he stopped 
work a month before his pension was due to increase by a twelfth.32 There were also a large 
number of employees who died in service having worked over ten years and it is not possible 
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to know the exact reasons why these men continued to work though eligible for pension, but 
there is a chance that, for many, work was more attractive than retirement. 
Looking at the pension applications for 1841, two things become clear. First, these pensions 
were not pursued to a great extent and, secondly, there was some flexibility in the system since 
workers outside of London, Dublin and Edinburgh applied for support. In 1841 there were a 
total of twenty-three applications for pensions and an additional nineteen notifications of deaths 
of current pensioners. These applications were not all on the Superannuation Fund and included 
requests for compensation following the death of a relative who worked at the Post Office. The 
majority of the applications in 1841 were from letter-carriers (nine out of twenty-three) which 
is probably a reflection of the larger numbers of employees in this role. Furthermore, contrary 
to the details of the rules of pension applications detailed in the Royal Commission report of 
1857 and the Postmaster General report of 1871, as well as the evidence supplied to the 1856 
Select Committee, not all of these applications were from employees based in London, 
Edinburgh or Dublin. The records for 1841 include applications for superannuation from a mail 
guard from Birmingham, a clerk from Glasgow, gratuities from a messenger from Carrigallen, 
and a postmistress from New Windsor.33 From the records it is unclear whether these workers 
were given an allowance or payment, but it is notable that they applied in the first place: it was 
a process that had to be endorsed by the Post Office Secretary. The unusual nature of the 
application from a clerk in Glasgow was highlighted by the Secretary’s accompanying letter to 
the Treasury: 
‘I beg to return the memorial the Lord Provost and Magistrates of Glasgow transmitted 
to me on the 15th Instant recommending Mr Mack Haliburton formerly a Clerk in the 
Post Office at that city for a superannuation allowance and to refer your Lordships to 
my Report (copy enclosed) of the 15th July 1839 upon a similar memorial. On that 
occasion I explained that it never has been the practice to grant superannuation 
allowances to County Postmasters or their clerks, but recommended the case as a proper 
one for the Exercise of the Royal Bounty, and under that recommendation a sum of 
£100 was granted.’34 
                                                          
33 PM POST 1/55 Treasury Letters (November 1840-February 1841), PM POST 1/56 Treasury Letters (January-
June 1841), PM POST 1/57 Treasury Letters (April-August 1841). 
34 PM POST 1/56 Treasury Letters (January-June 1841). 
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It appears that the previous success from the Glasgow office encouraged the postmaster to 
recommend another employee for superannuation, perhaps understanding the important 
precedent it had set.  
The employees at the Post Office had access to a range of systems and schemes designed to 
support those in retirement and need. However, most of these schemes were not official and 
could not be assumed to cover all post offices around the country. Furthermore, they were 
susceptible to changes in how the service was administered and financed and, since the Post 
Office reformed through the penny post and other innovations, many of these older systems 
were not sustainable. A number of employees were eligible for the formal government 
superannuation but the uptake was minimal, with many more employees dying in service than 
applying for the pension. The ‘jumping’ pension scale may have pushed many to work for 
longer in the hope of obtaining a larger pension, or due to lack of information on the pension 
regulations, or perhaps just a feeling that the pension was not large enough to live on. In any 
case, there is evidence that postal officials attempted to circumvent the rules to help and support 
employees outside of London, Dublin and Edinburgh through the official system; although 
there is little evidence to suggest they were always successful. It is possible that the more 
informal and unofficial provisions provided better assistance for employees in old age because 
they could be personalised and tailored to need based on closer relationships and more 
information. 
The 1859 Superannuation Act and the Post Office 
The 1859 Superannuation Act was designed to stop anomalies and standardise pension 
provisions across the Civil Service, but whether these changes were welcome is questionable. 
The reform was framed around a move away from the Civil List and ‘Old Corruption’; 
however, sinecures and placemen would have been a far cry from the everyday life of the 
numerous letter-carriers, sorters, clerks, postmasters and postmistresses across the country. At 
this time, the postal service was also changing radically and the traditional methods of welfare 
cultivated by workers, such as using fees, were no longer feasible. Superannuation was born 
out of the growing Civil Service bureaucracy and was often used to justify keeping salaries 
low, but for a department where pay was a recurring grievance throughout the century, it is 
interesting that the value of a pension system based on a fraction of salary was never 
questioned. To parliament the removal of contributions and the extension of the entitlement of 
superannuation payments were part of ensuring a working relationship based on loyalty and 
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service, but through examination of the pension applications made by some of the lowest paid 
civil servants it is clear that the pension meant something distinctly different to them. 
 
Figure 3. Number of Permanent (on the establishment) Employees at the Post 
Office from Postmaster General Annual Reports35 
The debates surrounding the extension of pension entitlement within the Post Office have clear 
significance when looking at the dramatic increase in the number of employees in the years 
between 1830 and 1900. This was not only due to the expansion of the postal service through 
innovations like the uniform penny post, but also to the growth of the Post Office’s remit and 
changes in practice which could not have been foreseen in the 1850s. New departments and 
services were created and amalgamated including the Money Order department, the Savings 
Bank and the domestic telegraph network, thus requiring new staff with new skills.36 
Furthermore, the railways changed how the mail was delivered and sorted, removing and 
developing employment roles. For example, by the 1870s the number of mail guards had 
dropped to only twenty-eight when there had been over 200 in 1859.37 As a revenue 
department, the government kept a keen eye on developments within the Post Office and at 
                                                          
35 The figures taken from the Postmaster General Reports are not all precise as the reports list the values of 
permanent staff differently over the years. They sometimes include everyone on the establishment, or 
occasionally exclude Postmasters or sub-postmasters. I have included where possible all established employees 
including Postmasters and sub-postmasters. 
36 The Money Order office was initially set up in 1792 and was overseen by Post Office clerks but was not 
officially recognised as a branch of the Post Office department until 1838. See Treasury Commission history 
and PP 1854-55 [1913] First report of the Postmaster General, on the Post Office, p.17. 
37 PP 1860 [2657] Sixth Report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office and PP 1880 [C.2670] Twenty-
Sixth Report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office. 
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least eight detailed reports were conducted by committees or commissioners alongside a large 
number of returns and departmental reports delivered to the Treasury and parliament between 
1830 and 1900.38 The ‘Return of the Post Office in London, Dublin and Edinburgh’ from 1834 
does not give any details of the ‘inferior staff’, which included the sorters and letter-carriers, 
but does give the figures for the more senior staff, from the Postmaster-General to the senior 
clerks, and the General Post Office London, the largest Post Office in the country with 207 
employees.39 By 1845, the changes in the Post Office’s service instigated by Rowland Hill saw 
a moderate growth in employees. The General Post Office in London employed 459 staff, 
excluding the sub-sorters and letter-carriers (840 including these ‘inferior’ staff). This was due 
to the addition of the large Money Order Office, the smaller Solicitor’s Office, and the increase 
in the Inland Office and Secretary’s Office.40  
  
                                                          
38 PP 1835 [416] Post-Office. Report of Commissioners of Post-Office Inquiry, dated 15 December 1834, with 
evidence, &c.; PP 1836 [49] [50] [51] The fourth report of the commissioners appointed to inquire into the 
management of the Post-Office Department; PP 1844 [582] Report from the Secret Committee on the Post 
Office; together with the appendix; PP 1850 [1262] Report of the commissioners appointed to investigate the 
question of Sunday labour in the Post Office; PP 1854 [1816] Report upon the Post Office, 1854; PP 1872 
[C.485] Report on Sunday labour in the Post Office; PP 1884-85 [C.4267] [C.4267-I] Central Post Office 
buildings and establishments. Report of a committee appointed by the Treasury to examine the subject of central 
Post Office buildings and establishments; PP 1884-85 [208] Report from the Select Committee on Post Office 
Sites Bill; together with the proceedings of the committee, and minutes of evidence, and PP 1887 [274] Report 
from the Select Committee on Sunday postal labour; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of 
evidence, and appendix. 
39 PP 1834 [20] Post Office establishments in London, Dublin, and Edinburgh. 
40 PP 1845 [72] Post Office. Return of all persons employed in the General Post Office in London and in Dublin; 
with the date of each appointment, nature of the duties, amount of salary, and fund from which each salary is 
paid. These figures also exclude the employees given for the London District Post Office as opposed to the 
General London Post Office. 
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Table 4. Number of established and unestablished staff employed by the Post Office from the 
Postmaster General Reports 
Year No. of 
unestablished 
staff 
No. of 
established 
staff 
Year No. of 
unestablished 
staff 
No. of 
established 
staff 
1854/5 
 
21,574 1877 
 
45,506 
1855 
 
22,547 1878 
 
45,947 
1856 
 
23,130 1879 
 
46,192 
1857 
 
23,731 1882 40,000 44,445 
1858 
 
24,372 1883 44,000 46,000 
1859 
 
24,802 1885 44,702 51,444 
1860 
 
25,282 1886 47,110 54,800 
1861 
 
25,473 1890 52,496 61,057 
1862 
 
25,380 1891 54,116 63,868 
1863-8 not known not known 1892 57,532 68,231 
1869 
 
27,270 1893 61,256 
 
1870 
 
28,429 1894 61,820 
 
1871 
 
38,000 1895 61,571 79,235 
1873 
 
42,300 1896 63,414 81,286 
1874 
 
44,000 1897 65,842 
 
1876 
 
45,024 1898 71,842 88,100 
 
The annual Postmaster General Reports provide the most regular account of the number of 
employees in the Post Office; yet, as can be seen from Table 4, above, even these reports were 
not consistent. The Postmaster General’s first annual report, delivered in 1854/5, numbered the 
staff attached to the Chief Office in London as approximately 2,500 out of a total of 21,574 
Post Office employees. This growth appears to be down to the extension of the Post Office 
Inland service and the large number of postmasters (the people in charge of the post offices 
across the country), totalling nearly 10,000, the largest category of employees in the department 
and closely followed by the letter-carriers who numbered closer to 9,000.41 By 1872 this had 
                                                          
41 PP 1854-55 [1913], p.20. 
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increased to 38,000, including 9,000 employees engaged in telegraph work, a new service 
absorbed by the Post Office in 1870. From this point the Post Office continued to grow at a 
substantial rate, claiming 63,868 employees by 1890, but with the addition of unestablished 
staff (those not in full-time employment) the number totalled 117,868. By the end of the century 
the number of employees was a staggering 159,942 (of which 67,832 were established and a 
remaining 71,842 unestablished).42 Figures for unestablished staff and female employees began 
to appear from approximately 1884 and are significant in portraying the growing presence of 
these ‘inferior’ groups. 43 Women had been employed by the Post Office in increasing numbers 
following the nationalisation of the telegraph in 1870: the majority were unestablished, part-
time workers, but women were increasingly present in full-time clerical or telegraphist roles.44 
The department celebrated their supposed aptitude for working in one place doing one 
monotonous task and, pointedly, could pay them less than men for doing the same job.45 
Women’s ‘inferior’ status was further justified with the implementation of a marriage bar from 
1876, which forced women to leave the service upon getting married.46  
According to restrictions in the 1859 Act, unestablished staff were unable to apply for a 
pension. This was justified by the understanding that unestablished letter-carriers and postmen 
were thought to work part-time and hold another job. By the 1880s the number of unestablished 
staff almost equalled those on the establishment, underlining how significant the decision was 
to apply the 1859 Act only to full-time established staff members. Furthermore, for the growing 
number of women employed on the establishment, the marriage bar restricted any claim to a 
pension. To compensate for the loss of a pension, a ‘marriage gratuity’ was introduced from 
the 1890s: it entitled established women who had worked for the Post Office for over six years 
to a one-off payment. Samuel Cohn has described this as an ‘enormous financial commitment’ 
                                                          
42 PP 1872 [C.645] Eighteenth report of the Postmaster General, on the Post Office, p.18; PP 1890-91 [C.6540] 
Thirty-seventh report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p.2, and PP 1899 [C.9463] Post Office. 
Forty-fifth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p.16. 
43 There had been female postmistresses before this time, but these were looked upon as unestablished staff. 
44 H. Glew, Gender, Rhetoric and Regulation: Women’s Work in the Civil Service and London County Council 
1900-55 (Manchester, 2016), p.18 and Daunton, Royal Mail, p.195. For further discussions on female postal 
workers and clerical workers in the Civil Service, see M. Zimmeck, ‘Marry in Haste, Repent at Leisure: 
Women, Bureaucracy and the Post Office, 1870-1920’, in M. Savage and A. Witz (eds), Gender and 
Bureaucracy (Oxford, 1992). 
45 These ‘qualities’ were described in an 1871 report to the Postmaster General and discussed in more detail in 
Glew, Gender, Rhetoric and Regulation, p.18. 
46 Ibid., p.179. 
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but, as Helen Glew points out, this financial commitment was decidedly cheaper than a full 
pension if married women had been allowed to stay in service.47  
The regulations may have been detailed and unambiguous, but it is also evident from the 
pension applications that there were attempts to bend the rules for certain staff members, 
particularly if a temporary worker had been employed by the Post Office for a long time or was 
retiring due to an injury at work. Nevertheless, despite a large permanent workforce and the 
appearance of some exceptions, for temporary staff the uptake for the superannuation 
employees were entitled to is surprising low. From figures given in the Postmaster General’s 
annual reports, the proportion of pensioned staff to permanent staff never reached eight per 
cent. 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of pensioners to permanent staff in the Post Office.48 
From Figure 4, above, we can see there was a steady increase after the 1859 Act, but also a 
notable drop in 1871. This drop is probably due to the spike in employment at the Post Office 
with the nationalisation of the telegraph, rather than any dramatic decline in pension 
applications. As the data between 1871 and 1883 was not recorded we are unable to tell if this 
drop was sustained or quickly recovered; however, comparing the number of applications from 
1861 and 1891 the rate appears to be consistent. In 1861 the total number of permanent 
established staff working in the Post Office was 25,473; in 1891 the total was 68,231.49 For 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 
48 The figures are taken from the Postmaster General Reports. Between 1871 and 1899 the only years the report 
mentions the number of pensioners is 1883 and 1886. 
49 PP 1862 [2984] Eighth report of the Postmaster General, on the Post Office, p.23 and PP 1892 [C.6775] 
Thirty-eighth report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p.2. 
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1861 the 180 nominations equate to just 0.71% of the workforce, which is similar to the same 
calculation for 1891 which equates to 0.68%. Although the data suggests that uptake was low, 
without more details relating to the turnover of employees or even the ages of the workforce it 
is fairly inconclusive. 
When we look in more detail at the conditions under which postal staff were retiring it appears 
that many workers put it off for as long as possible. Within the details of the 1859 Act, it was 
stipulated that an employee was entitled to a pension from the age of sixty and after ten years 
of service. The percentage of their pay increased with the number of years they had worked for 
the Post Office, but the Act suggested they were encouraged to retire after their sixtieth birthday 
and after 1890 it was compulsory for employees to retire at sixty-five.50  
Table 5. Number of Employees retiring in 1861 with role, average age and length of 
service.51 
Category 
Cause of 
Retirement 
Number of 
those 
retiring 
Role Average 
Age 
Average 
Length of 
service (years) 
Age 34 Rural Messenger 65 16.34 
Age 21 Letter-Carrier 66 22.98 
Age 7 Messenger 67 17.76 
Age 5 
Auxiliary Letter-
Carrier 
65 
23.95 
Age 4 Postmaster 68 27.31 
Age 4 Sorter 66 30.00 
Age 3 Mounted Messenger 64 18.33 
Physical 36 Letter-Carrier 46 17.39 
Physical 23 Rural Messenger 58 17.60 
Physical 10 Sorter 40 14.34 
Physical 6 Messenger 61 15.81 
Physical 4 Clerk 35 12.02 
Physical 3 Mail Guard 55 28.47 
                                                          
50 Employees being retired at sixty-five years are detailed as being ‘Under provisions of the Order in Council of 
15 August 1890’. 
51 Data compiled from PM POST 1/109 January-April 1861, PM POST 1/110 May-August 1861, PM POST 
1/111 September-December 1861. 
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In Table 5, above, it is evident that, even though employees could retire at the age of sixty, 
those whose reason for retiring was age (being ‘over 60’) were, on average, in their mid- to late 
sixties. Furthermore, all of those retiring, whether due to illness or age, had worked (on 
average) more than ten years, the minimum outlined in the Act. None of the roles appear to 
have an average close to the maximum of forty years; in fact none of these roles appear to show 
a trend of working towards the retirement conditions. It could be argued that since this data is 
from 1861 it may be too soon after the 1859 Act was enforced to have encouraged a change in 
behaviour from the postal employees. 
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Table 6. Number of Employees retiring in 1891 with role, average age and length of 
service.52 
Category 
Cause of 
Retirement 
Number 
of those 
retiring 
Role Average 
Age 
Average Length 
of service (years) 
Age 37 Postmaster 69 43.38 
Age 30 Postman 65 34.40 
Age 26 Rural Postman 67 33.43 
Age 11 Clerk 68 40.57 
Age 11 Sub Postmaster 71 36.32 
Age 6 Chief Clerk 66 42.08 
Age 5 Postmistress 69 40.83 
Age 5 Sorter 62 36.48 
Mental 9 Telegraphist 32 13.25 
Mental 7 Postman 38 22.87 
Physical 69 Postman 43 21.38 
Physical 36 Rural Postman 48 43.41 
Physical 33 Telegraphist 31 13.97 
Physical 11 Clerk 41 19.94 
Physical 9 Overseer 48 25.93 
Physical 9 Sorter 48 72.49 
Physical 9 Sorting Clerk 29 12.56 
Physical 7 Sorting Clerk and 
Telegraphist 
34 13.61 
 
However, data from 1891 suggests that staff were no more likely to take advantage of the 
minimum requirements of the Superannuation Act than in 1861. In fact, they appear to be 
working longer and further into old age than thirty years earlier, despite sixty-five being the 
compulsory age of retirement. 
                                                          
52 Data compiled from PM POST 1/227 March-April 1891, PM POST 1/228 May-June 1891; PM POST 1/229 
July-August 1891; PM POST 1/230 September-October 1891 and PM POST 1/231 November-December 1891. 
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This could be because the staff were generally unaware of the provision, or that it was not made 
available to them. The Post Office regularly produced handbooks and instructions for staff 
members, but details about the superannuation scheme did not appear in them. The 1860 
handbook for Manchester letter-carriers contains various instructions on what is expected of a 
letter-carrier whilst on duty, as well as a warning that his uniform was not his property and 
should be returned to the Postmaster when he leaves the service, but no details of an entitlement 
to a pension after certain conditions.53 This may have been because this document was 
produced very specifically for Manchester and the duties related to that area; however, in a 
more general handbook of ‘Instructions to Letter Carriers’ produced in 1869 there is also no 
mention of the superannuation scheme. There is a reference to life insurance provisions that 
had been established for staff, but not superannuation.54 In contrast, an earlier book of 
instructions from 1850, nine years before the Superannuation Act, instruction No. 22 stated: 
‘As an incentive to good conduct, the Postmaster General is authorised to grant 
superannuation allowances to those letter carriers who are disabled by accident or 
infirmity after long and faithful services’.55 
This is a very vague statement with no fixed details of the length of service required, exactly 
what qualified as a ‘long and faithful service’, how much these allowances equated to or the 
procedure for securing this superannuation allowance. It also describes the superannuation as 
an ‘incentive’, not an entitlement (once certain conditions were met), and many letter-carriers 
may have interpreted this type of benefit as a perk for the few, rather than a right for all full-
time staff. This instruction highlights the significant change the 1859 Act was supposed to 
bring into place, but the absence of any similar instruction in later books is marked and suggests 
that the Post Office officials may have wanted to keep superannuation as an incentive rather 
than publicise it as a right.  
The superannuation as incentive rather than entitlement fits the lens through which many 
nineteenth-century postal workers viewed their welfare benefits—as a mechanism to control 
behaviour rather than meeting a need within the workforce. In the early nineteenth century, 
threats of discipline could be relied on as a powerful method of control. However, the removal 
of corporal punishment for the stealing of letters in 1835 marked the beginning of a change in 
approach. Emphasis was put on the control of behaviour and appearance instead of the threat 
                                                          
53 PM POST 68/921 Handbook for Manchester letter-carriers, 1860. 
54 PM POST 68/159 Instructions to Letter-Carriers, 1869, p.16. 
55 PM POST 68/158 Instructions to Letter-Carriers, c.1850. 
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of punishment. Although postal workers continued to be subject to ‘rough and inconsiderate’ 
investigation into their honesty.56 Military techniques, such as good conduct stripes and 
military drilling for boy messengers were seen in the latter half of the nineteenth century but 
Daunton asserts that ‘discipline in the Post Office was in fact not militaristic’; instead, he 
argues that it rested upon a ‘bureaucratic rationality of career progression and benefits’.57 So, 
the stripes were framed around ideas of promotion, demotion (if removed) and pay increments; 
equally, uniforms and the promise of pensions were used as a replacement for pay rises.58 
Writing in 1872, the Postmaster General outlined this belief clearly in his annual report. He felt 
that the Post Office workers’ complaints about low pay were unfounded and that the public 
suffered under a misconception that the ‘money payment’ indicated ‘the whole remuneration’ 
where in fact he believed ‘that the officers and their families are in a better condition than they 
would be if the contingent benefits were exchanged for higher pay.’59 Nevertheless, for many 
letter-carriers good conduct stripes did not fit with notions of promotion for merit or the 
employment structures that had been established for decades; moreover, they were not 
answering the call for higher wages. In 1872 the men of the South Western District protested 
against the introduction of the stripes, shouting ‘Buttons and stripes won’t feed our children, 
it’s all favouritism’; and, in 1874, the London offices petitioned against the use of the stripes.60 
For the workers this type of system was a gimmick, a way to avoid increasing their salaries. 
Another benefit that became integral to the pension system and was often celebrated by the 
authorities but questioned by the workers was the medical examination. First suggested in 
1854, medical examinations were introduced ‘to ascertain that the candidate has no physical or 
mental defect or disease which is likely to incapacitate him for the public service’; and from 
autumn 1856 letter-carriers were being dismissed during their probation periods due to 
‘developing a disease’.61 It took some time for the practice to spread throughout the service, 
but once installed applicants could be refused on account of a medical condition or disease. 
This was significant for the superannuation system as the Post Office was able to employ the 
healthiest workers available to them and so reduce the risk of high costs of sick pay or 
superannuation allowances. The Postmaster General’s report for 1870 openly celebrated the 
                                                          
56 Clinton, Post Office Workers, p.45. 
57 Daunton, Royal Mail, p. 212. 
58 Uniforms were used to replace a pay rise in order to appease rural letter-carriers in 1872. See Clinton, Post 
Office Workers, p.47. 
59 PP 1872 [C.645], p.19. 
60 Clinton, Post Office Workers, pp.51 and 124. 
61 PM POST 64/23 Probation and Medical Examinations: Report of Committee, 22 May 1894, pp.1-2. 
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health of the Post Office’s pensioners, attributing the average age of retirement at sixty-three 
in Scotland ‘to the healthiness of that part of the country’.62 Although the average ages of 
retirement in England and Ireland were lower—fifty-seven and fifty-nine respectively—the 
Postmaster General notes that the oldest pensioners in each division were eighty-one and 
eighty-two in England, seventy-two and seventy-three in Scotland and seventy and seventy-
four in Ireland.63   
In addition to giving approval for retirement on the grounds of ill-health, medical officers were 
frequently tasked with visiting sick workers in their homes and administering care and 
medication where necessary.64 Through this provision postal workers were given access to 
medical treatment they would not have been able to afford otherwise and they also benefited 
from the medical officers’ recommendations concerning the improvement of working 
conditions. For example, the first medical report suggested increasing ventilation in the 
basement for the messengers’ kitchen and in 1872 the medical officer recommended 
vaccinating all employees against smallpox, whether they had previously suffered from the 
disease or not.65 However, for postal staff the duties of the medical officer felt intrusive and 
unnecessary: medical officers were seen as ‘medical police’ and, if they were not looking for 
reasons to dismiss a worker on probation due to a concealed illness, they were looking for those 
who feigned or exaggerated illness to get out of work.66  
The paper forms that had to be completed to apply for a pension also brought together a number 
of aspects deemed to be controlling the behaviour of employees. As part of the application for 
a pension, the Post Office Secretary had to complete a form on the worker’s behalf that required 
details related to their employment history. This comprised of the number of sick days, amount 
of annual leave taken, changes to their job role including promotion and any other benefits 
received such as good conduct stripes, a uniform or anything else that could be attributed a 
value. Patrick Joyce has discussed the use of the ‘form’ within the Post Office to ‘simplify and 
standardise’, it was a bureaucratic tool that could distil information making it ‘plain and 
                                                          
62 PP 1871 [C.438] Seventeenth report of the Postmaster General, on the Post Office, p.24. 
63 Ibid. 
64 For further discussion of the role and work of the Post Office’s medical department, see K. McIlvenna, D. 
Brown and D. R. Green, ‘ “The Natural Foundation of Perfect Efficiency”: Medical Services and the Victorian 
Post Office’, Social History of Medicine (2019, forthcoming). 
65 ‘Medical Office’s First Periodical Report’, Appendix L in PP 1856 [2048] Second report of the Postmaster 
General, on the Post Office, pp.76-77 and ‘Extracts from the Medical Report upon the London Offices for the 
year 1871’, Appendix R in PP 1872 [C.645], p.45. 
66 Evidence from Hobhouse Committee in 1906, in Clinton, Post Office Workers, p.47. 
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terse’.67 Pension applications could compress a long and complex career into a few elements 
of good and bad behaviour, with a final calculation made based on those factors. 
However, the Treasury could also make deductions from the final pension relating, for 
example, to occasions when an officer had to be disciplined or to the fact that they had taken a 
large number of sick days. William Johnston King, a postman in Annan, Scotland, applied for 
a pension in 1891 at the age of forty-three after twenty-three years of service. Suffering from 
‘atrophy of right arm’, he had his allowance deducted due to the number of sick days he had 
taken. King had effectively been off sick since March the previous year, clocking up 284 sick 
days. Despite his good conduct stripes, the Treasury deducted a year’s worth of service in the 
calculation for his allowance, which reduced his pension by a pound a year.68 Absences were 
routinely penalised, regardless of an employee’s health or their reason for retirement, and the 
Treasury’s decision was final. Mary Agnes Kirwan, a telegraphist in Dublin, was retiring due 
to ‘general debility’ at the age of thirty-nine after nineteen years of service. She appealed 
against the deduction of a year’s allowance from her pension relating to absences over the 
course of ten years, but this was quickly rejected.69 
The Treasury also made decisions based on the moral behaviour of the Post Office staff. In 
1891 Thomas McCord, a postmaster in Strabane, Co. Tyrone, was retiring at the age of forty-
eight after an astounding thirty-seven years of service due to a weak heart and lungs. The 
Secretary’s statement accompanying the application detailed that Mr McCord had been 
disciplined the previous year due to him ‘having given way to habits of intemperance’; the 
secretary added that ‘these habits the Postmaster General regrets to state, have not since been 
abandoned’.70 There appears to have been a reconsideration of the final part of the statement 
and the application was eventually sent without this addition. However, even without the 
suggestion that McCord was still drinking, the Treasury asked for ‘a further medical certificate 
stating whether in the Medical Officer’s opinion the ill-health which obliges Mr McCord to 
retire is connected in any way with the habits of intemperance on account of which he was 
recently suspended from duty’.71 McCord had enjoyed an illustrious career with the Post 
Office, rising from a telegraphist to postmaster, but on account of his drinking he lost £28 a 
                                                          
67 Joyce, The State of Freedom, p.143. 
68 PM POST 1/227. Treasury Letters March-April 1891, p.597. Including allowances William King earned 
£59.18.3 a year or 14,391 in pence. 23/60 of this is 5516.55 pence or £22, 19 shillings, William King was given 
an allowance of £21, 19 shillings and 9 pence. 
69 Ibid., p.619. 
70 PM POST 1/229 Treasury Letters July-August 1891, p.420. 
71 Ibid. 
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year from his pension.72 John Chambers, a telegraphist in London had his gratuity reduced as 
he was retiring at the age of twenty-seven after four years of service due to chronic syphilis, a 
condition that was deemed to have been ‘within his own control’ to prevent.73 In this sense, the 
pension form was the final act of control—the day of judgement when the conduct of a postal 
employee was weighed to determine if they had performed their duty with ‘diligence and 
fidelity’. 
The pension form and application process may have been used to reprimand workers twice for 
illness and misconduct, but it was also a method by which the Post Office gave a voice to 
workers—who were most likely to be women—who had been pushed to the margins. For 
example, Elizabeth Johns, a postwoman in Newlyn, Cornwall, had worked as an unestablished, 
part-time employee for over thirty-six years, but in March 1891 she applied for a compassionate 
gratuity.74 Whilst on duty she had tripped and broken her leg—a difficult injury for any postal 
employee required to deliver letters. But Johns was seventy years old and, according to the 
medical officers, it was unlikely that she would work again. The secretary appealed to the 
Treasury for some assistance for her on account of her long service: she had worked for the 
Post Office in one capacity or another for over fifty years, of which thirty-six had been as a 
postwoman. The Treasury agreed, possibly because she was on duty at the time of her accident: 
she was paid £20. In contrast, the Treasury was less sympathetic in the case of Elizabeth 
Woolston, the postmistress of Kettering. Woolston had worked in the Kettering Post Office for 
over fifty-three years, thirty-one whilst married.75 She was applying for a superannuation as 
she was seventy-eight and, following her husband’s death in the previous year, she was looking 
to retire. Legally, once a postmistress married, the title and role transferred to her husband; 
Woolston regained it following her husband’s death, but within her pension application the 
secretary of the Post Office argued that she had continued in this role whilst married and 
consequently deserved a pension that reflected her full service. The Treasury was not swayed, 
stating that the pension was her husband’s to claim, not hers. Further research is needed into 
what the pension applications can tell us about the management and working lives of female 
postal employees but these two cases demonstrate instances when postal officials were aware 
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of how the rules and regulations could be unjust and they were willing to make the case to the 
Treasury for support on behalf of female employees.76 
Woolston’s role was not officially categorised and as a result her work was not recognised. It 
is unlikely that she was the only woman to be neglected by the system. At a time when postal 
workers were continually categorised and graded to determine salaries, this was a matter of 
discontent for male as well as female workers. The Post Office had a problem in the nineteenth 
century with how to distinguish whether its clerical civil servants were more akin to tradesmen 
or clerks of a higher class. Comparing the salary of a clerk starting on the same day in the Post 
Office with one starting in the Customs Office in 1894, the Post Office clerk would expect to 
receive £170 less a year after ten years of service.77 In contrast, the telegraph staff taken on in 
the 1870s considered themselves craftsmen but were classed under the same grade as clerks. 
In 1871 they went on strike because they felt the status of their job had deteriorated and their 
skills were not appreciated, since they were supervised by postal workers.78 As with the 
telegraphists, in the second half of the nineteenth century the sorters and letter-carriers were 
increasingly aware of their position being downgraded through the creation of ‘sub-groups’. 
These groups between postmen and the sorters decreased the chance of promotion to an indoor 
role and increased the postman’s feeling of isolation from the rest of the organisation.79 Apart 
from the brief period when the same examination was used for the sorters and letter-carriers in 
mid-1880s, the letter-carriers were often treated separately from the rest of the workforce and 
their low wages regularly made the headlines.80 In 1861, Reynolds’s Newspaper reported a 
meeting held by 700 Post Office workers, overwhelmingly letter-carriers, to discuss the 
problem of low wages.81 By 1890, there were reports of a possible threat of strike in the General 
Post Office due to ‘the disaffection of the letter-carriers’.82 At this time a town postman’s wage 
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ranged from 18s to 34s a week, which would have left many in Charles Booth’s bracket of 
‘poor or very poor’, and justifies their grievances.83 
The low wages experienced by postal workers may also shed some light on the reluctance of 
some workers to take up a pension, or at least suggest that, once given, these allowances were 
inadequate in providing useful support in old age. Decades before Booth’s categorisations of 
poor and very poor, a possible point of comparison concerning what the poor could or could 
not be expected to live on was the amount paid to out-pensioners on the Poor Law. With the 
introduction of the New Poor Law in 1834 there were debates over how much would be 
adequate to pay to widows and the elderly.84 Individual Poor Law Unions may have had an 
influence on the amount given in particular geographical locations, but a Select Committee of 
the House of Lords looking into the New Poor Law Amendment in 1837-8 took the amount of 
2s 6d as a point of discussion. During this debate, a Nottinghamshire magistrate underlined the 
importance of support from an elderly person’s family or friends, since a person ‘could not live 
on 3s a week’.85 Of the 180 applications from postal workers for a civil service superannuation 
in 1861, there were twenty-eight granted that fell below the three-shilling-a-week barrier of the 
Nottinghamshire Magistrate, which equates to just under a sixth of applicants. As the 
superannuation payments were calculated on a percentage of wages, it is unsurprising that these 
workers were some of the lowest paid in the civil service. One of these workers was Michael 
Dowling, a letter-carrier in Maryborough, a rural community in County Cork, Ireland.86 
Dowling had worked for the Post Office for over twenty years and would therefore have been 
eligible for retirement ten years earlier when he was sixty-four. However, the low wages and 
prospect of an even lower pension would have made retirement unattractive. 
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The Post Office was an anomaly within the Civil Service when a new Superannuation Act was 
being discussed in the 1850s; however, the attempts to standardise provision for the Post Office 
within the Service, by removing contributions, was not enough to satisfy the needs of most 
workers. The Civil Service pension received a very low application rate from postal workers 
and many worked further into old age than the Act suggested they could. There are many 
possible reasons for this, including the lack of information given to workers, the perception of 
pensions as part of a larger system of behaviour control used in the Post Office and, perhaps 
most importantly, low wages that often resulted in extremely low pensions. The 
Superannuation Act of 1859 wanted to encourage a relationship of mutual benefit, providing a 
reward for loyalty. Nevertheless, the new system was not tailored to the needs of postal 
employees. The next section will examine the role of families, an element expressly left out of 
the 1859 Superannuation Act, but another important aspect of the working and retirement lives 
of postal employees. 
Supporting the Families of Postal Workers after 1859 
Through the Civil Service campaigns for superannuation reform, provisions for families were 
a recurring theme. Civil servants wanted their families to be able to claim some of their 
pensions after their death, and they based this claim on the contributions paid by employees 
towards the superannuation fund. By removing contributions, the government considered that 
they removed that claim from families and consequently ignored them within the 1859 
Superannuation Act. However, through examination of the pension applications and census 
records of a number of postal workers, it is possible to observe the important role families 
played in the working, as well as retired, lives of employees from the Post Office. Once retired, 
the low pensions meant that some postal workers had to look to family for support. However, 
the census records also provide evidence of other retired workers’ desire for independence. 
Families were important for postal workers and it is possible that their exclusion from the 1859 
Superannuation Act was a great injury to many low-paid employees.87 
The historiography of the elderly poor and their families in the nineteenth century has tended 
to focus on the role of the 1834 New Poor Law and the debates that focused on the duty and 
ability of families to support elderly family members.88  In the census records of retired Post 
Office employees it is possible to observe the important support role that families played for 
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those earning a small pension. Thomas Wilkins applied for a pension in January 1861, he had 
served as a messenger for the Post Office in Cheltenham for twenty years and nine months and 
was on a salary of £36.10s a year. He was sixty-six years old and used the clause of being over 
sixty to apply for a pension. The application submitted on his behalf noted that he had 
discharged his duties with diligence and fidelity and that he had had a large number of sick 
days in 1852 due to dislocating his shoulder whilst on duty. He was granted a pension the 
following month with little comment. He was entitled to twenty sixtieths, or a third, of his 
salary, which he was given exactly. This amounted to £12.3.4 a year, or just over four shillings 
a week.89 At the time of his retirement, the 1861 census shows that Wilkins was living with his 
daughter, son-in-law and their children; he appears to have continued to live with the family 
until his death at the age of eighty-nine in 1884.90 Wilkins did not appear to have a spouse and 
it can be assumed that due to his small pension he had to rely on his daughter and her family 
for support into his old age.  
However, retired workers also tried to maintain their independence for as long as possible. 
Samuel Chick was a letter-carrier in Weymouth, Dorset. In January 1861 he applied for a 
pension at the age of fifty-two, on account of suffering from ‘rheumation’, after seven years 
and one-month of service. Due to his illness Samuel had stopped work in May 1860 and he 
was receiving three shillings a week, ‘this being the difference between his full wage and the 
payment made to his substitute’, a system reminiscent of an old type of pension scheme.91 As 
he had served less than ten years and was under sixty, Samuel was not entitled to a 
superannuation, but could get a one-off payment or gratuity and was granted £22.16.2. If 
Samuel was suffering from some type of rheumatism, it is likely that the walking required in 
the role of letter-carrier could have made his condition worse, or at least difficult to manage. 
From the census it can be observed that prior to his work with the Post Office he was a ‘shoe 
maker’. Following his gratuity from the Post Office, Samuel returned to shoemaking: this the 
profession he is listed under in 1871. In addition, Samuel and his wife had a lodger, another 
possible source of income for them; their son and daughter are no longer listed as living in the 
household. However, by 1881 Samuel was living with his daughter, her husband and their 
children. He was seventy-two years of age: his wife had died and he had reassumed his identity 
with the Post Office, now listed as ‘formerly postman’. Samuel and his wife had tried to stay 
                                                          
89 PM POST 1/109 Treasury Letters January-April 1861, p.5. 
90 Census for 1861, 1871 and 1881 and death recorded in General Register Office. England and Wales Civil 
Registration Indexes. London, England: General Register Office. 
91 PM POST 1/109 Treasury Letters, January-April 1861, p.20. 
 
121 
 
independent for as long as possible, despite Samuel’s apparent ill-health. However, having a 
daughter gave Samuel an option to stop work in his seventies, and it was here he spent his last 
remaining years identifying with the profession he held for less than eight years.92 
Families were clearly important after a Post Office employee’s retirement, but they could also 
play a part in enabling workers to fulfil their roles, and the pension records demonstrate how 
sons were particularly useful at times when work was difficult for the parent. In July 1861, 
William Wales, a rural messenger in Spilsby, Lincolnshire, was applying for a superannuation 
allowance. He had worked for the Post Office for ten years and one month, but was only fifty-
six; his retirement was the result of a disease of the lungs. He had stopped working in May 
1861, and his absences notes stated that William had been off sick for twenty-eight days in 
1859 and that ‘since August 1860 he has been assisted by his son’.93 William had clearly been 
sick for a long time and appears to have tried to keep working for as long as possible, perhaps 
to get over the ten years of service mark after which he could claim a pension. William earned 
£36.10 and, having worked between ten and eleven years, could receive up to ten-sixtieths, or 
a sixth, of his wages. He received exactly this in August 1861, amounting to £6.1.8 a year.94 
Similarly, John Trerise’s son took over his duties as letter-carrier in the Lizard area of Cornwall 
in June 1859 when he could no longer continue his duties because of consumption. The absence 
notes states that ‘since he [Trerise] has stopped work in June 1859, his son has carried out his 
duty and collected his wages’.95 Although the application is dated August 1861, the work 
carried out by Trerise’s son was still counted towards his pension, and, having started work in 
December 1844, he was granted sixteen-sixtieths of his wages.96  
Despite the Post Office appearing to consider family members, particularly sons, as an 
extension of their employee when work was carried out, there was little provision for families 
in the Superannuation Act. The only record of payments to an employee’s family was on 
compassionate grounds after they died whilst working for the Post Office. This can be seen in 
1841, before the passing of the Superannuation Act, when requests from widows of employees 
stationed to packet ships were more frequent.97 This association with the Admiralty appears to 
                                                          
92 Samuel died in February 1883: see ancestry.com; and Dorset, England, Deaths and Burials, 1813-2010. 
93 PM POST 1/110 Treasury Letters May-August 1861, p.320. 
94 Ibid., p.320. 
95 Ibid., p.404. 
96 Ibid. 
97 PM POST 1/56 Treasury Letters January-June 1841, p.149, successful application by widow of Second-
Master Hare, PM POST 1/59 Treasury Letters, March 1841-October 1842, p.91; the unsuccessful application 
from Mary Duncan (he was not serving the Post Office, but the Admiralty at the time of her husband’s death). 
 
122 
 
have continued into 1891 when John Howlett, telegraphist for the Admiralty at Gosport, died 
in what is described as a ‘fatal accident’. He was fifty-seven and had worked for the Post Office 
for over thirty-six years. His widow requested assistance on account of herself and her son who 
was under sixteen; she was awarded £33.5.6.98 This is the only such application in 1891 and 
none were made in 1861. The superannuation allowance was not designed for or used for the 
families of Post Office staff. 
The Superannuation Act very clearly and purposely disassociated itself from the families of its 
workers, but there were other mechanisms in place to support Post Office employees’ families. 
The first annual Postmaster General’s Report noted that a Post Office Widows and Orphans 
Annuity Society had to be saved by the Treasury because it was in dire need.99 The Treasury 
gave the fund £16,000 a year from unclaimed money and added £2,000 to start an insurance 
scheme.100 It was a provision the Postmaster General considered would encourage ‘carefulness 
and forethought’ and consequently be ‘widely beneficial’.101 Its creation was even heralded in 
the Morning Chronicle newspaper, which saw the provision as due to the ‘comparatively small 
salaries of the great bulk of those in employment of the Post Office [that] almost precluded the 
possibility of their insuring their lives; and it was therefore wise, as well as generous, to come 
to their aid’.102 It was partly funded by the void money order and unclaimed property fund, 
which contributed £2,000, and had enabled the Atlas Assurance Company to take on the 
Widows and Orphans Annuity Society scheme on behalf of the Post Office. The provision also 
included special privileges with the eighteen insurance companies who had been selected. 
These companies had been chosen with the objective that ‘ample room may be allowed for 
competition, the number of offices shall not be so large as to reduce their several share of 
business to an insignificant amount’, hopefully providing good business for the companies as 
well as affordable security for the postal employees.103 Although the scheme allowed officers 
to pay one-fifth of their premiums on policies not exceeding £300, many employees did not 
sign up: the first Postmaster General Report in 1855 noted only 200 policies in effect.104  By 
1860, there were attempts to broaden the scheme’s appeal by increasing cooperation between 
the Post Office and the insurance offices. This included the insurance office arranging policies 
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without any payment in advance and agreeing to pay £50 immediately on proof of death of the 
insured (instead of after the usual three months). With these concessions the Post Office would 
directly deduct the premiums from the salaries or weekly wages and pay them directly to the 
insurance offices. In an 1862 publication championing a similar scheme for all civil servants, 
Henry Ancell of the Admiralty declared that: 
‘Under this plan a Letter-carrier can, by expressing a wish to secure some small 
provision for his family, possess himself a policy of £50 without paying one farthing 
in advance, while the deductions from his future wages will only amount to about 4d 
per week; and should he die the day after the policy is given to him, though it were a 
week or a month before any deduction would be made from his wages, his widow or 
representatives would be entitled to the amount, less the first premium. These are real 
facilities for the poorer paid officers, and are held in grateful appreciation by them.’105 
Ancell considered that, compared with other individual schemes seen in the Customs 
department and the Excise department, the Post Office demonstrated the best practice, and that 
private companies could easily provide this service for the rest of the government 
departments.106 To underline its success, Ancell maintained that 10.7% of officers in the Post 
Office were insured in the scheme. However, it is unclear how he calculated this as the 
Postmaster General’s Report for 1862 suggested that in 1861 membership stood at 1,188 
polices, far from 10% of a workforce consisting of over 25,000 permanent staff.107 The 
Postmaster General’s reports do not continue to list the number of policies sold, but the 
development of this scheme clearly attempts to address the issues put forward by Richard 
Bromley and Dr Farr during the 1856 Select Committee, that deductions could and should be 
used to offer civil servants a provident society for the benefit of their families. Through the 
insurance scheme the Post Office hoped to provide an affordable mechanism for employees to 
make their own provisions, and it must have been reassuring to the higher ranks of the 
department as the number of life insurance policies was greater than the number of 
pensioners.108  
Despite the burden put on employees in having to make their own provisions for their families 
through the celebrated insurance scheme, by the end of the century a charitable fund had been 
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set up to address the needs of postal workers and their families. The Rowland Hill Benevolent 
Fund was established in 1882 out of the surplus funds of a national memorial to Sir Rowland 
Hill, founder of uniform penny post, and had the express purpose of providing relief to 
distressed Post Office servants and their dependants. The servants it sought to assist were those 
neglected by the 1859 Superannuation Act, the people who had to retire before they had served 
in the Post Office for ten years. A letter appealing for donations to the fund was quick to 
establish that the Trustees were not suggesting ‘that the remuneration given to the Post Office 
employees is less liberal than it should be’, but they did consider that the service brought about 
unavoidable distress and hardship and they wanted to assist those who had to leave due to 
‘illness or other causes’ who had served less than ten years, as well as the widows and orphans 
of pensioners’ whose allowance ceased at their death.109 The Lord Mayor, who was also a 
Trustee of the Fund, felt that Post Office employees particularly deserved assistance owing to 
the ‘peculiar conditions’ of their ‘daily work’, which included the weather and exposure to 
various ailments, in addition to employees’ ‘exceptionally high character and honesty’.110 By 
1890, the fund had Queen Victoria as its patron and was worth £40,000, of which £22,000 had 
come from subscriptions from the public ‘and by other means’.111 Nevertheless, the fund did 
not pass without criticism. A letter in response to the Lord Mayor’s appeal appeared in the 
Morning Post in November 1884. It suggested that with ‘fore-thought and thrift they [the 
employees] should be able to make themselves independent of public charity’ and that one 
penny a week from each of the 53,000 employees would produce £11,470 a year without 
interest.112 It is unclear if the life insurance scheme established in 1854 was still running; little 
reference is made to it in news reports of the Rowland Hill Benevolent Fund, although from 
1890 there was a greater emphasis on the independence of postal workers. An appeal to the 
people of Guernsey detailed that: 
‘As a class, postmen are independent, self-reliant, and attentive to duty, and they 
unquestionably are entitled to all they receive in wages or superannuation allowance 
from the public treasury. In spite of self-reliance, postmen, like other mortals, are liable 
to be the victims of misfortune.’113   
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Supporters of the charitable fund did not want to challenge the government provision; instead, 
this fund was for the exceptions, the victims of misfortune who would fall through the welfare 
net of the government and thrift. However, it is clear that the fund did fulfil a similar role to 
the government superannuation allowances. They gave annual allowances rather than lump 
sums and in 1895 the Lord Mayor proudly told an annual meeting of the fund that they had 
ninety recipients over the age of seventy in receipt of payments.114 
The Fund was partly paid for by small contributions from the postal workers, but it also allowed 
an opportunity for social activities and acts of fundraising that have more in common with the 
raffles for the suspended employee in the 1840s.115 In Exeter, in 1889, postmen, mail porters, 
mail guards and telegraph messengers paraded, complete with a marching band, from the 
General Post Office on the High Street to Exwick Church, in aid of the Fund.116 Even though 
the trustees of the charity included the Lord Mayor, the Duke of Norfolk (who was also 
Postmaster General) and Sir James Whitehead, the lowest rank of workers were involved in 
fundraising and were therefore able to feel ownership over the fund, something that was 
distinctly absent from the provisions under the Superannuation Act.  
Conclusion 
The Superannuation Act of 1859 did provide a benefit for letter-carriers and other postal 
workers that was rare for those of a similar class. It had been created out of a desire to improve 
the relationship between government and civil servants, basing pension payments on a 
relationship of entitlement that would be mutually beneficial. Through its creation the Act 
attempted to establish equality across the Civil Service; however, by examining one 
government department it is possible to see that this standardisation produced a system that 
was not beneficial to all.  
For the postal employees able to claim a pension, the superannuation provision was simply not 
adequate, and many may have been hostile towards it. Only a small percentage claimed a 
pension and the pensions paid out were often so low they amounted to little more than an 
elderly person would have received from out-relief under the New Poor Law. The process 
devised to process applications also reinforced aspects of control imposed by officials with the 
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Treasury more likely to use their discretion to reduce pensions than grant concessions to those 
deemed unentitled. Furthermore, there were large sections of the workforce who could not 
claim a pension. Many women were forced out of the Service by the marriage bar, and by 
defining superannuation recipients as full-time employees, ignoring temporary or part-time 
staff, the Act excluded approximately half of the Post Office workforce. Finally, in ignoring 
the families of civil servants, the Act not only disregarded a fundamental demand from civil 
servants but did not acknowledge the sometimes vital role that families played in supporting 
postal employees in the fulfilment of their duties. The Post Office was just one of many Civil 
Service departments, but this case study offers valuable insight into how the 1859 
Superannuation Act was administered and how it impacted upon workers’ lives. Far from 
bringing equality, it was of little benefit to the lowest paid and precariously employed. 
The inadequacies were addressed through the establishment of a life insurance scheme and, 
later, the creation of the Rowland Hill Benevolent Fund. This fund filled a gap by providing 
for employees who were not covered by the Superannuation Acts and had not been able to buy 
insurance for their dependents after their death. It gave workers enough scope to be involved 
and actively fundraise for the cause, an active role similar to the older mechanisms of providing 
retirement funds. Even though the Civil Service superannuation may have been an entitlement 
under the definitions described by Zelizer, it was put under so many restrictions that a 
mechanism of charitable payment gave greater opportunities for workers to feel empowered.117 
The financial relationship between the Post Office employee and the government may not have 
been improved despite the best intentions of the 1859 Act, but by using this case study it is 
possible to gain a greater understanding of how the Civil Service superannuation compared 
with the schemes provided in other industries. The government designed superannuation may 
have influenced many subsequent schemes, but it is evident it was not as celebrated by the 
employees as it was its employers. 
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Chapter 4: 
Discretion and Control: The Slow Formalisation of the 
Bank of England’s Pensions  
 
‘At the Recommendation of the Committee of Treasury, that Robert Browning 
at his request have leave to quit the service of the Bank, in consequence of the 
ill state of his health; and that in consideration of his faithful services of upwards 
of 49 years, he be allowed £203.6.8 per ann: during pleasure, being 8/12th of 
his salary and emoluments.’ 
Minutes of the Court of Directors at the Bank of England, 20 January 1853 
 
Robert Browning was a clerk at the Bank of England for nearly fifty years. Following his 
resignation, the Court of Directors unceremoniously granted him a pension of eight-twelfths of 
his salary and emoluments in January 1853.1 The minutes record no discussion of his character 
or achievements, but simply state that due to his ill-health and his faithful service he would be 
granted this financial allowance. These parameters, combined with length of service, 
determined the amount of pension which was based on a fraction of his salary. In many ways 
this matter-of-fact entry in the Court of Directors’ minute book is like many others, giving little 
context or explanation for the reasons to grant a retirement pension besides the facts that 
determined a mathematical calculation. However, Browning was not just an ordinary clerk: he 
was the father of a successful poet, also named Robert Browning, a fact that gives us greater 
insight into the circumstances surrounding his retirement from the Bank’s service.  
Numerous biographies of the poet Robert Browning discuss the relationship between father 
and son, emphasising the great literary influence Browning Senior had over his son’s education. 
An 1891 biography of Robert Browning dedicated an entire chapter to the poet’s father, 
underlining that Browning Snr was ‘disinclined for bank work’.2 Without the ambition that has 
been credited to his father (poet Browning’s grandfather was a senior Bank of England official), 
Browning Snr did not rise to great heights in the Bank or draw a large salary, but ‘made the 
best of his position for his family’s sake’ as well as to ‘gratify his scholarly and artistic tastes’ 
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and ‘give his children the benefit of a very liberal education’.3 Robert Browning, the poet, had 
great affection for his father, a love most evident in his letters following his father’s death in 
1866. In these letters he described his father thus: 
‘[He was a] good, unworldly, kind hearted, religious man, whose powers natural & 
acquired would have so easily made him a notable man, had he known what vanity or 
ambition or the love of money or social influence meant.’4 
Browning is portrayed as a stable and consistent clerk, with little ambition to climb the career 
ladder, satisfied to earn enough to support his family and his son’s literary ambitions. His 
service was indeed faithful and long, but no more than that. However, it is also notable that 
despite retiring on grounds of ill-health Browning Snr lived in Paris for a further thirteen years 
and was considered by his son to have a strong body and mind. The poet described his father 
on his deathbed as ‘utterly indifferent to death’, retaining his intellectual faculties to the last 
and with the ‘strength of his constitution [that] seemed impossible to be subdued’.5 This brings 
into question his resignation on grounds of ill-health and further investigation turns up some 
surprising results for this ‘kind hearted’ and ‘religious man’. 
Six months prior to his retirement from the Bank of England, Robert Browning Snr had left 
England under questionable circumstances. On 1 July 1852 he had been ordered to pay 
damages amounting to £800 for a ‘breach of promise to marriage’, after being found guilty of 
wooing and then discarding the widow Mrs Von Müller.6 In a bid to avoid paying damages, 
Browning Snr decided, with his daughter, to ‘exile themselves beyond the arm of English law 
courts’.7 They turned to Robert Browning, the poet, for help and by 20 July, he had relocated 
them to an apartment in Paris.8 Having left the country, Browning Snr was no longer able to 
maintain his employment at the Bank of England; he subsequently resigned. He claimed ill-
health which, given his age, may not have been surprising to the Bank officials; however, the 
trial had been reported in The Times. It is interesting that, far from being dismissed for this 
lapse in character as well as skipping the country to escape a court order to pay £800 in 
                                                          
3 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
4 Letter 89, dated 20 June 1866, reproduced in E. C. McAleer (ed.), Dearest Isa: Robert Browning’s Letters to 
Isabella Blagden (Edinburgh, 1951), pp.240-241. 
5 Ibid., p.240. 
6 The Times, 2 July 1852, p. 7. Browning had ended the engagement based on the belief that Von Müller had 
married her second husband not knowing her first was dead; although this was proved to be untrue, the defence 
rested on the assertion that it had been the acts of ‘a poor dotard in love’. 
7 W. Irvine and P. Honan, The Book, the Ring and the Poet: A Biography of Robert Browning (London, 1975), 
p.298. 
8 Ibid., p.299. 
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damages, the Bank of England’s Court of Directors looked on Browning favourably. His long 
service was considered, and the decision was taken to grant him a pension of eight-twelfths of 
his salary.9  
An employee’s character was very important to the Bank of England and other banks. 
Historians have highlighted the importance of respectability in a work place that handled 
money on a daily basis.10 In addition, ideas of morality and character have also been shown to 
be important factors within the Victorian financial world more generally.11 Given the 
importance of character to the industry, it is possible that the Bank was unaware of the 
Browning trial or why Browning had suddenly left the country, despite the trial being reported 
in a national newspaper. Alternatively, if the Bank’s officials did know, this case represents a 
slightly skewed representation of the Bank’s perception of acceptable behaviour for employees. 
As Glassi and Newton have demonstrated, bank managers did not necessarily decide whether 
a customer was trustworthy based on their actions but on elements such as ‘religious affiliation, 
membership in particular social organisations or clubs, political allegiance or kinship links’.12 
Additionally, Anne Murphy’s examination of recruitment has shown how the Bank of England 
often relied on the system of patronage as a way of ensuring the respectability of employees.13 
In the case of Browning, the Bank put its perceived responsibilities to provide a pension to this 
long-serving clerk, the father of a renowned poet, before a punishment for a public 
misdemeanour. Following ideas similar to those that framed patronage, the knowledge of the 
individual, his long service, as well as social standing and connections, may have worked in 
his favour to secure a pension. Veiled in the appearance of regulation with the description of 
the length of service and consequent fraction of salary that calculated the pension amount, the 
Browning decision is a perfect example of the discretion employed by the Bank regarding the 
retirement of their employees.  
                                                          
9 BEA G4/75, Court of Directors’ Minute Book, 20 January 1853, p.257. 
10 G. Anderson’s Victorian Clerks (Manchester, 1976) makes several references to the importance of character 
and respectability, pp.12, 35 and 65, I. Jeacle, ‘The Bank Clerk in Victorian Society: The Case of Hoare and 
Company’, Journal of Management History, 16:3 (2010), p.314. 
11 Cultural history of economics is a growing field and the following provide good examples: J. Melling, 
‘Employers, Workplace Culture and Worker’s Politics: British Industry and Workers’ Welfare Programmes, 
1870-1920’, in J. Melling and J. Barry (eds), Culture in History: Production, Consumption and Values in 
Historical Perspective (Exeter, 1992) and Paul Johnson, Making the Market: Victorian Origins of Corporate 
Capitalism (Cambridge, 2013). 
12 F. Galassi and L. Newton, ‘My Word is My Bond: Reputation as Collateral in Nineteenth Century English 
Provincial Banking’, Warwick Economic Research Papers, No. 599 (Department of Economics, University of 
Warwick, 2001), p.35. 
13 A. L. Murphy, ‘Learning the Business of Banking: The Management of the Bank of England’s First Tellers’, 
Business History, 52:1 (2010), p.153. 
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This chapter focuses on the retirement provisions of the Bank of England, how and why they 
were developed and the role of the government and Civil Service in influencing any changes. 
Historians of the Bank of England, such as Acres and Giuseppi, have repeatedly shown how 
the British government had some influence on how the Bank of England operated, with the 
1844 Bank Charter Act as an example of how parliamentary power granted the Bank’s 
monopoly to print notes.14 But the way the Civil Service was managed also influenced the Bank 
which was reflected in their pension policies as the Superannuation Acts of 1834 and 1859 
helped to shape pension regulations at the Bank. Nevertheless, the Bank was able to maintain 
a far more discretionary and personal touch to its pension provisions. In this way, it was similar 
to the East India Company which, as a private profit-making company, was able to sustain a 
two-tier system of discretionary pensions and regulated superannuation.15 Yet, the Bank of 
England did not develop two separate systems and until 1870 it maintained a system framed 
by regulation but also subject to discretion through an assessment of an employee or their 
family’s need. This system changed in the 1870s, partly due to the greater scrutiny the Bank 
was under but also due to the competition for competent clerks with an increasing expectation 
of a regulated superannuation system.16 Yet, even with a more formal system in place, the Bank 
ensured it had the mechanisms to apply discretion in particular cases. Applying Zelizer’s 
categorisation of payment, the Bank of England wanted to ensure their pension system 
remained as much like a gift as possible, to help them maintain and assert their power over 
workers.17 As with the East India Company, pensions as a gift gave little opportunity for 
employees to bargain for change and the policy was only amended by the actions of the clerks 
they failed to attract. 
To examine the changing regulations for pensions within the Bank of England two pension 
ledgers that have survived in the Bank of England’s archives will be examined. These ledgers 
cover the period of the later eighteenth century up to the mid-nineteenth century and provide 
evidence regarding who were given pensions and why. These pension ledgers make it clear 
that certain roles entitled employees to larger pensions, based on the fraction of their salary—
                                                          
14 See W. M. Acres, The Bank of England From Within 1649-1900 (London, 1931), J. Giuseppi, The Bank of 
England: A History from its foundation in 1694 (London, 1966) and R. Roberts and D. Kynaston (eds), The 
Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694-1994 (Oxford, 1995). 
15 See Chapter 2 for more information on the East India Company. 
16 See Chapter 5 on railway companies and increased superannuation systems after 1870. 
17 V. A. Zelizer, Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy (Princeton, 2011), p.136. 
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not necessarily based on seniority or hierarchy but on wider considerations including family 
and need. 
The chapter then turns to changes in how the Bank of England managed its staff in the 1870s 
and the influence of an internal report on recruitment and superannuation. Through 
examination of this report, it is evident that the Bank was attempting to tackle a crisis of 
employment and recruitment of clerks, since it felt it was losing out on the best clerks to the 
Civil Service. This provoked a closer alignment to Civil Service superannuation regulations, 
but the Bank was careful to ensure discretionary practices could be maintained. By examining 
the Court of Directors’ minutes for the years following the 1870 regulation it is manifest that 
older practices of looking at an employee’s economic condition and dependents persisted. 
The Bank of England is a unique case study, being a private institution that worked closely 
with, and was influenced by, the British government and Civil Service. Through examination 
of how the institution managed its staff and retirement benefits it is possible to assess how the 
challenges of employing the clerking class over the course of the nineteenth century changed 
and how challenges were managed. Government practice was influential and there was a need 
to be mindful of finances, but as an independent and relatively small institution the older more 
personal practices were persistent to varying degrees and for various reasons.  
Bank of England Pensions in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century 
The Bank of England has a long history of giving pensions to its employees, but it was not a 
very large institution, barely exceeding 1,000 employees during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. When the Bank of England first opened for business in 1698 it employed nineteen 
officers; by 1790 this had increased to 375 and by 1820 it had reached 1,000.18 1821 saw a 
large reduction of staff due to the closure of the £1 and £2 bank note office, but the number of 
staff was then fairly consistent between 700 and 800 for most of the century, until it started to 
climb again to a peak of 1,100 in 1897.19 The number of staff was obviously much smaller than 
the Civil Service, or even the Post Office department, but larger than most other banks and 
financial institutions. Furthermore, after 1826, it had a small workforce that stretched across 
England.20  
                                                          
18 Giuseppi, The Bank of England, pp.19, 66 and 100. 
19 Acres, The Bank of England from Within, p.439; number of staff in 1897 from BEA G15/587 Secretary’s 
files: Superannuation Fund 6 September 1897-23 July 1941, p.1. 
20 From 1826 the Bank of England opened county branches; a branch in West London followed. 
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The first pensioner from the Bank of England is thought to have been Thomas Madockes, who 
retired in 1739.21 Madockes had been one of the original employees appointed in 1694, he had 
worked for the Bank for forty-five years, of which forty have been spent as chief cashier, 
leading one of the three divisions of the Bank.22 Acres suggests that pensions only became 
more common after the retirement of Madockes, but that during the eighteenth century they 
were largely given on an ad hoc basis and were not always generous. He gives the examples of 
Peter Saffree, whose job role is not given, but was granted £30 a year, and Samuel Jacobson, 
chief accountant, who retired in 1773 with a pension of £60 a year.23 Daniel Race, chief cashier, 
was granted £250 a year but this was described as being due to ‘exceptional services’.24 
However, looking at the ledgers that survive of the pensions paid out in the period between 
1780 and 1850 this appears to be a simplified view of how and why pensions were paid out.  
Within the Bank of England archives there are two ledgers that hold details of employees 
receiving pensions. One ledger records that 283 employees were given a pension or gratuity 
between 1735 and 1829.25 This ledger contains the employees’ name, role, salary, length of 
service, size of pension or gratuity and date of death (although some details, including date of 
death, stop being noted in 1829). The second ledger, covering the period for 1800 to 1852, 
gives some basic statistics including the date an individual was elected, their age at the time, 
the date they left the service, the date and age at the time of death.26 It lists the cases of 2,377 
individuals and though no names are included there is some indication if an individual was 
sacked or pensioned. There is some overlap between these two ledgers and it is possible to 
match entries through the date they were elected and subsequently left the service, however 
there are also several gaps in the data. 
Looking at the number of pensions granted we can see spikes in activity in particular years. 
                                                          
21 Acres, The Bank of England from Within, p.142 
22 Elizabeth Hennessy divides the management of the Bank of England from 1694 to 1930s into three: Chief 
Cashier – responsible for banking business and note issue; Chief Accountant – keep Bank’s accounts and 
registrar of Bank stock. Later added responsibilities for staff numbers and managing government securities, and 
Secretary – look after the Court and various Committees. In E. Hennessy, ‘The Governors, Directors and 
Management’, Roberts and Kynaston (eds), The Bank of England, p.202. 
23 Acres, The Bank of England from Within, p.230. 
24 Ibid., p.231. 
25 BEA E46/1 Pensions: List of Staff Receiving Pensions. 
26 BEA E46-2 Pensions: List of Staff. 
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Figure 5. Graphs showing number of pensioners from each Bank of England Pensions 
Ledger27 
The largest peak is recorded in ledger E46/2 during 1821 when the Bank of England issued a 
large number of redundancies as it stopped producing £1 and £2 bank notes. Otherwise, in most 
years both ledgers recorded less than twenty employees retiring each year.  
                                                          
27 BEA E46/1 Pensions: List of Staff Receiving Pensions and BEA E46-2 Pensions: List of Staff. 
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Figure 6. Comparison of Number of Bank of England Pensioners between 1798 to 1828 
Comparing the two ledgers for the years that they overlap, as shown in Figure 6, it is notable 
that in 1821 the second ledger records a far greater number of employees being pensioned off. 
This suggests that the ledgers may not be completely reliable in drawing accurate numbers, as 
some information may have been neglected and it is unclear why the Bank would have two, or 
more, ledgers recording similar information at the same time.28  Nevertheless, despite the 1821 
peak in ledger E46/2, the ebbs and flows of numbers appear very similar, and record a 
consistent granting of pensions for employees from the turn of the century. 
Comparing these numbers to the size of the workforce, it becomes apparent that these pensions 
may not have been as ad hoc as Acres describes. In 1829 there appears to have been 137 active 
pensions, which equates to an astounding 16% of the workforce.29 The cost of these pensions 
was even higher, standing at £8018.6.1 in October 1829, the equivalent of nearly a fifth of the 
total wage bill.30 These figures are substantial and, though they reflect the numbers of 
employees pensioned in 1821, they also underline the scale and importance of the pension 
system by this time.  
                                                          
28 There is another list at the back of E46/1 that records pensioners from 1791 to 1871 but with the names and 
details crossed out. 
29 The number of pensions listed in E46/1 Pension Lists without recipients being marked as deceased. The total 
number of employees for 1830 is recorded as 870 in Giuseppi, The Bank of England, p.100. 
30 Total costs of wages recorded as £37427.4.3 + wages of those in branches £5367.15.5 = approximately 
£42794. From BEA G4/52 Court of Directors’ Minute Book, p.159. 
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By the start of the nineteenth century the Bank of England’s pension system was clearly part 
of a well-established employment custom available to large sections of the workforce. This is 
demonstrated by the growth in pensions by the 1790s. There was only one recorded gratuity 
paid in the 1740s, growing to two pensions in the 1750s and four pensions and one gratuity 
granted in the 1760s. These pensions or gratuities may have been less frequent, but they were 
not just the reserve of the superior officers. It is recorded that Peter Merrick, an accountant on 
a wage of £70 a year was given a gratuity of £50 after thirty-five years of service, Merrick had 
been working for the Bank of England since 1708, so was one of a dozen or so staff members.31 
Despite his long service Merrick had not progressed far from the starting salary of £50 for 
clerks, which could reach a maximum of £200.32 In the 1750s, an out-teller and an upper 
doorkeeper also retired with pensions of £40 and £30 respectively.33 The minutes of the Court 
of directors give no indication if these were exceptional circumstances, or even suggest that 
retirement was being forced on account of ill-health. James Taylor, an out-teller for over twenty 
years, was recorded to have requested to leave the service and the pension was granted ‘in 
consideration of his long and faithful service’.34 German Staton, the upper doorkeeper, had 
served for over twenty-four years and was also recorded as requesting leave to quit his service 
at the Bank and was granted a pension ‘in consideration of his long and faithful service.’35 
From these records it appears that length of service and loyalty were the only criteria used for 
granting a pension, there was little reflection on the health or age of these employees.  
On some occasions, a Bank of England employee did not even have to boast a long career to 
secure a pension. In July 1768 William Barker resigned from the Bank after only nine years of 
service. He was an accountant and earning £70 a year and, presumably because of his short 
service, his pension was recorded as £20 a year.36 The minutes for the Court of Directors give 
no further details or reason behind the pension, however, we do know that Barker died in 
December 1797, and there is no reason to assume he did not continue to collect his pension for 
the twenty-nine years between resigning his post and his death.37 The case of John Best, another 
accountant who resigned in June 1768, gives a hint that personal circumstance and health were 
factors that were also considered by the directors when giving a pension at this time. Best had 
                                                          
31 BEA E46-1 Pension Lists. Regarding staff numbers Giuseppi lists thirteen in the Accountant’s Office in 1700, 
up to thirty-seven in 1720. Giuseppi, The Bank of England, p.34. 
32 Giuseppi, The Bank of England, p.61. 
33 BEA E46-1 Pension Lists. 
34 BEA G4/19 Court of Directors’ Minute Book, p.7. 
35 Ibid., p.63. 
36 BEA E46/1 Pension Lists. 
37 BEA G4/20 Court of Directors’ Minute Book, p.372; E46/1 Pension Lists. 
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only served the Bank for five years and was earning £70 a year; however, the Court of 
Directors’ minutes record that Best petitioned the directors, explaining his reasons for leaving. 
Best had problems with his eyesight that he claimed left him incapable of performing his duties: 
his petition revealingly stated that he had sought the advice of ‘two eminent surgeons’ who 
confirmed his condition had no relief.38 Best consequently was unable to support himself or his 
wife and prayed for the directors to provide him with some relief for ‘his future support’.39 The 
directors clearly took pity on Best and granted him a pension of £40.40 Though reasons were 
not always given, the Bank of England appeared to consider most employees who resigned the 
service for a pension, this included those who had worked for the Bank for less than ten years 
as well as those resigning after a long service and those unable to work due to sickness.  
From these examples of retirements in the eighteenth century, loyalty, length of service and 
health were all apparent as factors under consideration when the Court of Directors granted a 
pension, but they were not necessarily the reasons for the size of pension. In the early nineteenth 
century, the government had issued various Treasury Minutes detailing pension provisions for 
key officers. An 1803 Minute was the first to scale pensions according to length of service, a 
principle which was later made law by the 1810 Superannuation Act.41 Yet, there was no 
coherent system across the service and lower officers could be expected to arrange their own 
retirement emoluments through fees, funds or payments from their replacements.42 The Bank 
operated quite differently at this time and considered the individual’s circumstances in order to 
grant them an appropriate pension. Looking at the information recorded for pensions in ledger 
E46/1, which records pensions from 1753 to 1830, there is no trend for the most senior 
employees to be granted a higher percentage of their wage as their pension, as demonstrated in 
the table below:  
  
                                                          
38 BEA G4/20 Court of Directors’ Minute Book, pp.363-364. 
39 Ibid., p.364. 
40 Ibid., p.364. 
41 M. Raphael, Pensions and Public Servants: A Study of the Origins of the British System (Paris, 1964), p.82. 
42 See Chapter 3 on the Post Office for further details on provisions made in that department. 
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Table 7. Selection of Departments with Average Salary and Average Pension43 
Office Average 
Salary 
(£ per year) 
Average 
Pension (£ 
per year) 
Pension 
as % of 
salary 
No. of 
employees 
listed 
Notes 
Exchequer 225.00 287.50 127.78 4   
Porter 52.94 57.50 108.62 16 16 porters of different 
types, most give 100% 
or more of salary as a 
pension 
Cheque 192.50 185.00 96.10 8 
 
Drawing Office 214.36 190.42 88.83 14 
 
Cashier 256.67 226.67 88.31 31 
 
Accountants 158.70 139.13 87.67 28 
 
£3 per cent office 243.85 200.77 82.33 13 
 
£4 Per Cent 182.00 148.89 81.81 10 
 
Consols 148.00 118.62 80.15 28 
 
Head of 260.62 206.15 79.10 13 (up to 88% if two low 
pensions removed) 
Bank Stock 138.00 101.67 73.67 6 
 
Bank Note Office 183.78 132.00 71.83 10 
 
 
From this selection what is most obvious is that pensions appeared to be generous in relation 
to salaries, with the clerks in the Bank Note Office receiving the smallest percentage of their 
average salary at 72%. To be granted a similar pension in the Civil Service or East India 
Company in the early nineteenth century, an employee would have been expected to be over 
sixty-five with forty years or more service.44 
One department with a staggering record of granting pensions above the salary-level is the 
Exchequer’s office. A description of the role and conduct of this department can be found in 
the Committee of Inspection minutes, a committee put together to report on the daily business 
                                                          
43 BEA E46/1 Pensions. 
44 Scale of the 1810 Superannuation Act and 1813 Charter Act: under these conditions an employee would 
receive three quarters of their salary. 
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of the Bank of England with a view to recommending any improvements to the Governor, 
Deputy Governor and Committee of Treasury.45 What was produced is a unique record of how 
various departments conducted their business in the 1780s and, despite the aims of the 
committee, it is not likely that the purpose and role of the departments changed very much. On 
Wednesday 4 June 1783 the Committee interviewed Mr Cowper, the principal clerk who 
attended the Exchequer’s Office. Cowper had been at the Bank for thirty-two years, eight of 
which had been serving in the Exchequer’s Office and three in the role of principal.46 Cowper 
and two other clerks from the Bank attended the Teller’s Office in the Exchequer every day, 
apart from holidays, to pay and receive monies issued or brought in or used by Government.47 
To carry out this work, a sum usually between £50 and £100,000 was withdrawn from the 
Bank’s warehouse and taken to the Exchequer, where the clerks were in attendance between 
11am and 1pm.48 The importance of the role was such that it involved interactions with the 
Lords of the Treasury and daily reports to the Drawing Office and the chief accountant.49 It is 
probably the interaction with senior Bank of England staff, as well as those directly involved 
in the Bank’s daily relationship with the government, that gave the role enough importance to 
account for such large pensions. Cowper retired in July 1791 after forty years of service; his 
salary had been £220 and he was granted a pension of £200 ‘on account of his ill-health and 
long service’.50 Upon Cowper’s retirement, the wages of the other clerks within the Exchequer 
department were raised: these clerks, Rueben Ettie, John Guiningham and Benjamin Madden, 
would all go on to retire and be granted a pension or gratuity. When Ettie retired in July 1800 
after forty-one years of service, his salary was £220—the same as Cowper before him—but his 
pension was £350 a year.51 The Court of Directors’ minutes record that this sum was given ‘on 
account of his ill-health and faithful service of upwards of forty-one years; and as a special 
mark of the approbation of this Court’.52 Ettie was a valued employee, but this was surpassed 
by his successor, John Guiningham. Following thirty years’ service Guiningham retired in 
March 1807: his salary was recorded as £260, £40 more than his two predecessors and he was 
                                                          
45 Bank of England Archive website: 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Pages/digitalcontent/archivedocs/comminspection.aspx (accessed 21 
July 2015). 
46 BEA M5/212 Committee of Inspection Minutes, book 1, part 2, p.139. 
47 Ibid., p.139. 
48 Ibid., pp.139-145. 
49 Ibid., pp.143-144. 
50 BEA E46/1 Pension List; BEA G4/25 Court of Directors’ Minute Book 1791, p.362. 
51 BEA E46/1 Pension List. 
52 BEA G4/28 Court of Directors’ Minute Book 1800, p.314. 
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granted £400 a year as a pension.53 The Court of Directors’ minutes recorded that this large 
sum was given ‘in consideration of his ill-health and faithful services of upwards of 32 years’; 
however, it also notes that the figure came as a recommendation from the Committee of the 
Treasury.54 The Committee of the Treasury’s minutes provide a far more detailed analysis and 
calculation of a pension for John Guiningham. After receiving his letter praying for leave to 
resign due to ill-health, the committee noted his length of service and the number of his 
children, including one son who was provided for and four daughters who remained dependent 
on Guiningham.55 His salary is also noted, alongside his other emoluments, an allowance of 
£40 in lieu of morning money and an annual gratuity of £230, giving Guiningham a total 
income of £530. Taking all of this into consideration the Committee recommended £400 a year 
as a pension: Guiningham claimed this until his death in 1815.56 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this examination of the Exchequer department: first 
that all of those listed were in fact heads of department and not ordinary clerks, so caution 
needs to be taken when looking at departments listed in these ledgers. Also, the listing of 
salaries does not include the other emoluments and gratuities they may have received in line 
with their work.57 Finally, the calculation of pensions was not always clear, and show that 
family could be taken into consideration, but not always. Reuben Ettie was also discussed in 
the Committee of the Treasury, but it principally looked at his reasons for retiring, noting that 
he was seventy years of age, in ill-health and that he had worked for the Bank for more than 
forty years.58 There was no consideration of his salary or his dependents or lack thereof. 
Nonetheless, another type of employee who enjoyed large pensions, in proportion to their 
salaries, were the porters, a grade of employee far removed from the high-level Exchequer’s 
office. Porters received much lower salaries, and these tended to be fixed salaries without the 
possibility of increasing over time unless they were promoted to a more senior position. Still, 
as the Bank grew, the number of porters grew, and by 1790 there were a total of twenty-six, 
including a new role of day porter, later known as office messenger, that was introduced in 
1791—the total went up to thirty-seven employees within that class.59  
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The porters’ age and length of service were, once again, the most common reasons given for 
granting a pension. John Lucas was a gate porter for thirty-five years when he retired in January 
1788. The Court of Directors’ minutes simply noted that Lucas wanted to leave the service ‘on 
account of his age and infirmities’, and there is no evidence for how his £50 pension was 
calculated.60 Jeremiah Booth, a bullion porter, was treated in a similar way when he petitioned 
to leave the service in January 1790 after thirty-eight years’ service. He was on a salary of £30 
a year and granted £40 a year ‘in consideration of his long service and bodily infirmities’.61 No 
further explanation was given within the Committee of the Treasury minutes, which only 
mentioned Booth’s length of service and not even his role at the Bank.62 This was again 
repeated for Thomas Brand, a gate porter, who had worked for the Bank for forty-three years 
when he requested leave to resign in April 1795. The Court of Directors’ minutes simply stated 
that £40 a year should be given ‘in consideration of his ill-health and long services’.63 
Age and length of service were not the only reasons given for porters’ pensions and, possibly 
due to their low wages, porters’ families were also frequently discussed and considered. This 
is notable in the case of William Banning, a gate porter who retired in July 1777 after twenty-
five years’ service, whose wife may have also worked for the Bank. He was recorded as 
receiving a salary of £40 a year and granted a pension of £35 a year.64 The Court of Directors’ 
minutes noted that Banning and his wife had ‘grown old and worn out in the service of the 
Bank’ and ordered that they receive a pension from Michaelmas next.65 From the 1783 
Inspection Minutes we are told that the principal gate porter lived in the Bank and the keys to 
offices were kept in his house and issued by himself or his wife.66 In April 1777, Banning and 
John Lucas are listed as the only two gate porters on the payroll, so it is possible Banning was 
the principal gate porter with the privilege of having lodgings in the Bank.67 In addition, 
Elizabeth Banning was listed as a housekeeper earning £50 a year, £10 a year more than her 
husband.68 Elizabeth Banning was elected as housekeeper in 1767, so had worked for less than 
ten years before retirement. It is not clear if it was her short service, position or gender that 
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disqualified her for a separate pension, but her role can be seen as reason for her husband’s 
pension to be almost equal to his wage. 
Family members did not have to be employed by the Bank to feature in their considerations of 
porters’ pensions. John Beard, senior house porter petitioned the Committee of the Treasury 
for relief from work: his petition was based on the ‘decline in his health’ and he was ‘begging 
the bounty of the Court for the future support of himself & family’.69 It was subsequently 
agreed to comply with his request ‘on account of his great age and good services’ and a pension 
of £40 a year was granted with £10.20 to be made available for his ‘immediate use’.70 With 
these lower paid employees the Bank appeared to show more flexibility in their ‘system’, a 
flexibility that appeared to be born out of duty of care. This is exemplified in 1787 in the case 
of William Watkins. Watkins is listed in the ledgers as receiving a gratuity of £150, but with 
no other information regarding salary and length of service.71 The situation is explained in the 
Court of Directors’ minutes for 18 April 1787, where it was resolved: 
‘That in consideration of the extraordinary circumstance attending the deaths of 
William Watkins the late Gate Keeper, and his wife that late Housekeeper and of their 
having left three infant children in a manner unprovided for—One hundred and fifty 
pounds to give towards the education and support of the children, and that this sum be 
paid to Samuel Thornton and Thomas Boddington Esq. in trust to be disposed of as 
these gentlemen shall think fit for their benefit.’72 
Through the porters we can see the variety of methods that Bank of England’s directors 
employed to provide suitable support for their employees. Age and length of service as 
evidence of loyalty, or faithfulness, to the service were stable conditions for a pension. 
However, sickness and family conditions could also encourage the directors to make extra 
provisions through large pensions or one-off payments. Without having a particular set of rules 
the Bank developed its own system, which took the form of custom or tradition for giving 
financial support for employees retiring. 
This financial support was not only in the form of the pension and from this data of the 283 
employees listed, only five have no record of an amount paid to them; the rest are recorded as 
receiving a pension, gratuity or donation. A pension was a regular payment, paid quarterly at 
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the Court of Directors’ discretion; a gratuity was a one-off payment of a lump sum.73 These 
two types of payment are also seen in the Civil Service pensions where a gratuity was used to 
give employees a payment when they did not meet the criteria for a pension. As the example 
of the porters has demonstrated, gratuities were not necessarily used in this way at the Bank 
but could supplement a pension or replace a pension for non-employees. However, a donation 
was used slightly differently and, it appears, very specifically, in relation to employees found 
to be bankrupt. In 1817 the Court of Directors, with guidance from the Committee of the 
Treasury, decided to discharge any employee who had ‘taken benefit of the Insolvent Debtors 
Act’ or been declared bankrupt.74 This decision is reflected in the cases of donations listed in 
the Bank’s ledgers. For example, William Dickinson, a pay clerk, who was elected on 1 March 
1798 and left the service nineteen years later, was recorded as having been discharged from 
service, but in receipt of a donation. The Court of Directors’ minutes gave some further details, 
noting that William Dickinson was discharged from the Bank on 30 October 1817 following a 
suspension. When he was declared bankrupt under the Insolvent Debtors Act, his case was 
referred to the Committee of the Treasury to calculate the donation.75 Furthermore, in the case 
of George Sturdy Weller, a chief cashier who was suspended in early October 1817, it was only 
when the Court of Directors received a petition from him stating he had been declared bankrupt 
under the Insolvent Debtors Act that the Bank took action to discharge him.76 However, this 
does not help explain the use of a donation for William Keep, the only employee given this 
type of emolument prior to the Insolvent Debtors Act in 1813. Nevertheless, the Court of 
Directors’ minutes do confirm that he was discharged from the service on 11 January 1810 
rather than resigning due to ill-health or old age, and this may have been connected to his 
personal financial position.77  
The dismissal of clerks who became bankrupt supports the arguments of Ingrid Jeacle, and 
others, who promote the importance of respectability in a banking career. Alongside 
drunkenness, indebtedness was feared as it was believed to leave the bank vulnerable to fraud.78 
Yet, with these retirement payments, classed as donations, the Bank of England appeared to 
take a slightly more lenient approach to their bankrupt employees. Anne Murphy has shown 
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that the Bank of England would employ clerks who had previously experienced bankruptcy.79 
Murphy points out that this was following the law which granted individuals who had been 
bankrupt, but had cooperated with the Commission of Bankruptcy, a chance to ‘rebuild their 
lives’.80 Through the new legal framework there was an obligation for the Bank to consider 
these employees in the recruitment process. Yet, there was no legal obligation to make any 
financial provision for bankrupt employees. These workers may not be trusted to work within 
the Bank following their disgrace, but they were seen to still deserve some financial reward for 
their work and loyalty up to that point. 
The use of donations in addition to pensions and gratuities demonstrates a sense of 
responsibility felt by the Bank of England towards its employees. It installed a system of 
payment for all classes and almost all conditions of employee leaving the service, which 
included dismissal on the grounds of bad management of personal finances. There does not 
appear to be evidence of a scale of payment or formal procedure in formulating a pension 
payment, aside from the need of an employee to resign. An employee’s age, health and length 
of service could all be discussed in relation to a pension or retirement payment, but they were 
seen as evidence linked to the employee’s loyalty rather than forming the basis of a calculation. 
The employee’s family could also be considered, and this fell to the Bank’s sense of loyalty 
towards their employee, acting to ensure help was provided if requested. Finally, the amount 
granted was based on the sense of need and may have had some basis in salary but was not 
closely tied. The directors were able to grant pensions well above or below their employees’ 
salaries depending upon the individual and their circumstances. A system, of sorts, was in place 
but it was fundamentally informal, without the voices of employees it is not clear if they saw 
the informal system as part of an equal exchange. However, there did not appear to be any 
bargaining attempts from the employees and it could be assumed that employees did not know 
what to expect when petitioning for leave to retire from their service at the Bank, putting these 
payments into the gift category rather than compensation. Discretion and informal decisions 
kept the power and control over the retirement payments firmly with the Court of Directors. 
Introducing Some Formality to the Informal: 1821-1870 
There are two occasions when a regulated formula for calculating pensions had been used in 
the first half of the nineteenth century. The first was applied when a large number of employees 
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were discharged in 1821 and the second was implemented following government changes to 
the Civil Service superannuation scheme in 1834. These were the two major changes to the 
Bank of England’s pension system up until 1870, and though they can be seen to bring in some 
formality, it was still not a regulated system. 
In 1821 the Bank of England decided to discontinue printing bank notes valued under £5 and, 
consequently, had to dismiss over 100 staff members. Giuseppi associates the desire to end the 
use of these notes with the Bank of England’s directors’ distaste of prosecuting people for 
forgery.81 Between 1797 and 1829, 618 people were convicted for forging bank notes, and as 
the death penalty for forgery was not abolished until 1832, they all faced the possibility of 
losing their lives for the crime. Giuseppi argues that the directors were ‘humane and sensitive 
men’ who often pushed for a charge of possession over forgery in order to reduce the penalty.82 
Though the directors may have made changes for humanitarian reasons, their actions still led 
to the removal of large numbers of men, many of whom had been working for the Bank for 
several years. In order to limit the impact of releasing over 100 clerks on to the job market it 
was decided that pensions should be given. Providing compensation in the event of closing an 
office was later included in the 1834 and 1859 Superannuation Act, but it is not clear how much 
formal regulation the government had for this type of event in the 1820s.83 As a result, the Bank 
of England took the government’s superannuation regulation from the 1810 Superannuation 
Act as inspiration and devised the following formula: 
‘All Clerks who have been 30 years and upwards in the service, ¾ of their Incomes 
arising from Salary, Morning Money and Gratuity—but in those instances where such 
¾ shall be less than the amount of the Salary, then the Salary. 
All Clerks who have been 20 to 30 years in the Service, ¾ of the amount of their 
Salary, Morning Money and Gratuity. 
All Clerks who have been under 20 years in the Service, ½ of the amount of their 
Salary, Morning Money and Gratuity.’84 
This formula is based entirely on length of service, with twenty years of service acting as the 
focus for higher or lower pensions, and although half a clerk’s salary could mean a substantial 
amount, this is notably lower than the regular pensions given (see Table 1). The directors were 
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clearly attempting to gain a balance of an acceptable compensation for releasing their 
employees but keeping the costs down. This may have been why the 1810 Superannuation Act 
was useful. This Act had been passed as an attempt to curtail government spending after the 
Napoleonic Wars, and had been a ‘product of progressive forces’.85 It based its payments on 
fractions of twelfths of salary and was framed around ten-year milestones. For those aged 
below sixty with a medical certificate it granted between four-twelfths or a third of their salary 
for ten years’ service to eight-twelfths or two-thirds for over twenty years’ service.86 If you 
were over sixty and had served fifteen years or more, you were granted eight-twelfths or two-
thirds of your salary, if over sixty-five and serving forty years or more, nine-twelfths or three-
quarters of your salary and, finally, if you were over sixty-five and had served fifty years or 
more you received your entire salary. The Bank of England system was not based on age, but 
it did take length of service as the basis of calculating a pension based on a fraction of the 
employee’s salary. Notably other elements of the Bank’s pension customs, such as a 
consideration of dependents, was absent. Importantly, this system was not adopted for later 
pensions and was designed to meet a current problem. At this stage the government system 
may have answered a present need, but it did not suit the Bank’s directors for all pension 
provision.  
The next attempt to adopt some regulation within the granting of pensions is attributed to the 
1834 Superannuation Act. This Act gave a minimum pension of a quarter of an employee’s 
salary after ten years’ service and a maximum of two-thirds of salary for over forty-five years’ 
service. It also saw some civil servants paying contributions to a superannuation fund, set a 
compulsory retirement age of seventy and established the Treasury as the centralised focus for 
assessing applications, stating that good conduct was a requirement and retirement before the 
age of sixty had to be proved to be due to ill-health.87 Many of these features already existed 
within the Civil Service pension system, but the Act formalised and regulated the system 
through law, it was also during a period when the government was attempting to make savings 
but extend the power of the Treasury.88 The Bank of England was influenced by this Act, and 
began to use the scale of pension payment based on length of service from about this time, and 
maintained it for over thirty years.89  
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The adaptation of the Act suited the Bank for several reasons. It gave a framework within which 
it could calculate the growing number of pensions and prevented the large payments given to 
employees of the Exchequer’s Office or porters as seen in Table 7. However, it also maintained 
the Court of Directors’ flexibility, as seen with the case of Robert Browning at the beginning 
of this chapter. Due to his length of service of over forty-five years, there was a clear and 
established calculation to determine his pension, and as no further justification for a pension 
was needed this meant the Court of Directors did not need to get involved or refer to employees’ 
personal circumstances if they did not want to. 
Other funds at the Bank of England 
Part of the reason this loose pension system was maintained for so long, despite the changes in 
superannuation regulation ongoing within the British Civil Service, was that there were several 
other mechanisms to support workers and their families if in need. The Widows and Orphans 
Fund dated back to 1764 and provided extra insurance to employees’ families through the 
collection of subscriptions. In 1791, the Court of Directors began to contribute to the fund, 
initially purchasing £1,200 worth of stock ‘for the benefit of the fund for making donations to 
the widows of the officers of this House, of which Edwards Payne Esq. is Treasurer.’90 Between 
1791 and 1821, the value of the fund grew due to sums paid in from dormant accounts, 
unclaimed dividends, allowances paid by the government for clerical works on loans and 
contributions from staff.91 As the funds grew, so did the annual sum to be granted to widows 
and orphans, rising from a total of £500 in 1791 to £1,000 in 1802 and £1,200 in 1810.92 By 
1861, the amount of £1,200 had only been exceeded in 1855 and 1856 when £1,300 was paid 
out.93 It is not surprising that these years also saw a gratuity of 10% paid to clerks due to the 
perceived increase in the cost of living. 94 
The 1850s brought a reassessment of the Civil Service superannuation, but it did not lead to 
the Bank of England examining their pension provision. One reason for this is that out of the 
major changes to the retirement provisions for civil servants was the shift from a contributory 
fund to a non-contributory fund and the Bank of England had never taken contributions towards 
pensions. Another reason was that civil servants were campaigning on account of a lack of 
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provisions for their families within the superannuation system.95 The Bank of England did not 
have a formal pension provision that systematically considered employees’ families, but they 
did consider families and dependents on an ad hoc basis and also had a well-established 
Widows and Orphans Fund.  
Instead of re-evaluating their pension provisions in the 1850s the Bank of England decided to 
alter the scale and conditions of the Directors’ Charitable Fund, as the Widows and Orphans 
Fund had become known. Since 1827 the amount granted to widows was based on occupation, 
or the length of service, of their late husband. For a clerk’s widow allowances started at £25 if 
the husband had served for ten to fifteen years and went up to £33 if he had served for twenty 
years or more. For porters and heads of offices’ widows there were set allowances of £12 and 
£40 respectively.96 The circumstances of the widow were only made part of the fund’s 
conditions from 1829 but from September 1854 the scale of allowance was changed to account 
for the age of widow rather than her husband’s length of service (though the amount given to 
porters’ widows remained the same).97 This scale started at approximately £19 for widows 
between twenty-five and thirty years of age, up to approximately £32 for those fifty years old 
and over. The focus had turned from the Bank employee to the widow with conditions of 
payment now based on her situation and her age, though the responsibilities of her husband 
were not totally forgotten. From 1854 another condition of payment was added that stipulated 
that for widows and orphans to benefit from the Fund, the husband and father had to have been 
subscribed to the Bank Provident Society, and consequently the amount granted from the Fund 
should be of an equal, or lesser amount, to what was owed to her through the Provident 
Society.98 This is a clear attempt to encourage the Bank’s employees to make their own 
provisions for their families, and was seen at the time as a way of merging charitable aspects 
of the Fund with the insurance principles of a provident society. This was arguably a successful 
move for the Fund as by the end of 1870 the Directors’ Charitable Fund was paying out £4,317 
to 167 widows, a considerable jump from the reported payments of £1,300 in 1855 and 1856.99 
By creating the Bank of England Insurance, Annuity and Investment Association (that was 
later referred to as the Bank Provident Society), the Bank not only extended the principles of 
insurance into its charitable acts, but also into recruitment. A condition was added that ‘no 
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clerk [shall be] henceforth admitted into the service of the Bank who shall not, on medical 
examination, appear to be an eligible life for insurance.’100 Though membership of the new 
society was not compulsory, the Bank took measures to ensure their employees were a good 
bet, with regards to their insurance payments, which inadvertently made them more likely to 
receive large pensions for long service. The Charitable Fund and Provident Society also had a 
more precise and mechanised system for calculating payments at this time compared to the 
pension scheme and suggests that the Bank’s directors felt uncomfortable with being expected 
to give charitable support without any conditions or infrastructure. Markedly, all these 
schemes, from the pension to the charitable fund, required ten years of service as a minimum 
before a case would be considered. Loyalty, therefore, was laid down as a fundamental 
prerequisite for any financial support from the Bank. 
However, earlier, in 1854, another charitable fund was founded, one without the restrictions 
imposed by the Directors’ Charitable Fund. This was called the Samaritans Fund and it was 
created on 3 August 1854, a month before the new regulations on the Directors’ Charitable 
Fund and creation of the Provident Society.101 The Samaritans Fund was to be financed from 
the poor box and was created for ‘the relief of the clerks and porters in special cases of sickness 
or necessity, at the discretion of the Governors’.102 It is not clear from the Court of Directors’ 
minutes nor the Committee of the Treasury if there was a call for further help for clerks and 
porters possibly not supported by pensions or insurance. There may have been a gratuity 
increase to salaries to assist employees from 1856, but this did not exist in 1854 and, as we 
have seen, the creation of this fund was coupled with a change to provisions to support an 
employee’s family. 
The poor box was kept by the head doorkeeper and composed of fees paid upon deposit of plate 
and fines paid by directors for non-attendance. Prior to 1854, these fees were allocated to the 
Directors’ Charitable Fund and so changes to their destination may have anticipated the further 
changes coming to that Fund that were realised the following month.103 The allocation of a 
guardian in the doorkeeper, suggests that this was a real box that these fines could be paid into, 
and as a result the Fund may have been publicised through its physical appearance. However, 
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current research has not been able to determine what the Bank of England staff knew about this 
Fund and how many claims were made upon it.  
In the years between 1834 and 1870 the Bank of England and, overall, its employees, were 
happy with the dual systems of an informal non-contributory pension for their retirement and 
formalised insurance schemes for their families. This met the Bank’s desires to ensure a thrifty 
and secure workforce, but also maintained their perceived responsibilities in providing support 
for retirement. For the employees, the grievances of the civil servants of the 1840s and 1850s 
were not something they had to be concerned about. The insurance schemes, partly funded by 
the Bank, gave them some security for their families in the event of their deaths, but they also 
had the possibility of obtaining a pension in old age or ill-health. The use of a scale may not 
have made the provision formal but it had given employees an ‘indication’ of what they could 
expect.104  
However, this informal system would not survive into the final quarter of the century. The 
Bank may not have employed a vast number of clerks but it was increasingly competing with 
growing private and public institutions that required clerks and were making formalised 
pension schemes as part of their employment offer. As the market for clerks became more 
competitive the Bank began to realise its handling of pensions would have to change. 
The Introduction of Regulation from 1870 
The informal adoption of the 1834 Superannuation Act pension scale effectively laid the 
bedrock for the Bank’s directors to accept a more formal system after 1870. The changes that 
were eventually implemented were put together by a special committee appointed to look at 
the current rules for the examination of clerks entering the service and the granting of pensions 
to clerks quitting the service of the Bank of England.105 The special committee was appointed 
on the 22 September 1870 and consisted of Mr George Lyall, the deputy governor, and two 
other directors, Mr Thomson Hankey and Mr James Pattison Currie. The report, including an 
extension to look at the pensions of porters and other employees alongside clerks, was compiled 
in just over a month, and exactly eight weeks from when the committee had been appointed, 
its proposals for pensions had been largely approved.106 
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The report principally focused on the recruitment of new employees and the problem that the 
‘abilities and aptitude’ of those employed were not improving nor meeting the needs of the 
Bank.107 Nominated candidates had been interviewed and examined from the start of the 
nineteenth century but, as the report stated, the examination simply ‘consisted in addition of a 
few figures and the counting of a bag of silver coin’.108 This had been amended with a more 
formal system in 1852 and candidates were subsequently asked to ‘write from diction, write 
and add a column of figures and work out a simple sum in division and interest’, this appears 
to have worked for the Bank’s purposes, but two factors appear to have hindered this by 
1870.109 First, following the establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1860, the 
government had introduced a more complex series of educational tests for employees which 
had become ‘prejudicially to the Bank’. 110 As a result, the best candidates were going to the 
Civil Service leaving the Bank with applicants whose ‘abilities have not been found competent 
to obtain employment elsewhere’.111 However, the standard of the test was not the only 
problem. The special committee not only argued that the Bank should set higher standards of 
attainment, but that more weight should be given to the examination results in recruitment. 
Though they still valued the use of patronage to ensure a good ‘general character’ and ‘moral 
tone’, the examination process was leaving the Bank with the Civil Service’s left overs. 112  
The urgency of the problem is apparent within the Court of Directors’ minutes: it was noted on 
27 October 1870 that three out of the seventeen most recently elected individuals had been 
reported as ‘unsuited for the duties imposed upon them’.113 The individuals were not named, 
and the dedication to the patronage system is clear when it is decided that they should be kept 
on as it was understood ‘that vacancies may soon arise in an office where they [could] be 
profitably employed’.114 Though James Currie, one of the three members of the special 
committee, did not hesitate to underline that a ‘more rigorous examination than the one now in 
force on admission would have probably excluded them to the benefit of others more adapted 
for the service’.115 The report had been finished by this stage but not yet presented to the Court 
of Directors so it is possible that Currie was laying the groundwork for changes that were to be 
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proposed in the report. Examinations would not only provide better employees, but they would 
also remove the embarrassment of finding places for those who had been admitted and then 
found lacking. 
There was a clear and urgent need for examinations to be revised but the need to change the 
pensions system appeared less urgent and less explicit. A pension from the Bank was seen as 
necessary as it was an established custom, the Bank had always provided for employees in 
advanced years or illness, so this should be continued.116 The problem appeared to lie in the 
fact that it was not a formal and regulated system. The Bank had adopted the scale of payment 
from the government’s 1834 Superannuation Act aimed at the Civil Service but had largely 
ignored the other aspects of the government system which had been installed in 1834 and 1859. 
The committee was now interested in these other aspects and the report focused on the 
government’s policy related to age and the scale of payment. The report endorsed the 
implementation of a minimum age of retirement at sixty (unless ill-health could be proved) and 
a maximum age of service at sixty-five; furthermore, the scale of pensions adopted from 1859 
was praised as it increased with every year served.  
The justification for the adoption of a scale similar to the one used by the Civil Service from 
1859 was based on the advantage that it increased annually. The special committee felt that, 
overall, employees were happy with the pension, but the period of ‘seven years which elapse[d] 
between the advances in the scale, [was] often a source of anxiety, especially to clerks in ill-
health’.117 They believed that the prospect of incremental increases encouraged workers to stay 
on in roles they were no longer suitable for with the hope of achieving an increased pension.118 
Their reasons were aimed at ensuring a healthy and efficient workforce alongside meeting the 
perceived anxieties of staff members.  The previous scale was based on twelfths and increased 
when an employee had worked for the Bank for seventeen, twenty-four, thirty-one, thirty-eight 
or forty-five years. The new scale the Committee proposed was on a scale of seventy-fifths, 
starting with a pension of fifteen-seventy-fifths after ten years’ service, up to a maximum of 
fifty-seventy-fifths or two-thirds for employees who worked for forty-five years or over.119 
This was a slightly different scale to that of the Civil Service, which was based on a scale of 
sixtieths, but it otherwise followed the same principle. In addition, workers would now be able 
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to apply for a pension at the age of sixty but would be effectively asked to retire at sixty-five. 
Retiring at sixty still left them subject to the scale, but pensions given at the age of sixty-five 
were at the maximum of two-thirds of their salary. The adaptation of some of the Civil Service 
superannuation policies could be seen as representative of the more arm’s length approach the 
Bank and the government had at this stage. After the changes in 1834 the Bank had informally 
taken the government's scales and used it within their own mechanisms. However, by the 
middle of the nineteenth century it was possible that there was a greater inclination to question 
government policy. Relationships had become strained whilst Gladstone was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and the Treasury was increasingly looking for greater independence from the Bank 
of England.120  
The Bank was also explicit in its desire to maintain its discretion in administering pensions. 
The Treasury had been given some power to alter the pensions granted through the 1834 and 
1859 Act, but the Bank went further with the power to apply flexibility to the age of retirement 
as well as amounts granted. The directors ensured that they could keep employees on after the 
age of sixty-five if they were seen to still be of useful service.121 This desire to maintain 
flexibility demonstrates the important role the Committee of the Treasury and Court of 
Directors were seen to take in each retirement application, and there was no desire to take away 
their power in overseeing and influencing the amounts granted.  
The introduction of a scale and rules and regulations around pensions took away some of the 
informality around the system, but it was important to the Bank that some level of discretion 
remained. Unlike the Civil Service after 1859, there was no application form for employees or 
their superiors to complete. Instead, employees were required to write to the Committee of the 
Treasury to inform them of their application to leave the service. Unfortunately, none of these 
letters remain; all that exists are the entries in the Committee of the Treasury minutes. These 
entries are short and can appear abrupt in their nature. A name is given with the role and length 
of service and the amount recommended for pension. It is impossible to know how much 
discussion went into granting these pensions. In many ways the personal statement on character 
given by the Post Office secretary on behalf of postal employees provides a greater insight into 
the working lives of these employees, but despite the Post Office’s attempts to influence the 
                                                          
120 Clapham discusses the relationship with Gladstone in detail and outlines the creation of the Post Office 
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Treasury pensions, this was limited within the rules and regulations that existed.122 The 
flexibility within the Bank of England’s system is apparent within their earlier allocations of 
pensions. William Chimner petitioned the Committee of the Treasury to allow him to resign in 
August 1821. He had served the Bank for twenty-three years as a clerk in the Cash Book office, 
but felt he needed to retire due to an ‘affliction of the spine’, this was affecting his arms and 
hand and he believed it would turn him into ‘a perfect cripple’.123 His petition was supported 
by the Committee of Inspection and the Committee of the Treasury subsequently recommended 
that the Court of Directors accept Chimner’s resignation and grant him a pension of £200 a 
year.124 Chimner had been earning £220 a year: this was, therefore, a large pension for a service 
of twenty-three years and clearly based on the severity of his affliction.125 The Bank’s desired 
flexibility is demonstrated in the range of ways the Bank chose to categorise their payments: it 
not only gave pensions, but also donations or gratuities where it sought fit. For example, in 
October 1841, the house porters stationed at the Liverpool branch were discussed. Edward 
Taylor had been porter at Liverpool since January 1839 and Robert Chinery had been porter 
since July 1840, but they had both been unable to work for one or two months in 1841 due to 
ill-health.126 This absence so soon into employment led to the request for their resignation, but 
it was decided to give them both a ‘donation of £20 on their retirement’.127 The ages of Taylor 
and Chinery are not mentioned, but the Treasury’s language stipulates that they would like to 
see this as a retirement, rather than a dismissal of the men.  
As well as the policies adopted and adapted from the Civil Service Superannuation scheme, it 
is also notable what was ignored. During the 1850s, the British government debated and passed 
committee reports and Acts regarding pensions and as this was a time both Lyall and Hankey 
would have been MPs, it is very likely they would have been aware of them.128 Principally, an 
important feature of the 1834 Act that was abolished in 1859 was employee contributions. The 
main aim of the government in taking contributions from employees was for economic 
prudence, yet this had always been absent from discussions at the Bank of England.  
                                                          
122 See Chapter 3 on the Post Office for further discussion on the pension applications. 
123 G8/20 Minutes of Committee of Treasury, 1821, p.216. 
124 G8/20 Minutes of Committee of Treasury, 1821, pp.216-217. 
125 E46/1 Pension Book. 
126 G8/32 Minutes of Committee of Treasury, 1841, p.46. 
127 G8/32 Minutes of Committee of Treasury, 1841, p.47. 
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There are a number of reasons the Bank may have wanted to avoid contributions. First, the 
Bank did not employ as many people as the British government did, and it may not therefore 
have had enough contributors to make such a fund actuarially sound. It is also possible that, if 
the Bank had suggested introducing contributions, it could have come under the same criticism 
as the government in the 1850s. Many civil servants argued that they were being forced to pay 
into a pot from which they would not reap the benefits, since they were statistically unlikely to 
live until pensionable age.129 Furthermore, although the Bank of England is historically seen to 
be a good employer, giving staff good wages, salaries were still a matter of contention for 
employees. The 1850s saw petitions from clerks for the Bank to pay their income tax, this was 
refused but they were granted a 10% gratuity on salaries that was also paid in 1856, 1857, 1860 
and 1864.130 The gratuity was decreased to 5% in 1865 and was followed by petitioning from 
clerks for a permanent salary increase.131 The clerks’ petition did not plead abject poverty, but 
appealed to the Bank’s desire for clerks of good character and morality; the 558 clerks that 
signed declare they were in ‘much difficulty in meeting their unavoidable expenses and 
maintaining their social respectability’.132 They also emphasised the increase in the cost of 
living, including rents and emphasised that this was a call for help not a revolt, stating ‘they 
humbly hope that the Governor will not look upon their petition as a token of discontent’.133 
This petition was somewhat successful and a subsequent special committee report 
recommended a moderate increase as well an increase in the speed of wage progression to the 
maximum for particular roles.134 Following this success it is not surprising that a petition from 
the doorkeepers, watchmen and porters followed in July 1866, they were also successful and 
ninety people saw a salary increase costing the Bank an extra £720.135 Finally, as mentioned 
above, the Bank already had a number of insurance funds that were contributory and were 
aimed at providing for employees’ families rather than their retirement.  
With a formal review of salaries in 1865 and then a review of pensions within the following 
five years, contributions may not have been worth considering due to the inevitable impact on 
salary. However, it is important that contributions were not considered and then ruled out, they 
                                                          
129 Civil Service Gazette, 1 January 1853, p.7. 
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were not mentioned at all.136 This has probably more to do with the perceived customs of 
employment at the Bank. Employees were still expected to provide personal securities when 
they joined; after 1841 a Guarantee Fund had been established to allowed employees to pay in 
£5 and enter a bond of £1,000 to effectively insure against any losses sustained through their 
acts or defaults.137 In contrast, pensions had been given without preconditions aside from a 
loyal service and an inability to perform their duties due to ill-health or old age. A certain level 
of financial responsibility was expected from employees at the point of recruitment as a way 
of ensuring respectability and to cover any misdemeanour. But if their service was long and 
loyal the responsibility moved to the Bank as employer and meant employees could expect 
financial security through a good salary and pension if they required it. The special committee 
took its cue from what had proceeded before and opted to work within that framework. The 
framework was one that gave a percentage of salary to employees who were unable to work 
due to age and/or illness and did not rely on employee contributions. 
Another aspect the government examined in 1857 was the question of an employee’s family 
and their claim on pension. This was part of the contributions debate and the 1856 Select 
Committee argued that by eliminating contributions the claim from an employee’s family was 
also removed. Since it appears that the Bank of England had never asked its employees to 
contribute to a pension fund, it could be considered that family were not a concern. 
Furthermore, since 1764, employees of the Bank had access to a subscription fund for widows 
and orphans, that later became a separate provident society with insurance policies. However, 
this did not mean that the Bank felt no responsibility toward the families of employees and, as 
the previous examples of early pensions in the nineteenth century demonstrate, the 
consideration of an employee’s family and dependents could feature not only in calculating 
their pensions, but separate payments could also be made to family in certain circumstances 
including an employee’s death. Whereas the government associated extending assistance to an 
employee’s family with ‘Old Corruption’, the Bank felt a tie of loyalty to family through the 
employee. 
Even after 1870, when the Bank’s pension system had been formalised, the Bank continued to 
support employees’ families. In 1874, Mrs Bowyer, widow of George J. Bowyer, the late 
                                                          
136 The Royal Commission on Civil Service Superannuation in 1857 has a similar problem that salaries had 
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156 
 
deputy principal of the bullion office was granted a pension of £4 a week.138 The reasons for 
this are vague and the Committee of the Treasury minutes suggested there had been some 
petitioning from within the Bank, including the chief cashier, and noted that their decisions had 
been made in relation to the circumstances surrounding the retirement of Mr Bowyer.139 These 
circumstances are not elaborated on, but from this example we can see that the Bank has taken 
some responsibility for Mrs Bowyer and granted her a substantial sum, a pension of almost 
£208 a year, which did not come from any of the funds created for widows. Similarly, the 
widow of Mr Ayloner, the late chief accountant was granted a pension of £50 a year in 1885, 
and in 1893 a ‘compassionate allowance’ of £600 a year was granted to Mrs May, the widow 
of the late chief cashier.140 The Bank was clearly willing to give out large sums of money to 
these women if they were heard to be in need, but it is also notable that they were wives of 
some of the most important and well-paid employees. It may have been in the Bank’s favour 
to help the families of those in the highest positions to maintain their reputation as a good 
employer and the appearance of respectability, but these employees would also have been in 
the greatest position to make their own provisions. 
Nevertheless, the loyalty felt by the directors of the Bank of England was not felt in all 
circumstances and not extended to everyone. In May 1821, Sarah Richards sent a petition to 
the Bank; the Committee of the Treasury minutes did not note her request, but they include the 
detail that she was complaining of the conduct of her husband, William Richards, since he had 
resigned from the Bank earlier in May 1821.141 Richards retired on 3 May 1821 from the Chief 
Cashier Office and was granted a pension of £200 a year following twenty-eight years of 
service.142 The pension book notes that Richards had a wife and child, although this is not 
mentioned in the Minutes of the Committee of the Treasury or Court of Directors. In it unclear 
how Mr Richards’ conduct had changed upon retiring or what Mrs Richards was petitioning 
for, but the Bank simply acknowledged and then dismissed Mrs Richards’ petition. The 
directors’ role with the family had stopped after giving her husband a pension: the concern the 
Bank had regarding an employee’s conduct appears to have ended at their retirement. 
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However, this did mean that the Bank’s interest in an employee’s conduct could influence how 
and what pensions were initially granted. This is demonstrated in the case of Archibald 
MacLaine, a clerk in the Power of Attorney Office, who was asked to retire in April 1871.143 
MacLaine had been suspended for coming to work in an ‘unfit state’ and thought to be drunk, 
but as the Committee of Inspection investigated his case they found that problems had begun 
a few years earlier following a blow to the head in a previous role in the Bank’s branch in 
Manchester.144 He had suffered a paralysis and was sometimes seen to be confused; following 
an examination from Mr Smee, the Bank’s resident doctor, it was concluded that his ‘mental 
state [was] indifferent and that he appears stupefied’ due to both the accident and bad habits.145 
It was concluded that he should receive a pension, but that this pension of £120 a year should 
be paid to his wife.146 MacLaine was no longer felt to be a suitable employee and thought to be 
suffering from a previous injury and a drink problem, and consequently the Bank saw his wife 
as the sensible recipient for the payment of the pension.  
The more formal regulations introduced in 1870 brought the Bank of England more closely 
aligned to the contemporary superannuation provisions of the Civil Service. There was set 
regulation of what age pensions could start, the role of medical certificates and an age of 
compulsory retirement, alongside a scale of pension based on salary that increased annually. 
This allowed certain measures that would ensure efficiency amongst the workforce and keep 
the cost of pensions down. Nevertheless, by maintaining elements of a traditional pension 
system that was non-contributory, as well as developing a separate insurance fund for families 
within their pension system, the Bank had also managed to avoid the grievances the civil 
servants had campaigned against. However, the insurance provisions were not as satisfactory 
as the Bank had hoped and needed further amendments after 1870. 
Other Funds after 1870 
By 1889, the purpose and role of the Directors’ Charitable Fund were being questioned by the 
Bank. Although seen as evidence that the directors’ ‘interest in the welfare of those engaged in 
the service’, it was thought to be ‘unintentionally but practically’ weakening ‘that sense of duty 
which should lead every man to do his utmost to make definite and sufficient provision for his 
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widow’.147 The provisions of the 1850s had not been successful in their desired aim, 
furthermore, in light of the 1870 regulations for pensions, the structures surrounding the 
Directors’ Fund looked flimsy and lacked clarity. The heads of departments used a 
memorandum of 1889 to call for the directors to act and make allowances ‘like clerks’ pensions, 
on a regular known principle with the general understanding that each should receive, in the 
first instance, the sanction of the Governor’.148 
Although the discretion of the directors and the Governor were still underlined as being 
important, the memorandum asked for a clear framework to enable clerks to plan and make 
provisions. The 1870 report on pensions had highlighted that clerks were willing to plan and 
make sacrifices for their retirement. Under the old pension scale, workers were working for 
longer, and suffering from illnesses, in order to meet the criteria for a slightly increased scale 
of payment. For example, Mr Chandler, a bullion porter resigned on 7 October 1841 on account 
of being sixty-six years old, almost blind and suffering from rheumatism.149 The following 
week the Committee of the Treasury had a similar case. Mr James Jackson, an inspector, was 
sixty-four and had lost the use of one side of his body due to paralysis.150 The new regulations 
in 1870 hoped to prevent such deterioration of employees by allowing annual increases of 
pensions by fractions of seventy-fifths. The memorandum on the Directors’ Fund in 1889 was 
effectively calling for something similar, looking for a simple mechanism that could ensure the 
best deal for their widows and orphans through both insurance and the Directors’ Fund. 
After 1870 the Bank of England’s pension system had been established as an important part of 
recruitment as well as maintaining an efficient workforce, but still carried characteristics of 
tradition and custom originating in the eighteenth century. The insurance provisions were 
integral to the pension system, filling in the gaps and maintaining traditions of thrift amongst 
middle class employees. Families no longer had to provide a focus for the pension system, 
though directors still enjoyed using their discretion for the families, especially for employees 
of a higher social standing. They also still took an interest in the family conditions of employees 
when granting pensions and were willing to operate outside of the strict guidelines. 
Nevertheless, just as a competitive workforce had encouraged tightening of recruitment and 
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pension regulations, the increasingly savvy workforce was also forcing better regulations of 
the Bank’s insurance schemes.  
Conclusion 
The Bank of England was one of the oldest institutions to provide a pension scheme for 
employees of all grades. It was a generous scheme and for many years sought to ensure loyalty 
amongst its staff through an apparent discretionary system whereby the Committee of the 
Treasury could determine the amount of pension on a case by case basis. Without a formal and 
regulated scheme in place until 1870 the provision of a pension was arguably an uncertainty 
for employees. However, the frequency of pensions granted to all grades suggests employees 
knew this was a benefit available to them and the 1870 report noted that employees were 
planning their retirement around the informal scale adopted from the 1834 Act.151 Over time 
the payments made as gifts were becoming an expected part of service, something workers 
earned and could expect at the end of a long service.152 Alongside internal systems of insurance 
for widows and orphans, employees appeared to be happy with the system of benefits. 
Nevertheless, towards the end of the century, these benefits were being viewed as inadequate 
for an informed workforce who wanted to plan for the future. Increasing numbers of employers 
offered similar provisions and if the Bank wanted the best employees, they had to provide more 
formal and accountable systems. Pensions and patronage were part and parcel of the Bank of 
England’s management style, instilled through over a century of practice and custom, and the 
relationship between the employer and employee rested on practices such as the pension. 
Recruitment and retirement were closely linked in shaping this relationship and over time the 
shape of this relation had changed giving more power to employees without the need to agitate 
or lobby.  
This is demonstrated in the autobiography of Herbert de Fraine, an employee of the Bank of 
England from 1886, when he was just sixteen years old. De Fraine saw his pension as a deferred 
payment, part of his salary that he would receive when he was no longer fit to work. As with 
the 1870 committee report, de Fraine combines thinking about pensions and recruitment. He 
reflects on the meaning of a pension when discussing his recruitment through the nomination 
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of John Gellibrand Hubbard, a director at the Bank who sadly died the year de Fraine was 
employed. Due to this sudden death, and de Fraine’s employment, he saw his role as linked to 
that of his patron: he stated that ‘if a pension counts as deferred payment for service, between 
us we have served the Old Lady for hundred twenty years’.153 Pensions, then, were seen as a 
due to be paid on account of long and loyal service and as important as the patronage system 
for instilling loyalty into the employment system.  
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Chapter 5 
Aspiration and Superannuation:  
The Railways and Pensions 
 
‘ “I beg your pardon, gentlemen, but you have deducted money from my salary for 
some years, for a superannuation fund. As I shall not remain to reap the benefit, will 
you return me the deductions, in all, about £30?”  
“How long have you paid?” enquired Mr McLion. 
“I have not paid at all, sir,” I said, “the money has been stopped; and some of it even 
before the rules were issued.” 
“How long have you paid?” repeated Mr McLion, “there was an Act of Parliament for 
what we did.” 
“It has been stopped about nine and a half years.” 
“Then,” said Mr McLion, “you will not get one penny of it. The Directors do not 
consider any application unless the applicant has paid for 10 years and over.” ’ 
Ernest Simmons, Ernest Struggles, 1880 
 
In 1879 and 1880 Ernest J. Simmons published a two-volume semi-autobiographical account 
of life as a station master for the Great Western Railway. In contrast to the majority of railway 
histories published in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Simmons’ account presented 
a humorous and highly critical depiction of the railway industry. The Company’s directors were 
incompetent and the railway employees over-worked, unappreciated and underpaid. The 
suffering of Simmons’ central character, Ernest Struggles, is so extreme that at the end of the 
second volume he resigns from the service.1 Yet, even at this final encounter with the railway 
company, Struggles faces further maltreatment. First, one director, Mr McLion, unsuccessfully 
tries to get Struggles dismissed rather than accept his resignation; then Struggles attempts to 
reclaim the deductions made to his salary for a superannuation fund. Through the dialogue 
between Struggles and McLion we discover than an Act of Parliament justified the deduction 
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from Struggles’ salary without his consent. Furthermore, the unjust nature of the deductions is 
amplified by the fact that Struggles was not able to receive any of his money in return. Under 
the conditions of the scheme a railway servant was required to have paid into the fund for at 
least ten years before receiving any repayments, Struggles had only contributed for nine and a 
half. 
In many ways, the representation of life working for the Great Western in Ernest Struggles is 
not entirely accurate. In his introduction to the edition published in 1974, the railway historian 
Jack Simmons noted that on matters of fact the work was ‘unreliable’, giving the example of 
an account of a 'most awful smash at Bliston' which never actually took place.2 However, Ernest 
Simmons’ depiction of the Great Western superannuation scheme was correct. The Great 
Western superannuation fund, like all railway superannuation funds, had been established 
following an Act of Parliament.3 In addition, like most of the railway superannuation funds it 
was based on a contributory system where 2.5% of employees’ salaries were taken and matched 
by the Company. After ten years of service an employee was eligible for retirement if unfit to 
work or over sixty. They would then receive a payment calculated on their length of service 
which would be converted to a fraction of their salary which, at the Great Western, was a 
sixtieth. If a member died before being superannuated the Committee, at their discretion, could 
pay his dependent a sum equal to his contributions to the fund, though each sum could not 
exceed half a year’s salary of the deceased.4 Additionally, if a member was to leave the service 
of the Great Western Railway but had been paying into the superannuation fund for ten years 
or more, they could, at the committee’s discretion, receive their contributions.5  This obviously 
meant that, as in the case seen in Ernest Struggles, if they had been working for the Company 
for less than ten years, they would leave empty handed. The time, name and location of events 
may have been shaped to fit Ernest Simmons’ narrative, but it is likely that his representation 
of the rules and regulations that governed the pay, pensions and working lives of employees 
was accurate. 
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Furthermore, Jack Simmons’ introduction emphasised the value of Ernest Struggles in offering 
insights into the feelings and views of a middling railway worker—including his frustrations 
and ambitions—regardless of the historical inaccuracies.6 For Simmons the value of the work 
is its ‘fundamental truth, a truth not of fact but of feeling’.7 With regard to superannuation, 
Ernest Struggles is then useful on two fronts: it gives an accurate representation of the rules 
and regulations but, also, a valuable insight into how many railway workers may have felt about 
these schemes. The book does not mention the creation of the fund nor the start of Struggles’ 
payments into it, pensions are never reflected upon nor discussed over the course of his two 
volumes apart from the last two pages, when it is held up as a final injustice imposed upon 
workers. For Struggles, the superannuation was no benefit and provided no welfare safety-net 
to reward a long and troubled service, it was simply another way to short-change and exploit 
an abused workforce. 
This view is supported, to some extent, by the historiography of railways and the management 
of their workers.8 Pensions and superannuation funds have been portrayed as part of the ‘new 
form of social contract’ devised by railway companies as a mechanism to ‘bind the railwaymen 
more closely to the service of the companies’.9 They formed part of the vision of the companies 
as a secure employer and though the standard of benefit could vary greatly and was not 
available to all, it was designed to create dependence upon the company and discourage 
workers’ independence.10 It is safe to say that history has not been kind to the railway 
superannuation funds. This is partly due to the focus on trade unions and labour movements 
within the history of labour since the 1960s. As the Webbs demonstrated in 1897, compulsory 
company benefit schemes and trade unions were frequently incompatible as the former 
prevented members from paying to join the latter.11 Additionally, the objective of tethering an 
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employee to a company prohibited mobility which formed the ‘best possible bargain for the 
sale of his labour’.12 
However, this focus on labour management has neglected the question of why these schemes 
were developed and maintained, as well as how employees felt about them. Audrey Caroline 
Giles’ 2007 doctoral thesis examining the employees of the London & South Western Railway 
made a start in filling this gap in the literature.13 Giles suggests that pensions and other 
mechanisms of welfare were more to do with the Company’s ambitions to appear like a 
generous employer to senior office staff than part of an aim to regulate order and discipline.14 
Giles frequently looks to the paternalistic management styles of eighteenth-century employers 
and factory systems for comparative institutions. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
railways were not alone in developing superannuation schemes for the increasing numbers of 
white-collared workers in the nineteenth century, as previous chapters have demonstrated. The 
railways were greatly influenced by the Civil Service, East India Company and the Bank of 
England, not only in the design and regulation of superannuation, but also through the 
perceived social meaning of this provision for the growing numbers of clerks and salaried 
employees. When railway companies first began to discuss superannuation schemes it was to 
align themselves with these larger, more prestigious organisations. A superannuation scheme 
could add to the status of a Company. This was important for some companies in their early 
days and reflected in early superannuation discussions in the 1840s and 1850s. Alongside this 
pursuit of status was the unique pressure to do more to manage the risk of railway accidents. 
Superannuation funds were one way to provide insurance for employees and their families in 
the event of a life changing or fatal accident, and one of the first superannuation schemes that 
was established owed a lot to the company’s attempt to manage risk. However, most early 
superannuation funds were aimed at the salaried employees who were less likely to be involved 
in an accident, which may partly explain the slow expansion of superannuation schemes. 
By the 1870s, there was a shift in how superannuation schemes were viewed by employees, 
and they were a benefit that was increasingly desired and anticipated in a new workplace. When 
the demand for clerks grew, and organisations were increasingly having to compete for 
workers, the superannuation scheme became an expectation rather than the exception. By the 
                                                          
12 Ibid., p.551. 
13 A. C. Giles, ‘Railway Influence in Kingston upon Thames: Paternalism, “Welfarism”, and Nineteenth Century 
Society, 1838-1912’, PhD Thesis (Kingston University, 2007). 
14 Ibid., p.257. 
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early twentieth century, paying into a superannuation fund was an activity that helped shape 
class identity amongst railway clerks.15 It was something they expected to pay into and, as a 
result, an increasing number of companies began to investigate and implement a 
superannuation scheme. 
Nevertheless, despite the number of similarities between railway superannuation schemes and 
those provided by the government, East India Company and the Bank of England, there are 
also notable differences. The railways were an explicitly commercial enterprise: as a result, 
tension between providing welfare systems and generating company profit resulted in an 
emphasis on employee contributions and actuarial approval that did not exist in the 
organisations discussed in earlier chapters. This also resulted in a different expectation from 
employees towards the end of the century. Some of the cynicism of Ernest Struggles can be 
seen in evidence given to the 1910 Board of Trade inquiry into railway superannuation, but 
this was generally a criticism of how the schemes were run, not that they should exist at all. 
Ultimately, railway employees, at the start of the twentieth century, were most suspicious of 
the features of superannuation schemes that had been inherited from the older institutions, such 
as the Civil Service. The biggest objection was against pensions based on salary and length of 
service since they considered that it put unnecessary pressure on the superannuation funds’ 
finances. They may have desired a similar social standing to clerks in government and the City, 
but they held their employers in lower regard and did not trust their companies to design and 
manage financially sound retirement provisions.  
This chapter will focus on the superannuation schemes developed by the Railway Clearing 
House and the London and North Western Railway Company in the mid-nineteenth century 
and then in the 1870s. Through these two companies’ individual schemes and the attempts to 
develop superannuation schemes for the entire railway industry, the changing motivations and 
limitations for providing pensions will become evident. As with the previous case studies the 
focus will be on the white-collared, salaried employees, a group of workers that were growing 
in number and strength at the end of the nineteenth century. This can be seen from the 1870s 
in the demands for better retirement provision alongside the mounting criticism and cynicism 
about the various superannuation schemes. As most schemes were contributory, they were 
                                                          
15 P. Scott and J. T. Walker, ‘Demonstrating Distinction at “the lowest edge of the black-coated class”: The 
Family Expenditures of Edwardian Railway Clerks’, Business History, 57:4 (2015), pp.12 and 25. 
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easily defined as deferred pay and viewed as an entitlement by employees, empowering them 
to campaign for a superannuation they could trust. 
The First Railway Superannuation Schemes 
From the 1840s and 1850s there were a number of attempts to create an industry-wide 
superannuation scheme. These early attempts were frequently aligned with the existing 
superannuation provision in the Civil Service and the Bank of England, which were used as 
justification and inspiration for developing a new scheme. The creation of the early 
superannuation schemes in the railway industry was not simply about managing a growing 
workforce; it was still comparatively small in these decades and the schemes were aimed at the 
salaried clerks rather than waged staff. They were more focused on aligning the status of 
railway work and companies alongside the historic positions of the Civil Service, East India 
Company and the Bank of England. 
Initial attempts at an industry-wide superannuation scheme were led by the Railway Clearing 
House, a unique organisation that had connections to almost all railway companies across the 
UK. The Railway Clearing House was established in 1842 to meet the growing problem of 
distributing the income from journeys made by passengers and goods across routes operated 
by different railway companies. It was a membership organisation, maintained by the fees paid 
by various railway companies for the service of having the receipts of railway traffic distributed 
fairly. It was from this position that it started to investigate universal railway superannuation.  
In the 1840s the Railway Clearing House was too small to create its own fund. In January 1842 
the Company employed six clerks, and although this would increase to approximately 800 
clerks in twenty years and reach over 2,500 by the turn of the century, the small numbers at the 
start of the Company's life did not warrant an independent fund.16 Consequently, the discussion 
that surfaced in 1844 focused on the creation of a Railway Fund, subscribed to by railway 
companies and their servants. It proposed that the Fund would be ‘enrolled under the acts 
regulating friendly societies’, being managed by a Company Committee of Management 
containing twelve individuals selected from the principal officers of the railway companies, 
two of which would be elected by subscribers.17 Although little survives to give a more detailed 
account of the motivations of this first proposal, it appears that it looked to the friendly societies 
for inspiration. It would have a management committee and adhere to the friendly society 
                                                          
16 P. S. Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House in the British Economy 1842-1922 (London, 1968), p.15. 
17 TNA RAIL 1008/66 Letter from Alfred Beeston to C. A. Saunder, Great Western Railway, 25 March 1844. 
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regulations. It also generated considerable interest in the railway community. In March 1844, 
the provisional committee had nine members from eight companies with written support from 
a further five companies.18 Nevertheless, the scheme went no further and it can be presumed 
that a general consensus across the companies could not be achieved. 
By the second attempt in 1849, there was a clear shift in the tone of the schemes that were 
being suggested. Now the focus was turned away from friendly societies and fixed upon 
government as the proposal suggested that the creation of a fund ‘similar in principle to that 
which exists in each of the Offices of the Government’ would be ‘highly advantageous to 
Railway Officers generally’.19 As a consequence, a committee was created with the express 
purpose of ‘ascertaining if the Government system of superannuation was applicable, or could 
be modified so as to be made applicable, to the establishments of Railway Companies’.20 The 
committee took the Superannuation Act of 1829 as their basis for the Civil Service 
superannuation scheme, ignoring the various amendments and variations across departments, 
describing the system as a contributory fund, graduated according to length of service and 
guaranteed by Government.21 It was a scheme that the committee preferred to any private form 
of insurance, noting that compared to the type of schemes based on assurance company tables 
that granted deferred annuities, the Government granted larger provisions at much earlier 
periods and was much easier to understand.22 The lack of actuarial calculations was noted but 
not criticised and was seen as being due to the advantages of having the guarantee of the state, 
though this did mean the railway companies had no way of knowing if the government system 
was sustainable.23 It was this apparent uncertainty and lack of transparency of the government 
system that led to the employment of Mr Ansell, the actuary from the Atlas Assurance 
Company, to determine if the government system could work for the railway companies. 
Following Ansell’s report, the committee recommended an amendment whereby railway 
companies should ‘imitate the example of government by guaranteeing and subscribing to the 
fund’ with the aim of reducing the amount members would need to pay through subscription.24 
                                                          
18 TNA RAIL 1008/66 Letter from Beeston to Saunders, dated March 1845. 
19 TNA RAIL 1008/66 ‘Proposal for creating a superannuation and widows’ annuity fund &c For the Benefit of 
the Officers of the Railway Companies in Great Britain’. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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This proposal also included plans for a widows’ annuity fund and a benevolent fund based on 
those provided by the Bank of England and endorsed by Ansell.25 
In December 1851, the committee’s plans had progressed to suggesting the creation of a 
General Railway Association with responsibility for administering the superannuation and 
guarantee funds.26 Following two years of consultation, the superannuation scheme was a lot 
more conservative in its offerings. It had also added a number of other organisations that gave 
employees a superannuation to its list of influential schemes, including the Civil Service, the 
Bank of England, East India Company and insurance companies.27 The financial crisis that had 
spread across Britain following the railway mania was blamed for prohibiting previous plans 
for a general superannuation fund, but the author of the proposal was adamant that one was 
needed.28 The absence of a superannuation scheme was portrayed as a catalyst for even more 
financial suffering and public humiliation as companies failed to support their growing and 
ageing workforce. The proposal warned that without ‘immediate steps’ railway companies 
would soon find themselves ‘in a situation of considerable embarrassment’ but compelled by 
‘necessity’ and ‘a sense of public duty’ to remove ‘old and faithful servants’, men who had 
given the best years of their lives to the company.29 Without a mechanism to remove these old 
employees the results could be expensive, either in keeping on inefficient employees or paying 
for their removal. The reference to ‘public duty’ suggested a shift in how the companies were 
viewing and portraying themselves. Like the large institutions that inspired the superannuation 
proposals, railway workers served the public and, consequently, ensuring an efficient service 
by pensioning the older, slower and incapacitated servants was part of their responsibilities to 
the public. Superannuation therefore was not just about financial or personnel management, it 
was part of a statement of who the railways thought they were and their relationship with the 
public. 
Nevertheless, railway companies were governed by boards of directors who were responsible 
for ensuring a profit for shareholders, and the decision to provide superannuation schemes, 
even with employee contributions, was potentially expensive. As a result, the reasons for 
creating a General Railway Association to supervise a superannuation fund was justified as a 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 TNA RAIL 1008/2 Railway Clearing House Minute Book, 10 December 1851, Resolution 211, p.181. 
27 TNA RAIL 1008/66 ‘General Railway Association for providing Superannuation & Guarantee Funds, and 
other benevolent objects’. 
28 Ibid. 
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good financial decision. A proposal for the creation of the Association used estimates from 
actuaries to prove that a large pool of employees, more than could arguably be provided by one 
company, was needed to make the fund viable.30 Secondly, by sharing the day to day cost, the 
companies would also be sharing the financial risk, and a fund across several companies paying 
a fixed annual payment would be relatively safe from ‘any uncertainty arising from the feelings 
of a particular board of directors, or the state of depression or prosperity of a particular 
railway’.31 Finally, a superannuation scheme under a General Railway Association would 
‘prevent invidious comparisons between different Railway Companies, and ... relieve them 
from the highly unpleasant task of adjudicating upon applications of this description without 
any recognised rule or principle for their guidance.’32 All of these points were designed to 
attract the cooperation of company executives rather than the ordinary railway worker. The 
General Railway Association was styled as giving railway companies the opportunity of 
becoming an employer akin to the government and the Bank of England. It mitigated risk and 
cost by spreading this across the companies and consequently gave the companies the elevated 
status of competing for the same employees as these public institutions, as well as fulfilling a 
public duty. 
Despite the detailed arguments for an industry-wide superannuation, these early attempts by 
the Railway Clearing House and its committee were ultimately unsuccessful. A year after the 
General Railway Association had been first proposed, and over three years since the committee 
had been formed to examine the subject of creating a superannuation akin to the government 
scheme, the committee was formally disbanded in December 1852.33 The work the committee 
had done was not completely lost and went on to influence the creation of the first formal 
railway superannuation scheme at the London and North Western Railway the following year. 
Yet, it would be another twenty years before the aspiration of an industry-wide superannuation 
scheme was realised through the Railway Clearing House. From these initial attempts the role 
and influence of government superannuation is clear, but it was not enough in itself to 
encourage companies to get involved. There would need to be greater outside pressure to push 
these private enterprises to provide retirement provisions for employees. 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 TNA RAIL 1008/66 Railway Clearing House Superannuation Fund paper, ‘General Railway Association for 
providing Superannuation & Guarantee Funds, and other benevolent objects’, p.1. 
32 Ibid., p.1. 
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 Public Duty and the Role of Accidents 
Attempts to align the management of clerical workers with employers like the government, 
were not just about mimicking high status organisations. Another factor that contributed to the 
pressure for greater provisions for employees was the increasing anxiety regarding accidents 
on the railways.34 Accidents were used as a reason for enforcing strict obedience amongst 
employees through the publication of rule books, circulars and supervising work.35 Failure to 
adhere to the rules could lead to a serious loss of life. Yet, as Daniel Martin has shown, 
alongside the focus on ensuring that competent staff prevented accidents, there was also a sense 
that the utilisation of new technology in the railway inevitably led to accidents.36 This 
perception of the inevitable accident can be seen to a limited extent through the minutes of 
railway committees, suggesting a greater responsibility for employers to support their 
workforce in these types of events, and not just use them as scapegoats.37  
                                                          
34 Ralph Harrington points out that the railways were a very safe mode of transport and in the period between 
1850 and 1909 the number of fatal accidents per year fell from 6.9 to 4.0. However, despite the repetition of 
statistics and articles on the subject, the public’s anxiety about accidents increased during the Victorian period 
partly due its depiction in fiction and popular press: see R. Harrington, ‘Railway Safety and Railway Slaughter: 
Railway Accidents, Government and Public in Victorian Britain’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 8:2 (2003), 
pp.187-192. 
35 Mike Esbester argues these techniques were not very effective in improving workplace safety arguing that 
workplace safety at the Great Western Railway only improved in the twentieth century through the ‘Safety First’ 
campaign; see M. Esbester, ‘Reinvention, Renewal, or Repetition? The Great Western Railway and 
Occupational Safety on Britain’s Railways, c.1900-c.1920’, Business and Economic History On-Line, 3 (2005), 
pp.4-6. 
36 Martin’s work uses the writings of Charles Dickens to test the theory of the existence of a ‘risk society’, 
suggesting that the use of new technology and the view of the railway as an expanding network meant that 
railway accidents moved from being perceived as localised disasters towards the suggestion that a constant level 
of risk as accidents were inevitable. D. Martin, ‘ “Affirmative Signalling”: Dickens’s Railway Journalism and 
Victorian Risk Society’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 22:4 (2017), p.432. Julia Moses also discusses the 
European context in The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origins of European Social States 
(Cambridge, 2018), pp.23-24. 
37 Esbester examines why the government did not get involved to regulate railways more until after 1913, 
arguing that it was because the railway companies were able to ‘deflect state interest’ partly through the strong 
representation of railway companies in Parliament, and persistent arguments that the companies would deal with 
it independently; see M. Esbester, ‘ “No Good Reason for the Government to Interfere”: Business, the State, and 
Railway Employee Safety in Britain, circa 1900-1939’, Business and Economic History On-Line, 4 (2006), p.5. 
Rande Kostal also argues that the lack of enforcement of compensation payments to railway employees gave 
railway companies no financial incentive to improve safety at work: see R. Kostal, Law and English Railway 
Capitalism, 1825-1875 (Oxford, 1994), pp.254-321. Other work that discusses the nineteenth century and 
accidents include T. Crook and M. Esbester, (eds), Governing Risks in Modern Britain: Danger, Safety and 
Accidents, c.1800-2000 (London, 2016), J. L. Bronstein, Caught in the Machinery: Workplace Accidents and 
Injured Workers in Nineteenth-Century Britain (Palo Alto, 2008) and B. M. Hutter, Regulation and Risk: 
Occupational Health and Safety on the Railways (Oxford, 2001). A work that does not look at railway accidents 
specifically, but provides a useful introduction to the historiography of occupational health is P. W. J. Bartrip, 
The Home Office and the Dangerous Trades: Regulating Occupational Disease in Victorian and Edwardian 
Britain (Amsterdam, 2002), pp.1-35. 
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Impetus for superannuation schemes in the 1840s and 1850s either arose from opportunities 
related to the business of passenger insurance against accidents or external pressure from 
officials related to company compensation to families. The responsibility and role of the 
railway companies in the event of an accident provided some motivation to examine wider 
welfare for employees, but it was not enough in itself to sustain momentum for change. The 
Railway Clearing House’s 1849 examination of a universal superannuation fund had been 
prompted by the creation of the Railway Passenger Assurance Company. This insurance 
company had been established to allow passengers to insure against the frequent railway 
accidents by paying a small additional fee to their railway ticket.38 This insurance would pay 
compensation regardless of whether the railway company and its servants were deemed to be 
negligent, and also proposed that parts of its profits should be paid to railway clerks, guards, 
engine drivers and stokers, signal-men and points-men, as an incentive for them to ensure travel 
was safe.39 In September 1849 the Passenger Assurance Company proposed that they pay the 
railway companies 10% of their gross profit in return for the railway companies and their 
servants handling the assurance company’s business.40 A pamphlet on the aims and purpose of 
the Railway Passenger Assurance Company, published in January 1849, before the company 
had been given any powers by Parliament, suggested how the funds paid to railway companies 
could be used for the benefit of employees, this included ‘a sick fund, a superannuation fund, 
a widows’ and orphans’ fund, a burial fund, and a children’s education fund’.41 It is therefore 
unsurprising that by September the secretary of the Railway Clearing House, Kenneth Morison, 
described the income from the new assurance company as having an obvious use: ‘a general 
Railway Superannuation and Widows Fund as well as a general Friendly Society for the benefit 
of all classes of Railway servants and their relatives’.42 Morison had been an accountant at the 
London and Birmingham railway company when it had begun to sponsor a workers’ Railway 
Friendly Society in 1839, and had also been part of the Railway Clearing House’s 1844 
provisional committee; he therefore had some experience and possible interest in retirement 
provisions for workers.43 The money that the Passenger Assurance Company was offering was 
                                                          
38 B. Rotch, The Railway Passengers Assurance Company: The objects of the Railway Passengers' Assurance 
Company considered with reference to existing railway interests, and to the mode in which the business 
connected with passenger traffic is at present carried on (London, 1849), p.3. 
39 Lord Campbell’s Act or the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846 deemed railway companies liable if they were 
deemed negligent following an accident, but the Railway Passenger Assurance Company argued this could be 
hard to prove and took time. Rotch, The Railway Passengers Assurance Company, pp.2-5. 
40 TNA RAIL 1008/2 Railway Clearing House Minute Book, p.86. 
41 Rotch, The Railway Passengers Assurance Company, p. 5. 
42 TNA RAIL 1008/2, p.86. 
43 Bagwell, Railway Clearing House, p.164. 
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available to all railway companies that would sell their policies; consequently, with multiple, 
and possibly all, railway companies involved, it made sense for any superannuation scheme 
funded in this way to apply across the industry and not just to the Railway Clearing House. 
Using the money in this way had several advantages: for example, it relieved the railway 
companies of the financial burden of funding a superannuation scheme independently and it 
also incentivised workers to ensure railway safety to guarantee a profitable return from the 
assurance company. Furthermore, it would have had a limited impact on the relationship 
between the companies and railway workers because a third party would have administered 
and paid the pensions. However, not all railway companies were very keen on becoming agents 
for the Railway Passenger Assurance Company and profits were slow in coming owing to the 
continual high number of accidents.44 By 1851, the profits from the Passenger Assurance 
Company were seen as only possible to apply to a death annuity paid out to widows and 
orphans.45 
Even without the income from the Passenger Assurance Company, the issue of providing 
support for workers and their families following an accident was still relevant to discussions 
surrounding a railway superannuation fund. Inquiries by actuaries included investigations into 
the possible operations of widows’ and benevolent funds which were packaged together with 
superannuation to create a scheme the committee felt was worthy of ‘encouragement and 
support’ from the railway directors.46 This extra provision was not only seen to provide greater 
security of the good conduct of servants but it gave servants and their families’ greater security 
in the event a servant was disabled or died in an accident.47 Additionally, even after a much 
amended proposal from the Railway Clearing House, the committee failed to gain support and 
the London and North Western Railway continued to pursue the idea with the issue of accidents 
at the forefront of their discussions.  
By December 1852 the industry-wide scheme had been abandoned, but since April of that year 
the London and North Western had set up its own internal committee to investigate the matter.48 
The London and North Western Railway internal committee were not only interested in 
                                                          
44 The Standard, Thursday, March 06, 1851; p.1. Report of the Railway Passengers Assurance Company 
shareholders meeting where it was stated that dividends could not be paid out due to the high number of 
accidents, and also notes a number of railway companies that refuse to work with them. 
45 The Standard, April 19, 1851, Report of the General Railway Superannuation and Widows’ Fund. 
46 TNA RAIL 1008/66 Proposal for creating a superannuation and widows’ annuity fund &c For the Benefit of 
the Officers of the Railway Companies in Great Britain. 
47 Ibid. 
48 TNA RAIL 1008/3 Railway Clearing House Minute Book, p.26; TNA RAIL 410/22 London and North 
Western Board Minute Book No. 3, minute 1788. 
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superannuation but wanted to include a casualty fund and provision for widows.49 The 
significance of the Company's interest in this area was made more apparent in January 1853 
when Captain Huish, London and North Western Railway’s General Manager, gave details to 
the Board of the coroner’s report following an accident at Harrow.50 The coroner made 
recommendations for carriages to be padded but also suggested compensation for the families 
of servants killed in the accident. The matter was referred directly to the superannuation 
committee.51 
London and North Western Railway are generally credited as establishing the first railway 
superannuation fund in 1853. They adopted the scheme that had been proposed by the Railway 
Clearing House committee in the previous year and, consequently, excluded any wider 
provisions for widows or a benevolent fund. In August 1854, London and North Western 
Railway was still investigating compensation for servants’ families, but by this time the issue 
had been separated from the superannuation scheme. As the 1852 Railway Clearing House 
proposal recommended that it was better to avoid any ‘difficulty or complication’ in 
establishing a new fund, with widows and compensation classed as such. Additionally, the 
London and North Western superannuation fund required employee contributions and, in the 
event of death in service, the Company was able to return their own and the Company’s 
contributions to the families.52 This was a provision that was envied by civil servants but also 
viewed as ‘compensation on the cheap’ by those working in the industry.53 Provisions 
following accidents may have been a catalyst for discussions surrounding railway 
superannuation funds, but they were not enough to produce large welfare schemes that 
supported more than the railway servant. This may have been because the employees most 
likely to be involved in an accident were the waged employees, not the salaried clerks. Railway 
companies may have felt a moral obligation to their employees, but there was little interest or 
motivation to create superannuation funds for the lower-classes of employee, and even when 
more schemes were established, very few included waged employees—this is shown in Table 
                                                          
49 TNA RAIL 410/22, minute 1788. 
50 TNA RAIL 410/22, minute 1967. 
51 Ibid. 
52 TNA RAIL 410/2052 Comparison of Superannuation Funds between GWR, LNW and LSW. Different funds 
had different policies regarding death in service. Great Western: representative to receive amount of 
Membership Contributions not exceeding 1/2 years’ salary. London and North Western: If death within ten 
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8. Instead companies preferred schemes that were viewed as simple and straightforward to 
manage. For this reason, the Civil Service superannuation scheme was central to these initial 
discussions. 
Employee Reaction to Railway Superannuation in the 1850s 
The ‘top-down’ implementation of superannuation schemes in the 1850s could be assumed to 
result in many employees having similar feelings to Ernest Struggles, the fictional character 
who opened this chapter. Through Struggles we see an employee unhappy with the compulsory 
nature of the Company superannuation scheme, and a perception that it was another way to 
exploit workers. This is mirrored in a report from the Standard newspaper when it became 
aware of a proposal for a General Superannuation and Widows’ Fund in 1851. The newspaper 
conceded that the scheme may have been devised with the ‘best possible intentions’, but the 
terms and conditions set out were ‘almost universally unacceptable’.54 Following previous 
attempts by companies to reduce the benefits and the cost of working expenses the newspaper 
was highly suspicious of the ‘machinery of railway patronage’, suggesting it was simply a way 
to cut wages and give the executive more power.55 
However, examination of the minutes of the first railway superannuation committee reveals 
that, although some of the London and North Western Railway employees were confused about 
the regulations, there was very little obvious opposition. At the second meeting of the London 
and North Western Railway Superannuation Committee on 14 May 1853, a letter from Mr 
Sirett was read. Sirett objected to the compulsory contributions and had written to the 
committee to state that ‘under certain circumstance he would be unable to continue his 
contributions’.56 The Committee was unsympathetic and Sirett was duly informed that he was 
not allowed to withdraw from the scheme.  Perhaps news of the swift and blunt rejection of 
Sirett’s opposition spread quickly, but the Committee did not receive any further attempts from 
employees to remove themselves or stop their payments. 
Instead, it was the new emphasis on paperwork and the creation of new rules and regulations 
that appeared to cause the most confusion or opposition. Birth certificates were increasingly 
required to confirm the correct age of new employees and medical examinations were 
introduced in June 1853 in order to ensure workers were healthy both for work and for 
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admission to the Fund.57 The amount of paperwork now required by new starters became a 
matter that Hueley Slatery felt compelled to appeal against at the end of 1854, arguing that, 
although he was new on the staff list, he was not a new employee and had been working for 
the company for over nine years.58 His appeal was approved and Slatery was excused from the 
‘filling up of forms’.59 However, this new emphasis on keeping a record on employees also 
exposed any previous discrepancies and, in November 1854, Peter Rymer Wall was refused 
admission to the Fund on account of the lack of information regarding when he had formally 
joined the Company.60 
The new need for paperwork and record keeping was not the only part of the scheme that caused 
confusion. Several misunderstandings and administrative hiccups in establishing the 
superannuation fund in the first year led to some people being added to the Fund by mistake. 
In the same meeting in which the Sirett case was discussed, the committee read a letter from 
Mr Oboval regarding the case of Mr J. Webster.61 Webster had been wrongly added to the Fund 
despite being on a wage, not a salary, and already a member of the Company benefit fund. He 
was, consequently, permitted to withdraw. Part of the reason for the confusion originated from 
the option for some officers ‘not now’ on the salary list to join the superannuation fund.62 This 
was to allow officers of the Company who were excluded from the superannuation fund, by 
dint of being paid through the weekly or fortnightly pay sheet and not the salary list, to transfer 
from the benefit fund to the superannuation—although it still excluded those employed in 
manual occupations,.63   
Nevertheless, the London and North Western’s superannuation fund was established with what 
appeared to be, very little protest from the staff members. From August 1853 the committee 
started to receive applications from officers who were not immediately added to the fund’s 
lists. The first to apply were four clerical employees from Liverpool, Wolverhampton and 
London.64 It is not clear why they were required to apply separately and were not just added to 
the fund, perhaps they were coming towards the end of their probation or perhaps they were 
paid through the pay sheet and not the salary list; nonetheless, their applications were 
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59 Ibid., Meeting 8 December 1854, minute 81, p.26. 
60 Ibid., Meeting 11 November 1854. 
61 Ibid., Meeting 14 May 1853, minute 12. 
62 Ibid., Meeting 14 May 1853, minute 15. 
63 Ibid., Meeting 14 May 1853, minute 15. 
64 Ibid., Meeting 12 August 1854, minute 27, p.6. 
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successful and they were permitted to join.65 The applications continued to come in and the 
principal reason for rejecting an officer was his age, as those over forty were deemed too old 
for the scheme.66 Objections to the scheme may not have been sent directly to the Fund, but 
what the minute book for the Fund does show was that there was interest and desire to join 
amongst a range of employees. 
Establishment of Universal Superannuation scheme in 1870s 
Despite the apparent success and good reception of the London and North Western Railway 
superannuation fund, it would be another ten years before another railway company, the 
London and South Western Railway company, established something similar. Moreover, it was 
not until the 1870s that even greater numbers of companies began to follow suit.  
 
  
                                                          
65 Ibid., Meeting 12 August 1854, minute 27, p.6. 
66 For example, Mr Chowder, parcels clerk in Birmingham was rejected in October 1853 for being ‘upwards of 
40 years of age’, TNA RAIL 1174/84, Meeting 15 October 1853, minute 28, p.7 and Mr Willgable and George 
Baternan of the Goods Department in Liverpool were also rejected due to age in December 1853, TNA RAIL 
1174/84, Meeting 10 December 1853, minute 37, p.9. 
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Table 8. Railway Superannuation Schemes67 
Railway Company Year established Included waged staff 
London and North Western Railway 
Superannuation Fund Association 
1853  
London and South Western Railway 
Superannuation Fund 
1864  
Great Western Railway Superannuation 
Fund (later Superannuation Scheme) 
1865  
Midland Railway Superannuation Fund 
Association 
1870  
London Brighton and South Coast 
Railway Superannuation Fund (later 
Pension Fund) 
1872 Waged staff also members 
Caledonian Railway Superannuation 
Fund Association 
1872  
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
Superannuation Fund 
1873 Waged staff also members 
Railway Clearing System 
Superannuation Fund Association (later 
Superannuation Fund Corporation) 
1873  
Great Northern Railway Superannuation 
Fund 
1875 Waged staff also members 
Great Eastern Railway Superannuation 
Fund 
1875  
North Eastern Railway Superannuation 
Fund 
1882  
North British Railway Superannuation 
Fund Association 
1883  
Glasgow and South Western Railway 
Superannuation Fund Association 
1898  
Great Central Railway Pension Fund 1905  
South Eastern and Chatham Railways 
Pension Fund 
1906  
     
                                                          
67 PP 1910 [5349] Departmental Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds. Report of the committee 
appointed by the Board of Trade to inquire into the constitution, rules, administration, and financial position of 
the superannuation and similar funds of railway companies, p.2. 
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As Table 8, above, demonstrates, seven out of fifteen companies established their 
superannuation schemes in the 1870s. Giles has shown that the 1870s was a period when 
railway companies took a particular interest in the condition of employment and welfare of 
some employees. The London and South Western Railway established a special committee to 
examine the appointments, salaries and general working within the Company’s Traffic and 
General Office Departments.68 Railways were not the only industry that began to look at the 
employment conditions of their workers at this time. In 1870 the Bank of England decided to 
formalise their superannuation scheme. This was established at the same time that recruitment 
procedures were overhauled and fitted with an overarching aim to compete with the Civil 
Service for the best employees.69  
Welfare benefits, including a pension, were not simply designed by institutions to encourage 
the loyalty of staff, they were also demanded by employees. On 18 April 1872, the secretary 
of the Railway Clearing House’s Superintending Committee reported that, on the third day of 
that month, there had been a large meeting of clerks in the dining room of the Company's 
offices to consider the necessity of a superannuation fund.70 The meeting passed a resolution 
that the clerks desired a superannuation fund for those ‘in the service of the Railway Clearing 
House’, but it acknowledged that a fund would not be successful without ‘pecuniary aid’ from 
the Committee of the Company.71 The Superintending Committee was, on the whole, in favour, 
and started to investigate how the fund would work. 
Despite the extensive investigations twenty years earlier, the Railway Clearing House treated 
this as a completely new area of research and there was no reference to previous proposals. In 
May a letter was circulated to members of the Clearing System, and the clerks began to work 
on a draft scheme.72 By June the Superintending Committee had begun to receive responses 
from the other companies and had decided to submit the proposal to the Railway Clearing 
House Company's committee to start a more formal investigation.73 The committee approved 
the proposal and Dr Farr, an actuary, was contacted to start making calculations; by September 
the first draft of a parliamentary bill on the matter was being reviewed by the Company’s 
committee.74 In December 1872 comments from the Clearing System’s members had been 
                                                          
68 Giles, ‘Railway influence’, p.283. 
69 BEA M6/61 Special Committee on the Examination of the Clerks and Pensions. 
70 TNA RAIL 1080/27, RCH Superintending Committee Minutes, 18 April 1872, p.275. 
71 Ibid., Meeting, 18 April 1872, p.275. 
72 Ibid., Meeting, 30 May 1872, p.281. 
73 TNA RAIL 1080/7 RCH Minute Book, 12 June 1872, minute 1228. 
74 TNA RAIL 1080/27, Meeting, 27 June 1872, p.293; RAIL 1080/7 11 September 1872, minute 1242. 
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received on the proposed scheme and the bill had been approved by the Clearing House 
committee.75 In less than a year a small agitation from the Company’s clerks had led to the 
investigation and formal proposal for a new superannuation fund. 
The fund that was established by the Railway Clearing House and approved by parliament, 
maintained some similarities to the original proposals twenty years earlier, but was also 
distinctly different. The fund was based upon an employee contribution of 2.5% of their salaries 
which was matched by their employer, and after ten years’ service, if over sixty years of age 
or incapacitated they could leave with a full pension.76 The scales of pension were based on a 
percentage of the employee’s salary but was no longer a copy of the Civil Service provision. 
Instead a pension started at 25% of their salary after ten years’ service, increasing by one or 
two percent every year until a maximum of 67% following forty-seven or more years of 
service.77 
By establishing this fund, the Railway Clearing House provided the workers of their member 
companies with greater leverage to lobby for superannuation provision. In 1876, a number of 
sub-committees of the North Eastern Railway began to circulate and sign a memorial calling 
for the Company’s directors to join the Railway Clearing House Superannuation Fund.78 The 
printed memorial stated that a number of companies including the London and North Western, 
London and South Western, Great Western, Great Northern, Midland and Caledonian, amongst 
others, now offered a superannuation fund to employees, and begged the directors to consider 
the Railway Clearing House Superannuation Fund as a basis for their own.79 The Clearing 
House scheme was not without its problems, and many of the sub-committees across the North-
East expressed concern with some of the clauses, but it gave the workers some leverage as the 
directors of the North Eastern Railway had effectively already approved of the Clearing House 
scheme, though just for the Railway Clearing House staff.80 A total of 1,864 employees of the 
                                                          
75 TNA RAIL 1080/7 11 December 1872, minute 1252. 
76 TNA RAIL 1080/66, ‘Railway Clearing System Superannuation Fund Association’ (London, 1873). 
77 Ibid., ‘Superannuation Fund Association’. 
78 TNA RAIL 527/1730 Numerous letters and committee minutes discussing the memorial from August 1876. 
79 Ibid., Numerous signed printed petitions. 
80 The Tyne Dock district objected to almost the entirety of the Railway Clearing House scheme, whereas the 
Hartlepool sub-committee approved the memorial and suggested a number of changes to clauses within the 
RCH superannuation scheme, TNA RAIL 527/1730 ‘Proposed Superannuation Fund’ Letter from Tyne Dock 
Department, 1 August 1876; and ‘Proposed Superannuation Fund’ minutes of Hartlepool sub-committee, 7 
August 1876. 
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North Eastern Railway petitioned their directors, with the majority of signatures originating 
from Newcastle.81  
By the early twentieth century, the Railway Clearing House superannuation fund was well 
established. In 1909, it had 11,256 contributing members and forty contributing railway 
companies from across the UK, all matching the contributions of their employees.82 Its growth 
had been steady since its establishment in 1874, yet, as Figure 7, below, shows, the fund faced 
its biggest setback in 1906 when the Grand Central Railway Company withdrew from the fund 
at great expense. Nevertheless, within a couple of years it had successfully recovered the 
balance of the fund.  
 
Figure 7. Railway Clearing House Superannuation Fund Balance in £s83 
One of the main reasons the Fund was able to recover so quickly was the profit the Company 
could collect from the interest on contributions. A balance sheet prepared by the Railway 
Clearing House for the 1910 Board of Trade inquiry into superannuation funds, details three 
types of interest on their Fund. The interest came from investments, a 4% interest paid by the 
Company on the Fund and any profits from sales and transfers of stock. As Figure 9, below, 
demonstrates, the contributions from employees and companies were able to produce an 
income from the interest that after fifteen years or so matched the growing contributions. After 
twenty years, it was beginning to exceed the contributions. 
                                                          
81 TNA RAIL 527/1730 Hartlepool 328 signatures, Newcastle 823 signatures, Darlington 3 signatures, Hull 208 
signatures, Leeds 66 Signatures, York 316 signatures, Gateshead 109 signatures, elsewhere 11. 
82 TNA RAIL 1008/66 RCH Superannuation Fund. 
83 Ibid., Balance sheet for 1874-1909. 
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Figure 8. Income for the RCH Superannuation Fund 1874-190984 
By 1909 the fund was paying out to 404 annuitants, which equates to just over 3.5% of the 
contributing employee members.85 This is quite a low figure compared with the Post Office 
department where the number of pensions in 1886 was equal to 6-7% of the workforce.86 
Nevertheless, after 1886, unsurprisingly, the majority of the Railway Clearing House’s Fund 
expenditure was paid to superannuated members. Figure 9, below, demonstrates how the 
expenditure of the fund was split over time.  
                                                          
84 Ibid., Balance sheet for 1874-1909. 
85 Ibid. 
86 PP 1887 [5211] Thirty-third report of the Postmaster General on the Post Office, p.2. 
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Figure 9. % of RCH Superannuation Fund Expenditure 1874-190987 
The management of the Fund was, unsurprisingly, the main area of expenditure at first, but 
payments to members or bereaved families then took over, until regular annuitants began to 
pick up. The first annuitant on the Fund was in 1879, five years after the Fund had been 
established. To receive an annuity or pension at this stage a member would have had to pay in 
the equivalent of five years back pay when they joined, as it was a requirement to have paid in 
for ten years.88 Evidently, a small number of employees had been able to save and either 
transfer money from a private fund or from a savings account. They had been thinking about, 
and planning for, their retirement and had decided the Railway Clearing House Superannuation 
Fund was a good option for them. The first four annuitants in 1874 were paid a total of £80, so 
                                                          
87 TNA RAIL 1008/66 RCH Superannuation Fund Balance Sheet for 1874-1909. 
88 Ibid., Railway Clearing System Superannuation Fund, 3 September 1873, clause 2. 
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received approximately £20 each, which is just over 7 shillings a week.89 Considering an engine 
driver could have earned between 5s 6d and 7s 6d a day and a porter could earn on average 18s 
7d a week in 1840, this was not a substantial sum in 1874.90 By 1909 the averages had grown, 
with the 404 annuitants receiving, on average £76 a year, which is just over 17 shillings a 
week.91 Compared to the wages of sixty years earlier, this was not a large income, yet it was 
over three times the size of the maximum new old age pensions, which were 5 shillings a 
week.92 The Railway Clearing House may have set up a sustainable fund, but it is unclear if its 
members would have been able to, or did, live on the payments. 
Through the Railway Clearing House Superannuation Association Fund, a superannuation 
system had been established that could be applied to more than one company at a time. 
However, by this stage a number of different schemes had already been established by some 
of the larger companies including the London and South Western, Great Western and Midland 
Railway. This resulted in a huge variety of schemes that operated under different rules and 
regulations offering different benefits. Nevertheless, despite this confusing range of products, 
superannuation was a benefit more likely than not to be expected by railway clerks and salaried 
officers. By 1870, the Civil Service superannuation scheme had been available to all staff for 
over ten years, and the Bank of England were formalising their superannuation scheme for 
employees. Clerks and salaried officers working at the railways were now able to compare their 
position to other similar roles and though a wide range of complaints about how the systems 
were run and managed were expressed and debated, almost all agreed that they should still be 
offered. 
Employee Perceptions of Superannuation 1880s-1910  
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, expectations of what a superannuation should be 
and how it was managed had changed for many railway employees and there was growing 
dissatisfaction with the systems currently on offer. Through activities by the Railway Clerks’ 
Association and other publications by railway workers it is evident that this was a better 
informed and organised workforce compared to the passive responses seen in the London and 
North Western Superannuation Fund minutes. Agitation from railway workers prompted a 
parliamentary enquiry into railway superannuation in 1910, and the union officials that gave 
                                                          
89 Ibid. RCH Superannuation Fund Balance Sheet for 1874-1909. 
90 Bagwell, The Railwaymen, p.20. 
91 TNA RAIL 1008/66 RCH Superannuation Fund Balance Sheet for 1874-1909. 
92 P. Thane, Old Age in English History: Past Experiences, Present Issues (Oxford, 2000), p.223. 
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evidence to the inquiry could be the loudest critics of the schemes. However, this did not mean 
workers did not want superannuation funds—far from it. Instead, when their opinions were 
heard workers often set out very clear and detailed ideas of what a railway superannuation 
should look like. 
Writing in 1887, D. MacGregor, an official of the North British Railway set out his vision of 
the perfect railway superannuation that would be ‘legitimately benefiting [to] the Company’ 
and attract the best men and allow them to retire ‘from trying and hazardous duties’ when no 
longer able to conduct them.93 This fund should 
‘… be provided by those who benefit by the service of the employee, unless in cases 
of provision for men who have to retire on account of bad health. 
All classes of permanent servants should be included. …   
The allowance should be granted to those whose character and length of service marked 
them as deserving. …  
The allowance should be in some fair proportion to a man’s salary and length of service 
at the date of retiring.’94 
For MacGregor, the superannuation system was an important one: if conducted correctly it was 
beneficial to both employer and employee and, consequently, the cost should be met by both. 
Many of these principles had been established by the Civil Service superannuation schemes 
from the start of the century, including the condition of character and length of service, as well 
as the amount of pension that was granted being based on a calculation of the employee’s salary 
and length of service. The key difference, however, was how the costs were met. As MacGregor 
outlined above, he believed an employee should contribute towards their retirement in case it 
was caused by ill-health, whereas the employer was responsible for repaying a long and faithful 
service as they had benefited from it. Pensions were an entitlement, but one earned through 
individual prudence alongside loyal service. 
Superannuation schemes were important for railway clerks and salaried officers. Giving 
evidence to a parliamentary inquiry in 1910, Alexander Walken, union official for the Railway 
Clerks Association, insisted that the provision was not only approved of but desired by the 
railwaymen, they wanted ‘to have their old age provided for, and they [were] willing to 
                                                          
93 Macgregor, Railway Superannuation Funds, p.15. 
94 Ibid., pp.15-16. 
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subscribe for that purpose’.95 This is supported by the work of Peter Scott and Trevor Walker 
who have examined Edwardian railway clerks’ family expenditure. Scott and Walker argue 
that the membership of a superannuation schemes was important in shaping class identity and 
maintaining a standard of living in old age for railway clerks, with subscriptions taking up 7% 
to 8% of household expenditure.96 Having pension provisions was important to align 
themselves with clerks in other industries, such as the Civil Service and Bank of England, but 
they expected to pay for it. The emphasis was on employers enabling employees to make a 
valuable and viable provision for their retirement. They did not expect to have to fund and 
manage a benefit or friendly society, welfare more closely associated with working-class 
communities, but also did not expect their employer to be the sole provider of it. 
Part of the reason for this relationship may have been the distrust employees felt towards 
railway companies. Early superannuation attempts were regarded by some employees as 
‘compensation on the cheap’, combined with greater attempts to manage and discipline staff.97 
There was also a deep suspicion that companies were trying to make money out of employee 
contributions to superannuation funds. This was something of which company directors were 
well aware, as Lord Claud Hamilton, chairman of the Great Eastern Railway, outlines in 1903: 
‘there is a suspicion by various means often engendered in the minds of working men that 
companies want to make something out of those funds themselves, and do not establish them 
really for the benefit of the men, and it was in order to avoid the slightest breath of suspicion that 
we thought it better to invest its funds in such a manner that they could not by any possibility be 
touched by the company, except with the consent of the members of the fund, and I must say that 
in that way any breath of suspicion has been entirely avoided, and both the salaried officers and 
the wage-paid class have absolute confidence in our bona-fides in establishing and working these 
funds.’98 
Two years later, when it was found that the Great Eastern Railway Company Fund had a deficit, 
Lord Hamilton attempted to meet the concerns of employees by not just having a separate fund 
but by guaranteeing the fund. Speaking to a meeting of the Fund’s members, he dismissed 
                                                          
95 PP 1911 [5484] Departmental Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds. Minutes of evidence taken 
before the committee appointed by the Board of Trade to inquire into the constitution, rules, administration, and 
financial position of the superannuation and similar funds of railway companies. With appendices and index. 
p.22. Evidence of Alexander George Walkden. 
96 Scott and Walker, ‘The Family Expenditures of Edwardian Railway Clerks’, pp.12 and 25. 
97 Bagwell, The Railway Clearing House, p.166. 
98 PP 1903 [1745] Civil service superannuation. Minutes of evidence to the report of the Royal Commission on 
Superannuation in the Civil Service, together with appendices and index, p.53. Evidence from Lord Claud 
Hamilton, Chairman of the Great Eastern Railway Company. 
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actuarial calculations, referencing how in recent years they had seen actuarial error in other 
areas.99 He did not see how a fund could satisfy actuaries with its solvency whilst paying out 
adequate pensions and ensuring the ‘peace and security’ contributing members required.100 
The pamphlet written by D. MacGregor in 1887 had also voiced scepticism over the value of 
actuaries in calculating the solvency of superannuation funds.101 However, guaranteeing funds 
was not enough for some employees and their union representatives. Walken argued that 
companies frequently used Acts of Parliament to alter the conditions of their superannuation 
funds, and some favourable terms might not be sustained or guaranteed in future years. For 
example, the Caledonian’s superannuation had been directed by an 1854 Act to have an 
actuarial report every five years, however a later Act had ensured that policy was removed.102 
Furthermore, following a campaign by the Railway Clerks Association to have railway 
superannuation funds examined, the 1904 controversy surrounding the Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway Company’s attempt to alter their superannuation fund to remove employee 
contributions and retain the interest earned on the fund had helped lead to a parliamentary 
inquiry.103   
In contrast, the practice that union officials and railway clerks advocated was more heavily 
focused on actuarial practice, and argued that pensions should be calculated from the amount 
of money paid into a fund by an individual, a ‘money-value’ system as it was called.104  By 
1909, only one railway company had attempted to implement the ‘money value’ system—the 
London and South Western Railway—but they had found the pensions calculated to be ‘too 
small to provide a comfortable maintenance’ and had supplemented the fund to increase 
payments.105 The possible low value of pensions was acknowledged by several witnesses, but 
the principle of getting what you paid in was the dominant feature. The Civil Service 
superannuation was credited for establishing the system where pensions were based on salary 
and length of service, but this did not appear to meet the demands of a suspicious and self-
reliant workforce in the railway sector. Nevertheless, the Civil Service system endured as it 
                                                          
99 PP 1911 [5484], p.17, Speech from January 1905 read as part of Evidence of Alexander George Walkden. 
Lord Hamilton was unsuccessful in getting all railway companies to agree to guaranteeing the Railway Clearing 
House Fund. 
100 Ibid., p.17. 
101 Macgregor, Railway Superannuation Funds, p.12. 
102 PP 1911 [5484], pp.13-14. 
103 Scott and Walker, ‘The Family Expenditures of Edwardian Railway Clerks’, p.6. 
104 PP 1911 [5484], p.99, Evidence of E. Chandler, Chief passenger trains clerk and member of Midland 
Railway Superannuation Fund Association, p.94. J. MacDiarmid, station auditor at North British Railway and 
member of the North British Fund, and p.216, Evidence of A Walken, secretary of Railway Clerks Association. 
105 PP 1910 [5349], p.14. 
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managed to produce pensions that satisfied the companies in terms of providing figures 
perceived as fair for employee contributions and fair for calculating benefit payments. 
Conclusion 
Superannuation funds were important for railway companies and employees since they helped 
to portray an image of respectability and enabled them to align themselves with older 
establishments such as the Civil Service and Bank of England. For the railway companies, they 
gave the additional benefit of addressing their perceived public duty of keeping a workforce 
efficient by being able to remove infirm and elderly workers. This could contribute to keeping 
the public safe on the railways and also meet perceived obligations of rewarding long and loyal 
service. Furthermore, it gave a small mechanism for providing compensation to families 
following the death of an employee whether in an accident or not but, perhaps most 
importantly, after 1870 it met the desires of the growing clerking classes in an increasingly 
competitive labour market. 
Nevertheless, railway clerks were different from the clerks that worked in the corridors of 
government, in the Post Office or in the City. They were far more likely to expect to pay 
towards their pension provision which was, in part, due to their relationship with their 
employer. As a new and commercial industry, in comparison with the Civil Service, the Bank 
of England or the East India Company, there was a greater expectation that financial 
sustainability should be maintained through the advice of actuaries. There was also a suspicion 
that the employee benefits could be easily changed or manipulated to benefit a company’s 
finances. Superannuation may have been initially designed as a way to reward loyalty, but 
railway employees did not feel their employers were loyal to them. 
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Chapter 6:  
Deferred Pay, Reward and Charity: Family and the 
Ownership of Civil Service Superannuation 
 
‘Mr T. D. Venables, the general secretary of the Postal Telegraph Clerks’ Association, 
who was the convener of the present meeting, in opening the proceedings, said that 
they had met for the purpose of inviting the support of the Civil Service generally with 
the object of having a definite pronouncement from the authorities on this much-
debated question of deferred pay. He referred at length to the injustices done to the 
widows and children of civil servants, inasmuch as the Government did not recognise 
that they were entitled to any compensatory allowances at its hands, though the 
deceased has throughout his service contributed, perhaps, indirectly towards the 
pension to which he would have become entitled.’ 
‘Civil Service Pensions: Reform Movement’, Belfast News-Letter, 1896 
On Saturday 28 November 1896, in rooms of the Manchester Hotel in East London a large 
number of civil servants held a meeting.1 The meeting had been arranged by the Telegraph 
Clerks’ Association and was attended by representatives from twenty-five associations across 
the Civil Service, including the War Office, Admiralty, Inland Revenue, Customs, Home 
Department and all branches of the Post Office.2 The purpose of the meeting was to address 
the growing dissatisfaction with the 1859 Superannuation Act. Civil servants argued that their 
pensions should be defined as deferred pay and that, as a result, their pension money was not 
only owed to them by the government after a long service, but in fact owned by civil servants. 
The civil servants argued that they indirectly paid towards their pensions throughout their 
working life by receiving smaller salaries than they would receive elsewhere. As a result, they 
felt their families should be able to claim this pension money in the event of their death. Other 
organisations, such as railway companies, made provisions for employees’ families and so, 
Venables concluded, ‘the Government of the richest country in the world should show a good 
example and not lag behind the enterprise of private employers and public companies’.3 
                                                          
1 Ibid. 
2 Huddersfield Daily Chronicle, 30 November 1896, p.3. 
3 Ibid., p.3.  
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This meeting was the start of what became known as the deferred pay movement within the 
Civil Service. The needs of families following a civil servant’s death had been a feature of the 
civil servants’ pension campaigns in the 1840s and 1850s and, once again, the desire to provide 
support for dependents motivated agitation. However, the question of whether civil servants 
owned their pensions (as deferred pay) or were given them as an occupational benefit was at 
the heart of the campaign.  
The focus on definition and emphasis on ideas of deferred pay had been enabled by two major 
examinations of the management of the Civil Service in the 1870s and 1880s. The first was a 
Select Committee tasked with exploring ways to limit the expenditure of the Civil Service, 
published in 1873, and the second was a Royal Commission charged with not only finding 
savings but ensuring the administration and organisation of the Civil Service was as efficient 
as possible. Within these inquiries superannuation was defended because of its ability to help 
the Service remain efficient but also as a cost-effective measure, a reason for paying civil 
servants less than the market-rate. These ideas were put forward by leading members of the 
Treasury and became the foundation for the civil servants’ campaign, closely linking lower pay 
with a subsequent pension. 
However, the justification for providing a pension did not mean that the superannuation had a 
simple definition. In fact, the inquiries of the 1870s and 1880s revealed a range of views related 
to how this form of remuneration should be administered and calculated. Some of these views 
provided civil servants with the evidence that superannuation could be defined as deferred pay, 
but it also uncovered differing interpretations within the Treasury and government and there 
was no clear narrative of how a pension shaped, or should shape, the relationship between 
employee and employer. Was superannuation a reward for loyal service as old age pension 
campaigners, such as Henry Broadhurst, argued, calling for non-contributory financial support 
in old age for all citizens in return for long service.4 Those that objected to old age pensions, 
including Octavia Hill, disputed this definition as they saw superannuation as deferred pay.5 
Civil Service superannuation presented a confused and ambiguous picture. As an economic 
sociologist describes, people unconsciously ascribe meaning to payment and so it is 
unsurprising that, in the absence of a clear position from the Treasury, civil servants were able 
to promote their view that it was an entitlement and campaign accordingly.6  
                                                          
4 National Old Age Pensions League, Report of Inauguration (Birmingham, 1894), p.36. 
5 PP 1895 [7684] Royal Commission on Aged Poor, p.558.  
6 V. A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money (New York, 1994), p.18. 
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Finally, in 1902, the lobbying of the deferred pay movement resulted in a Royal Commission 
to, once again, examine the issue of Civil Service superannuation. Despite the concerns over 
the growing cost of the pensions seen in the 1870s and 1880s, this Commission was not charged 
with finding ways to save money. Instead, the Commission, led by Liberal MP Leonard Henry 
Courtney, was given the task of trying to find a way to appease the civil servants at no extra 
cost. The Commission was consequently restricted to trying to find ways of giving civil 
servants greater benefits from the superannuation system, but without burdening the taxpayer 
with a larger superannuation bill. The Commission, which became known as the Courtney 
Commission, reported its findings in 1903 and recommended that something should be given 
to the widows and orphans of civil servants but with a reduced pension for the servants 
themselves.7  
The Courtney Commission set out to define Civil Service superannuation not as deferred pay, 
but as ‘remuneration for continuity of service contingently payable on the continuity being 
maintained during a defined period and not accruing from year to year as an indefeasible 
interest’.8 In other words, pensions were part of the contract between employer and employee; 
they were a recognition for long service and not the result of accrued money during their 
working life. The civil servants had, to an extent, achieved what they set out to do—to gain 
recognition for their families. However, they had done this at a cost to their pensions and 
without recognition that their pensions were defined as deferred pay, hence it was their property 
to claim. 
The recognition of the needs of families in the 1903 Royal Commission was significant, but 
this report was important for another reason. Over forty years since the 1859 Superannuation 
Act, the relationship between the state and civil servants was again being assessed through the 
lens of a pension, there was a clear move to ensure control and power over this financial 
remuneration remained with the Treasury.  
                                                          
7 PP 1903 [1744] Civil service superannuation. Report of the Royal Commission on Superannuation in the Civil 
Service, p.xii. In return for a reduction in a pension calculated on 1/80th of their final salary, instead of 1/60th, a 
civil servant’s family would have claim to a number of benefits. A year’s pay would be given to family 
members upon a servant’s death; if a servant had retired before their death the family would still receive this 
payment of a year’s salary if they had retired after forty years of service; however, if they had retired before 
forty years of service, the family would only receive something if the retired servant had not been paid the 
equivalent of a year’s salary through their pension. The family would receive the difference between the amount 
paid out in pensions and a year’s salary. 
8 Ibid., p.vi. 
 
191 
 
The 1859 Superannuation Act had purposefully acted to move away from connotations of Old 
Corruption by removing the characteristics of sinecures and the Civil List that handed pensions 
down through generations. Through this Act superannuation and pensions were cast as being 
solely focused on the relationship between employer and employee by rewarding loyalty, hard 
work and good character. The 1903 Courtney Commission serves as evidence that the meaning 
of superannuation was shifting. Taking place under the Conservative and Unionist coalition 
the Commission was extremely mindful of not increasing the taxpayers’ burden, but it felt more 
needed to be done to meet the grievances of workers. Ownership over superannuation, how it 
was defined and who could receive money as part of its terms, all became matters subject to a 
tug of war between government and its workers—a final compromise was needed. The 
government was willing to acknowledge and pay compensation to civil servants’ families, 
widening its remit of responsibility, but rejected a definition of deferred pay, enabling the 
Treasury to maintain a level of discretion in administering superannuation. It acknowledged 
that retirement payments were not confined to an actuarial balance of money paid in and 
accumulated, underlining the belief that government money and finances were fundamentally 
different from those of companies and other institutions that employed large numbers of people 
and paid superannuation. How government managed its finances was different, which meant 
its employees and their superannuation were distinctly different from other workers. 
Drawing the Lines in the Deferred Pay Movement 
In a memorial to the Treasury in January 1899, the civil servants made clear they considered 
their pensions to be deferred pay.9 As evidence for their definition they listed the occasions that 
Civil Service superannuation had been described, or referred to, as deferred pay in the 1873 
Select Committee on Civil Service Expenditure and the 1886 Royal Commission on Civil 
Establishments. Those listed included senior civil servants serving in the Inland Revenue 
department, the Admiralty and even the Treasury, as well as MPs: they all seemed to agree that 
civil servants were paid less due to receiving a pension. In 1873, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer was recorded as saying, 
‘I think that if you had no superannuation you would pay a great deal more than one-fifth more 
in order to keep your men, and even then you would not keep them.’10 
                                                          
9 PP 1899 [48] Return of Memorial with respect to Superannuation to Treasury by Civil Servants of Crown, 
January 1899. The civil servants were asking for an inquiry into the operation of government superannuation. 
10 Ibid., p.3. 
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Lord Playfair, who had chaired the Playfair Commission between 1874 and 1875 and who had 
issued recommendations to ensure recruitment to the Civil Service was based on merit, was 
also explicit in his view of pensions: 
‘I have always thought that pensions were nothing but postponed wages, and that was one of the 
temptations to get men upon moderate salaries.’11 
One of the most significant people quoted was Sir Francis Mowatt. In the memorial, Mowatt 
was listed as Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, which was his position at the time of the 
memorial; but at the time of the 1886 Royal Commission, from which his quotations were 
taken, Mowatt had been Principal Clerk to the Secretary to the Treasury.12 From his position 
as a clerk in the Treasury, the department that administered Civil Service pensions and 
government finances more generally, Mowatt gave a figure for the salaried equivalent to 
pensions. His discussion on this with the Commissioners Lord Lingen and Mr Harvey, 
reproduced in full in the memorial, shows that Mowatt believed superannuation was the 
equivalent to an increase in salary of between 16% and 20%. The Commission clarified 
Mowatt’s calculation for the record: 
Mr Harvey: ‘Do you mean that if a Civil Servant entering under the ordinary conditions, has 
£100 a year salary, the real charge that the State has to undertake for him under the present 
system is £118 a year?’ 
Sir Francis Mowatt: ‘I should say at least.’13 
For the memorialists the implication of this statement was clear, the state considered their 
salaries to be 16% to 20% higher than they were paid. For the civil servants this proved they 
were paid less and gave a figure of how much of their salary was being held back or redirected. 
It demonstrated how much they were entitled to receive, whether through a pension in 
retirement or a gratuity to their family after death. The significance of this figure is later 
underlined by evidence from another prominent figure from the Treasury. Lord Welby was not 
given an accreditation in the memorial, but by 1886 had become the Permanent Secretary of 
the Treasury, the most senior civil servant in the department. From his evidence, the 
memorialists conclude that ‘less than thirty per cent of the number of pensionable Civil 
Servants reach the pension stage’.14 Therefore, most civil servants were losing out on receiving 
                                                          
11 Ibid., p.3. 
12 M. Wright, ‘Mowatt, Sir Francis (1837–1919)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University 
Press, 2004; online edn, May 2009 (https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/35137, accessed 16 November 2016). 
13 PP 1899 [48] Return of Memorial with respect to Superannuation, p.4. 
14 Ibid., p.5. 
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any of their deferred pay through a pension; it was a benefit that was only received by a 
minority. 
The government’s interest in the shape and performance of the Civil Service through two 
committees and commissions in the second half of the nineteenth century had provided plenty 
of evidence for the deferred pay committee. Both were tasked with examining aspects of how 
the Civil Service was managed: the purpose was either to reduce expenditure or to review the 
service as a meritocracy; as a result, grievances concerning superannuation as well as some 
suggestions for reform were discussed in evidence and recommended in the formal reports. 
Despite this, the changes to the system that were brought forward focused on reducing the cost 
rather than the complaints of the civil servants. It is worth examining these two committees in 
detail to highlight the neglect of issues relating to definition and the provision for families 
which made the creation of a committee dedicated to superannuation inevitable. 
The 1873 Select Committee on Civil Service Expenditure 
The 1873 Select Committee on Civil Service Expenditure was tasked with finding 
opportunities to reduce expenditure and consequently examined ways to reduce the growing 
superannuation bill. Through this committee a continuity of many older ideas about reward and 
privilege were represented. Superannuation was justified as a public benefit, but there were 
suggestions that some civil servants were worthier of a superannuation than others by virtue of 
their class and social standing. Superannuation may have been part of the reforms to remove 
elements of ‘Old Corruption’, however, there was still confusion about how it could adhere to 
the narrative of fiscal efficiency as the Service continued to grow.   
Superannuation of civil servants under the power of the Treasury was handled in the third and 
final report. In this report the Committee acknowledged the benefits of ‘retaining in the service 
trained officers, as protecting the public from combinations, and as a means of enforcing 
discipline’; however, they also felt restrictions were needed and that the expense may turn 
public opinion against the policy.15 The Committee subsequently recommended that 
Parliament should enforce retirement at a certain age, possibly sixty-five. However, it did not 
feel able to make any further recommendations and, instead, suggested any further measures, 
                                                          
15 PP 1873 [352] Select Committee on Reductions in Expenditure for Civil Services not under Control of 
Treasury: Third Report, Proceedings, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, Index, p.v. 
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such as restricting future numbers of employees eligible for a pension, should be addressed by 
another committee.16  
Despite the limited recommendations, the evidence the Select Committee collected portrayed 
a strong sense from some senior civil servants that equality was not necessary across the 
Service. With attitudes mirroring older arguments that supported the principles of the Civil 
List, it was argued that superannuation had the largest impact for ensuring efficiency and 
longevity for the higher grades of the Civil Service. When examined, Mr Robert G. W. Herbert, 
the Permanent Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, divided the Civil Service into two: the 
higher-class clerk and the assistant grade clerks. To Herbert, the higher-class clerks deserved a 
more substantial pension as they could have chosen a career elsewhere and by becoming civil 
servants, they had potentially sacrificed making more money and a more prominent position in 
society. Consequently, his pension upon retirement should enable him to ‘live as he previously 
did’.17 This, however, was not the case for the assistant clerks who belonged to a ‘different 
walk of life’; he believed they should still receive a pension to make staying in the service 
‘worth their while’ but he did not believe they deserved the same rate.18 Through further 
examination it was the thriftiness of the men in the assistant grade that led Herbert to this 
conclusion, suggesting that the function of the superannuation to compel men to make 
provision for the future was not necessary since they insured their lives immediately upon 
marriage, ‘having fought their way in the world, and having no assured income’.19 Mr Thomas 
Henry Farrer, the permanent secretary for the Board of Trade, had a preference for pensions 
for the higher grades of clerks arising from his lack of experience of the assistant class, and his 
preference for the use of temporary staff, who were not entitled to pensions, for the lower 
grades.20  
The Committee had been charged with looking for ways to reduce expenditure and were clearly 
looking for ways to possibly reduce the amount of pension available to the lower division of 
clerks. For this they had the support of at least two heads of government departments, but met 
with opposition when consulting the Treasury, both Mr Ralph Lingen, the Permanent Secretary 
and Mr Reginald Farle Welby, clerk for Financial Business, were against any alteration. Lingen 
agreed with statements that the superannuation ensured efficiency and that salary and 
                                                          
16 Ibid., p.v. 
17 Ibid., p.164. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p.190. 
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superannuation were both part of a servants’ remuneration so should not be removed. He did 
not elaborate on why the scales should be kept the same and was not pushed on it.21 Welby was 
more passionate in his response: he was extremely reluctant to remove any rights to pensions 
as he felt ‘convinced that it will mean keeping men in the service after they have ceased to be 
efficient’.22 Yet, as an extension of this, Welby also felt ‘so strongly’ that there should be a 
compulsory age of retirement.23  
Though there was some discussion over the amount clerks should receive in their pensions, and 
how a system of deductions did and could work, there was general agreement that pensions 
were to the public benefit. This was based on the value of pensions in securing good men for 
the higher grades and making it possible to remove men who were no longer performing 
efficiently. With this in mind, there was almost unanimous agreement amongst witnesses that 
a compulsory retirement age should be implemented.24 Furthermore, despite the Committee’s 
interest in the idea of curtailing pensions for the lower-class assistant clerks, they appear to 
have sided with the influential rising clerk Reginald Welby, recognizing that economic 
efficiency could be secured to some degree simply by installing a compulsory retirement age. 
1886 Royal Commission on ‘Civil Establishments’ 
The 1886 Royal Commission on ‘Civil Establishments’ had a much broader remit compared 
with the 1873 inquiry. It was tasked with looking into the ‘numbers, salaries, hours of labour, 
superannuation, cost of staff, and administration, regulation and organisation of offices’, to 
find savings as well as ensure the structure and management of staff was efficient and the best 
it could be.25 Established ten years after the Playfair Commission, a Royal Commission that 
had recommended restructuring the Civil Service and widening recruitment by merit, the 1886 
Commission was also tasked with reviewing whether these changes had taken place and if they 
were functioning well.26 Working within these parameters, the Commission recommended 
changes in how superannuation for civil servants should be administered and calculated. They 
                                                          
21 Ibid., Index, p.147. 
22 Ibid., p.7. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p.475. 
25 PP 1887 [5226] Royal Commission to inquire into Civil Establishments of Offices of State at Home and 
Abroad. First Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, p.iv. 
26 Although the Playfair Commission looked at the management of staff, superannuation was not initially within 
its remit. Nevertheless, it had been ‘forced on their attention’ and subsequently examined a proposal to allow 
retirement after twenty years of service, with the aim of speeding up promotion; they did not recommend it. 
Playfair Commission quoted in PP 1888 [5545] Second report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire 
into the civil establishments of the different offices of state at home and abroad, with minutes of evidence, 
appendix, &c, p.xix. 
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recommended introducing salary contributions, to appease the aggrieved civil servants by 
removing any ambiguity over the definition of pensions as deferred pay, as well as reducing 
the cost of superannuation. These changes were not pursued as they were viewed by 
government as too complex and several MPs were preoccupied with other aspects of 
superannuation related to the termination of offices that were viewed as costly and improper. 
This Commission did attempt to address the civil servants’ grievances, however there was no 
sense of urgency to push MPs into appeasing them and they consequently focused on ways to 
reduce the cost. 
The Royal Commission on ‘Civil Establishments’ produced two reports in 1887 and 1888. The 
1888 report looked at superannuation in some detail and not only made several 
recommendations to reduce the cost but again underlined the importance of maintaining this 
benefit. Though the commissioners established that they saw their remit as only dealing with 
clerical staff and consequently did not pass comment on the superannuation of non-clerical 
staff they felt they could discuss the superannuation scheme as a whole. As evidence for the 
justification for providing pensions, the three reasons set out in the 1857 Royal Commission 
were quoted.27 In support of these arguments, that a pension should be given to keep civil 
servants free from anxiety or worry about their future, that public opinion supported a pension 
for loyal civil servants and that a pension would improve efficiency by enabling heads of 
departments to remove inefficient staff members, the Commissioners stated that pensions were 
now a ‘growing practice’.28 Railway companies, banks and other large commercial businesses 
had established superannuation systems and in order to compete with these companies they felt 
it was desirable to maintain the Civil Service superannuation scheme. It was agreed that 
pensions should be maintained but there was a question of how the money should be viewed. 
For the first time since the 1850s the style and management of the superannuation system was 
up for discussion and the Commission examined several proposals for a slightly altered 
scheme. The most detailed was submitted by Mr R. Hamilton who proposed that pensions 
should be removed completely and replaced by an annual sum, based on the current scale of 
pensions being invested into a Government fund.29 Hamilton thought this money should be 
considered as deferred pay and paid out in a lump sum with interest to a civil servant, or his 
                                                          
27 See Chapter 1 for full discussion of 1857 Royal Commission. 
28 PP 1888 [5545], p.xx. 
29 Ibid., p.xx. 
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dependents, when he left the service.30 The rejection of Mr Hamilton’s scheme rested partly on 
the payment of a lump sum which, the Commissioners felt, did not protect the servant from 
‘improvidence or misfortune’ and could still see them in need of public or private charity which 
the pensions were supposed to prevent.31 Their other objection to Hamilton’s scheme rested 
with the definition of deferred pay which was not something they could accept.32 Their problem 
was based on the perceived extra cost of paying out to families where there was no fixed 
proportion of what the deferred pay and actual working salary of a servant should be.33 The 
report itself did not go into any further detail of the Commissioner's definition of the Civil 
Service pension, but the reasoning behind their thinking can been seen in their examination of 
two key witnesses. 
The two witnesses to the Royal Commission who formed the definition of superannuation for 
civil servants were Sir Herbert E Maxwell MP and Mr Francis Mowatt. Sir Herbert Maxwell 
was one half of the Treasury’s committee on pensions and superannuation alongside Sir 
Reginald Welby. He had provided the Commissioners with a history of Civil Service 
superannuation and he believed that the way the pensions were calculated discredited any 
suggestion that they were deferred pay. The superannuation was based on the salary of an 
employee for the past three years or an average of that if it had changed in those three years, 
consequently, Maxwell argued, the pension was related to an employee’s final salary and not 
their salary during their working life. In his view the focus on final salary ‘knocks the bottom 
out of that [deferred pay] argument’.34 For Francis Mowatt, at this time Permanent Officer at 
the Treasury responsible for granting pensions, the definition was related to how the pensions 
were viewed and administered rather than calculated. He argued as follows:  
‘I think the definition of deferred pay, though convenient, is not exact; because if it 
were adopted it would carry with it some consequences which are not recognised in 
our present system. If pensions were deferred pay it would be the absolute property of 
a civil servant. You must give it to him whenever and for whatever cause he retires, or 
if he should die in the service it would belong to his estate; again, if it were deferred 
                                                          
30 Ibid., p.xxi. 
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32 Ibid., p.xx. 
33 Ibid pp.xx-xxi. 
34 Ibid., p.150. 
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pay, it must be calculated, not upon the salary upon which he retired, but on the salary 
which he has received from year to year.’35 
Mowatt’s view appears to be less clear cut compared with that of Maxwell. He suggested that 
the pensions could not be deferred pay because that was not how they were administered within 
the Treasury. The fact that other passages of his evidence were later to become a fundamental 
part of the Civil Service Deferred Pay Committee’s argument suggests that Mowatt may have 
had an ambiguous view of the Civil Service superannuation. However, even though Mowatt 
had calculated that civil servants were paid 16% to 20% below the market rate because they 
received a pension, he saw no benefit in changing the management of the pensions towards a 
system based on deferred pay.36 In his view the pension system was there to benefit the public 
by encouraging longevity but also giving government the power to remove servants at will, not 
to benefit the civil servant.37 Maxwell on the other hand did see a benefit in changing the status 
of the pension to deferred pay and it was this view that made its appearance in the 1899 
memorial. 
Maxwell’s view appears to have had a lasting impact upon the commissioners because, 
although they did not define pensions as deferred pay, they made suggestions that would have 
changed the definition. This was principally expressed through a recommendation to 
reintroduce contributions from employees. They acknowledged that this was not a new idea 
and supported the argument of the 1857 Royal Commission that pointed to the difficulties of 
deciding on an effective contribution scale, as well as potential problems if the fund was 
deficient, or also if it was in surplus.38 Furthermore, they recognised that, despite the apparent 
success of superannuation funds offered by the London and North-Western Railway and 
Railway Clearing House, any actuarial calculations used by railway companies would not apply 
to public funds principally because voluntary retirements were so low.39 Nevertheless, with the 
desire to allow civil servants to actively contribute to their pension and make provisions for 
their families, the commissioners suggested a 5% deduction. This sum would be recorded and 
held by the National Debt Commissioners and could be paid to the employee or their family, 
along with interest ‘at the rate allowed by the Post office Savings Bank, if they died or left the 
                                                          
35 Ibid., p.156. 
36 Ibid., for discussion on salary below the market rate see p.162 and on the belief that pension should not be 
seen as deferred pay, p.156. 
37 Ibid., p.161. 
38 Ibid p.xxi. 
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service voluntarily.40 In a concession to solve the potential problems the management of a fund 
might present, the commissioners suggested that civil servant salaries should be reduced by 
5%, with the saving used to contribute towards the cost of pensions.41 In either case employees 
would be directly contributing to their pensions through their salary.  
This reintroduction of contributions clearly met several needs of the Commissioners. They not 
only removed the question of pensions as deferred pay, but also the suggestion that, even if 
pensions were deferred pay, the cost was still a ‘non-effective charge’ on government for the 
management of civil servants: they were paying them for not doing anything in retirement and 
consequently the public benefit could be questioned. With contributions, civil servants were 
paying towards their pension and the government could also address the issues of payments for 
families and the abolition of office, on top of potentially reducing the burden on public funds. 
In addition, it was proposed that superannuation payments should be calculated from an 
average salary of the past ten years, rather than the previous three.42 A small adjustment 
designed not only to reduce the cost but also to dismantle Maxwell’s argument that pensions 
were not deferred pay as they were based on final salary. The 1888 Royal Commission did not 
currently believe that civil servant superannuation was deferred pay, but they were clearly  
supported making it become a deferred payment to reduce the cost and meet civil servant 
demands. 
The value of superannuation in removing servants who were proving inefficient had come up 
in the previous reports, but now the value of its use through the payment of pensions or 
gratuities to men whose office had been abolished was being challenged. The Commissioner 
felt this part of the Act had been greatly abused and entitled many men to ‘extra pensions for 
their inefficiency’, effectively rewarding bad behaviour. They consequently argued that the 
reorganisation of offices should be taken out of the remit of superannuation and arranged 
through an Act of Parliament, which could either remove the right to a pension or reduce it 
significantly. If a single officer had to be removed, it was suggested he should be transferred 
instead of pensioned and that an office should not be filled once vacated. It was hoped that with 
the focus on merit in the recruitment and promotion processes that this would be less of a 
problem.43 
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Despite the recommendations for large changes in how superannuation was calculated and 
managed, including the introduction of contributions and a change in how they were calculated, 
when the report was discussed in parliament it was another aspect of the superannuation system 
that became the focus. Following the publication of the Royal Commission’s report, one of the 
members of the Commission, Mr Henry Fowler, MP for East Wolverhampton, brought what 
he saw as the principle grievance to the House of Commons.44 With an annual cost of nearly 
£2 million, which he calculated as being nearly 3d in every pound in income tax, Fowler was 
adamant that the cost of superannuation needed to be cut, and that the obvious way to do this 
was to combat some of the grievances uncovered by the committee.45 The first was the 
‘abolition terms’ under which inefficient civil servants could be retired, secondly, the lack of 
regulation surrounding medical certificates and the retirement of officers due to ill-health, and 
finally the procedure of adding ten years to the calculation of pensions for professional 
employees including magistrates.46  
The cost and abuse of the ‘abolition of offices’ clause of the Superannuation Act was a principal 
issue for the commissioners and was discussed in both the 1887 and 1888 report. The ability to 
remove men from office had been portrayed as a distinct benefit of the superannuation system 
over ten years previously in the 1873 Select Committee by Welby and Lingen of the Treasury.47 
In the 1887 report, the commissioners, one of whom included the now ennobled Lingen, 
acknowledged that the removal of inefficient men must bring large financial benefit to the 
government, but were also scathing about the misuse of this part of the Superannuation Act.48 
In their view the reorganisation of the Accountant-General’s Department of the Admiralty had 
been a prime example where staff had been reduced and then simply replaced later, they also 
suggested that the reorganisation could have seen good men released but others retained ‘whose 
services might with advantage have been dispensed with’.49 Perhaps, unsurprisingly with 
Lingen on the Commission, their solution for this type of blunder was to allow greater Treasury 
control and management of the redundancies.50 The 1888 report went into more detail of how 
the practice should be amended, recommending a new Act of Parliament to enable each large 
reorganisation of an office or offices to either remove the right to a pension or reduce it 
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46 Ibid., cc.617-621. 
47 1873 [352], pp.147 and 7. 
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significantly.51 If a single officer had to be removed, it was suggested he should be transferred 
instead of pensioned and an office should not be filled once vacated. It was hoped that due to 
the focus on merit in the recruitment and promotion processes this would be less of a problem.52   
The cost of superannuation had been important to the Royal Commissioners, but it was 
dominant in the subsequent parliamentary debate, with little discussion of the meaning or 
ownership of the pension. MPs focused on the areas listed by Fowler and were in general 
agreement that action should be taken swiftly.53 The issues of ‘abolition terms’ and principles 
for professional officers’ retirement allowances, were simply a matter of changing regulation, 
along the lines of the report’s recommendations.54 However, the matter of medical certificates 
was slightly more complicated. There was a general suspicion of ‘friendly doctor[s]’ providing 
inaccurate or untrustworthy certificates that pensioned officers on grounds of ill-health, and a 
criticism that there was no mechanism to check up on these officers to ensure they were still 
incapacitated and not, in fact, working elsewhere whilst still claiming their pension.55 There 
was an accepted understanding that civil servants did not own that pension payment, and, if 
they were able to be employed elsewhere, the government should be able to stop the 
remuneration. As Mr Handel Cossham, MP for East Bristol, articulated, there was an 
assumption by MPs that the government’s power in regard to pensions was ‘permissive and 
not compulsory’, whereas the government acted as if the granting of pensions was a ‘matter of 
absolute compulsion’.56 Cossham and other MPs called for the state to act more like a private 
company and review any pensions given on medical terms, arguing in terms of fiscal 
responsibility but highlighting that superannuation was compensation that could be given and 
equally taken away. 
The issue regarding deferred pay and whether contributions should be introduced were touched 
upon but were not central to the debate.57 This was partly due to a clear disagreement on how 
far civil servants could be treated the same as employees of a private company. Fowler 
supported the view of the Commission that advocated a contribution of 5% of salaries, bringing 
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52 Ibid., p.xxiv. 
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civil servants in line with clerks in the railways, such as the London and North Western.58 
However, Mr Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, disputed this idea, arguing that private 
firms were not under ‘extraneous pressure’ of government to justify and prove every decision, 
in addition, the recruitment process and ‘watchfulness’ exercised over civil servants by the 
House of Commons, set them apart from other employees.59 If the two sets of employees were 
distinctly different, then their pensions systems should also be managed differently. 
It would be four years before any of the 1888 Royal Commission’s recommendations on 
superannuation made it into legislation. Despite the continued pressure and questions from the 
House of Commons, and even being included within the Queen’s speech in 1889, the subject 
was seen as being too ‘difficult and complicated’ to make a successful Bill.60 By this stage, 
most of the legislation had already been imposed through Treasury Minute or other regulation, 
and saw the introduction of the compulsory retirement age of 65, a removal of the policy to 
add ten years to the service of professional officers, as well as the end of special ‘abolition 
terms’ and a new regulation that meant medical certificates could undergo investigation if felt 
necessary.61 When the Act was finally passed in June 1892, it was concerned with the definition 
of public office and the ability to consider more than one employment, if they were continuous 
and successive, within a pension calculation.62  
No new regulation or legislation addressed the discussion of how a pension was earned, either 
through deferred pay or loyalty and the terms of a contract. Despite being directly handled 
within the 1888 Royal Commission, these issues had been effectively ignored or avoided by 
MPs allowing the deferred pay campaigning to gather evidence and build in momentum. The 
Civil Servants, encouraged and supported by their newspaper The Civil Service Gazette and 
led by the Deferred Pay Committee, felt they had ample evidence that their pensions were 
deferred pay and that, consequently, their families had a claim to financial aid in the event of 
their death. However, the Treasury, now led by Sir Francis Mowatt, was clear that pensions 
were simply a reflection of the contract between employer and employee for the advantage of 
an efficient government for the public. It was acknowledged that salaries were lower than the 
market rate but not that the difference amounted to the equivalent of a pension and that any 
payment to families would be an ‘additional benefit’ that would have to be paid for either 
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through smaller pensions or smaller salaries.63 It would take another Royal Commission—in 
1903—to address the issue and produce recommendations that the Deferred Pay Committee 
could support and lobby for in the coming years.  
The 1903 Royal Commission on Superannuation in the Civil Service 
Civil servants had been asking for recognition of their families within the superannuation 
system since the 1840s. These demands had since been examined several times, but 
consistently dismissed or ignored as other issues took priority. However, in 1902, a new Royal 
Commission was established with the sole purpose of determining if it was possible ‘to amend 
the existing system of superannuation of persons in the Civil Service of the State as to confer 
greater and more uniform advantages upon those to whom it applies’.64 It may have been set 
up with the caveat of not ‘increasing the burden which it imposes on the taxpayer’, but this was 
the first time the demands of the civil servants were the focus of the discussion.65 This was a 
direct result of the actions taken by the Deferred Pay Committee. By 1902, they had been 
campaigning for six years, and had galvanised large numbers of civil servants, sending a 
petition signed by 50,000 of their colleagues.66  
The establishment of a Royal Commission was an achievement for the Deferred Pay 
Committee and there was a real sense of optimism that it might be able to finally meet their 
grievances. This was an opportunity to ‘get to the bottom of things’ and give justification to 
civil servant agitation.67 Even considering the restrictions of the Commission the secretaries of 
the Deferred Pay Committee, Charles R. Moir and Herbert Rolfe, hoped that the terms of 
reference might be pushed to their extremes, acknowledging that including families within the 
superannuation system would come at a financial cost.68 They felt this was acceptable as this 
was not a burden on the state, but a cost met by civil servants. 
As a result, the first point Moir and Rolfe wanted to emphasise was the definition of pensions 
in the Civil Service as deferred pay.69 The arguments and statistics based on evidence presented 
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by various MPs and Treasury officials in the 1873 and 1888 inquiries were well rehearsed but 
did not provide much data for the current Commission to analyse. When asked where he 
believed Mowatt had got his figures to value a pension at 16% to 20% of salaries, Moir had to 
admit that he did not know: all he could argue was that the figure proved that in ‘the Treasury 
mind’ there was ‘some deduction’.70 This deduction, Moir and Rolfe argued, was also seen 
when comparing the salaries of established and unestablished civil servants. Within the War 
Office, Dockyards and Post Office there had been several occasions when temporary workers 
had been brought into the establishment and received a lower salary.71 Furthermore, the grant 
female postal employees were given upon leaving the service to get married was also seen to 
be a ‘recognition that some of her pay [had] been deferred’.72 Combined with the fact that civil 
servants were paid below market rate, for Moir, Rolfe and many of the other civil servant 
witnesses, it was strongly felt that civil servants were not paid as much as they could be and 
this was directly linked to pension provision. 
Nevertheless, as evidence from the Treasury demonstrated, these deductions were not a matter 
of a simple calculation. T. L. Heath, principle clerk in the Treasury, testified that the Treasury 
was in a difficult position to make any reliable calculations or predictions on the cost of 
pensions due to growth of the Civil Service and variations between departments. In the 
Customs department pensions equalled 30.6% of the cost of salaries in the year 1902-3, very 
similar to the cost eleven years before which was 32%.73 In contrast, the cost of pensions 
compared to salaries in the Post Office was very low, standing at 4.8% in 1892-3 and creeping 
up to 5.97% in 1902-3. For Heath these figures did not ‘feel anything like the normal charge’, 
as the department had grown so quickly, and due to the continuous restructures and changes 
made between and within departments it was very difficult to predict any future ‘normal 
charge’.74 Discussing the deduction made to salaries when staff moved from temporary to 
established employees, Heath acknowledged that it could be regarded as going ‘towards the 
cost of giving him pension rights’, but it was not related to any specific calculation and would 
be a ‘small contribution’.75 In addition, the payment to women who left to get married was a 
‘kind of discretionary allowance’ that derived from the department they worked it, and had not 
                                                          
70 Ibid., p.12. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., p.27. 
73 Ibid., p.7. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., p.10. 
 
205 
 
been subject to an Act of Parliament.76 In other words, it was not official government policy 
and had been a practice developed specifically for women in that situation. It appeared that 
Moir and Rolfe were close to the mark when they put forward their suspicion that the Treasury 
did not work with any specific system in mind, and the superannuation policy had almost been 
formed ‘by chance’.77 
After interviewing a range of witnesses, the Commissioners conceded that superannuation 
available to civil servants could be defined as deferred pay, but it was payment upon continuity 
of service rather than any perceived deductions of salary.78 Civil Servants held a contractual 
agreement that assured payment ‘of a definite salary or way during the continuity of … service 
and of a provision of a pension for the remainder of his life upon retirement’.79 The salaries of 
civil servants were below market rate, but the reduction did not equate to the provision of a 
pension. Instead deferred payment rested on ‘the continuity being maintained during a defined 
period and not accruing from year to year as an indefensible interest’.80 In this sense deferred 
pay was reshaped by the commission as a type of compensation or reward; it was not, as the 
Deferred Pay Committee had argued, owed to, and owned by, civil servants. 
If the pension was part of a contract based on continuity of service—a reward for loyalty—
provision for families was not a right and separate insurance would be needed to meet this 
demand. Through the Commission’s investigation, a list of seven insurance or charitable 
organisations that made some provision for civil servants’ families were listed. Some applied 
to specific departments, such as the Postmen’s Mutual Benefit Society and the Post Office 
Insurance Society, whereas others were available to all civil servants, such as the Civil Service 
Insurance Fund and the Civil Service Benevolent Fund.81 The Civil Service Insurance Fund 
had been established in 1890 and had sold over 20,000 policies; it had also started a widows 
and orphans annuity fund.82 However, despite being available to all departments it had a 
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minimum policy of £100 and was intended for grades above postmen.83 The Postmen’s Mutual 
Benefit Society and the Post Office Insurance Society held approximately 12,000 and 20,000 
policies respectively offering a minimum insurance of £25 and £50.84  
It appeared that the mechanisms existed to meet the need of civil servants’ families. However, 
the problem, in the eyes of civil servant members of the Deferred Pay Committee, was that 
membership of all of these societies was optional, and they believed it was the state’s 
responsibility to provide this type of insurance for their families.85 They argued that the extra 
insurance from these societies was not accessible as membership or subscriptions had to be 
paid for out of salaries which, they believed, were already smaller due to superannuation. 
Additionally, most of these organisations were independent of government and did not receive 
any contributions from the state, Moir stated that he had been on the committee of the Civil 
Service Benevolent Fund for ten years and in that time the government had made no grants to 
it, though some of the departmental benevolent funds may have received small grants 
previously.86 As suggested by one of the Commissioners, MP Arthur Morton, for many civil 
servants the argument that pensions should be provided as the public would not want civil 
servants to be destitute in old age was not enough, and this sentiment should be extended to 
their widows and orphans.87 
The Commission’s report had reframed the definition of deferred pay, removing any claim of 
ownership, and highlighted the various ways civil servants could provide private insurance to 
help their families and dependents after their death. Nevertheless, a new compulsory insurance 
system was proposed, one that would pay a year’s salary to a servant’s dependents upon their 
death, or, if already pensioned, it would pay the difference between what had been paid out and 
a year’s salary.88 This proposal was based upon a reduction of pension by a quarter, moving 
from a scale of sixtieths to eightieths and was to apply to all male new starters and be optional 
for the male workers who had worked for less than ten years. 89 Women were excluded from 
the new system as it was assumed most women working in the service were unmarried, and 
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consequently did not have a dependent family who would need this type of insurance in the 
event of their death.90  
The recommendation from the Commission was an attempt to meet the grievances of the civil 
servants, despite proving that their claims, particularly those focused on the deductions from 
their salaries, were unfounded. However, not all the members of the Commission agreed with 
the final recommendations and a supplemental report was submitted by Sir Ralph Knox and 
Edward William Brabrook, distancing themselves from the main report and defending the 
current system.91 Knox had been Accountant-General of the War Office and Permanent Under-
Secretary of War until 1901 when he retired.92 At the time of the Commission he was chairman 
of the Civil Service Insurance Society, and presumably receiving a pension under the 1859 
Superannuation Act.93 Brabrook had started his career in an insurance office and finished it as 
Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies, retiring in 1904 with the reputation as an expert in thrift 
and social insurance.94 Both men were very familiar with systems of insurance and not 
sympathetic to the Deferred Pay Committee’s claims. As Brabrook was to later assert, he 
believed ‘the right way to provide for old age [was] by thrift, self-denial and forethought in 
youth’.95  
They argued that the old superannuation system was ideal for what it was designed for. In 
principle it supported older workers in ways similar to procedures seen in the commercial world 
where aged employees were given less work for reduced pay, and it consequently made no 
difference to salary.96 In practice, the superannuation system had enabled the Civil Service to 
gain a reputation for fidelity, zeal and independence and had been copied by ‘establishments 
of the highest standing in the country’.97 It was a system that worked across a vast range of 
departments and employees on very different average salaries. In contrast, they saw the new 
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system, proposed by the rest of the Commissioners, as inadequate. They argued that actuarial 
analysis was needed, suggesting any change would inevitably transfer the emoluments of some 
departments to others as the cost fluctuated and would increase the financial burden on the 
taxpayer.98 They also objected to the idea that families would receive support at the cost of 
pensions, and any move to ‘avoid the stress of making a present payment’ was inverting any 
tendencies towards thrift.99 
Despite Knox and Brabrook’s objections the recommendations made by the rest of the 
Commissioners, to redistribute the cost of superannuation and include a provision for families 
and dependents for male employees became the basis for an Act of Parliament in 1909. The 
civil servants’ campaign had managed to influence and sway the majority of the Royal 
Commission to support the idea that there was justification in providing financial assistance to 
family members of civil servants in the event of their death, and it was not the responsibility 
of the servant alone. However, what this meant for a definition of superannuation was still not 
clear. The Commission did not see it as the property of the civil servant or their family and 
instead encouraged this transaction to take place as an extension of salary, part of a contract, 
but also a reward for loyalty. The ambiguity on the definition and conflict within the Royal 
Commission ensured a bumpy path between report and Act of Parliament, and it was never 
certain that it would happen. As the Civil Service Gazette concluded with cynicism and regret 
‘When doctors differ who shall decide?’100 
The 1909 Superannuation Act 
Civil servants’ initial reaction to the proposals of the 1903 Royal Commission, which became 
known as the ‘Courtney scheme’ were subdued. The Deferred Pay Committee had campaigned 
claiming to represent a united Civil Service, but, as Knox and Brabrook had suggested, the 
needs across grades were different, and questions were quickly asked about the loss of pension 
for the lower grades. A consensus was eventually established as the Deferred Pay Committee 
and its supporters accepted the changes as the best they were going to get. Yet, despite the 
campaign’s resignation it would not be until 1909 that a new Superannuation Act was passed 
by parliament due to other priorities as well as the perceived complexity of the situation. 
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As the largest and most diverse department, it is unsurprising that the Courtney Commission 
divided opinion within the Post Office. The Post, a publication for the Fawcett Association, an 
organisation that represented postmen and sorters, published an editorial that was very quick 
to dismiss the report as a ‘disappointing document’.101 It lamented there was no discussion of 
pensions for unestablished employees, or of improving the pension provision for lower grades 
by allowing workers to retire early.102 It disputed their definition of deferred pay, and were 
very critical of the suggestion that any benefit to widows and orphans had to be paid for by 
reducing pensions.103 They argued that the current system provided a pension that was ‘hardly 
sufficient to keep [the lower ranks] outside of the workhouse’ and were adamant that they could 
not entertain any further reduction.104 As far as they could see their ‘fight for justice [had] just 
begun’.105 
However, the following week, the Chairman of the Association, G. W. Gains, published a more 
sympathetic piece in The Post. It acknowledged the loss of pension, but argued that it was an 
‘improvement’ on the current system and the best offer the Commission could provide given 
the restriction of the terms.106 The improvement rested with the provision for widows and 
orphans, and given that only five in every hundred sorters retired on a pension, there were many 
more families that would benefit.107 It did not answer all of the Association’s grievances, but, 
for Gains, it was worthy of support.  
The uncertainty about how to receive the report was also evident in the coverage in the Civil 
Service Gazette. Following the Courtney Commission’s publication, the Gazette gave a very 
straightforward and factual account, and then neglected the subject until the week after Gains’ 
piece in The Post.108 This was nearly a month after the Commission had published its findings, 
and even this report was a factual account of Gains’ position and argument. In stark contrast to 
the knee-jerk call to arms put forward by The Post’s editor, the Gazette remained silent on the 
subject for several months. It may have seen itself as fighting ‘single-handed’ for the cause of 
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superannuation, but without direction from the Deferred Pay Committee the paper could not 
provide an opinion for its audience.109 
No action or position was taken until the spring of 1904 when the Deferred Pay Committee 
began to hold meetings across the country to discuss the report and its recommendations. These 
meetings were important for establishing the general support for the Courtney system, but they 
were also part of an effort to establish carefully the narrative of the campaign now it appeared 
to be coming to an end. The Gazette reported that a meeting in Sheffield had declared that ‘they 
were not agitators’, a meeting in Liverpool asserted that there was not a ‘more unselfish 
movement’, and in 1905 a letter sent to a London daily newspaper described the deferred pay 
campaign as a movement of ‘quietness and dignity’ rather than an agitation.110  
The committee’s momentum had stalled, and though strong support still existed throughout the 
Civil Service, there was no desire to take more drastic action. Nevertheless, pressure was 
maintained, and the issue never managed to go away. In 1905, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
received a deputation of civil servants to discuss the Courtney Commission.111 In 1906, a vote 
was held amongst civil servants which overwhelmingly supported the Courtney system and the 
subject of pensions was discussed and reported in the 1907 Select Committee on Post Office 
Servants.112 By 1908, this persistence had paid off and a Bill was being prepared and actuaries 
consulted.113  
For the government the success of the Civil Service Superannuation Act was that it was not 
redefining a pension system that would cost them more money. The most important aspect of 
the new ‘Courtney scheme’ to Charles Hobhouse, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, was that 
the scheme was simply a ‘redistribution’ of funds, and not a new scheme at all.114 The 1909 
Act did not introduce contributions as the 1903 Courtney Commission had suggested but 
instead focused on financing a payment upon retirement or death by reducing the possible 
pension from a faction based on sixtieths to eightieths.115 Pension amounts were reduced but 
families were now provided for and there were additional provisions for servants who had 
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served for less than ten years and were either forced to retire or died in service.116 As chairman 
of the 1907 Select Committee on Postal Servants, Hobhouse had become increasingly aware 
and sympathetic to the desire for change in the superannuation system. That Committee had 
not felt equipped to make substantial recommendations in relation to pensions, but it did hear 
grievances from the postal staff and noted its support of the Courtney system in providing 
support for the widows and orphans of postal employees.117 The Superannuation Bill that was 
presented in January 1909 met the long held desire of civil servants to have some recognition 
of the needs of their families and was justified in parliament as a redistribution of funds and 
not a promise of more money.118 
By this stage the idea or discussion of superannuation as deferred pay and what that definition 
meant had fallen away. There was no recognition of employees paying towards their pension 
through reduced or deferred wages, and families were entitled to the one-off cash payment of 
a year’s salary and no more. As a result, families did not have a claim upon the pension and 
their rights to the public purse were strictly limited. This availability of funds, even at the cost 
of the value of a pension was enough to appease the civil servants. Throughout the Deferred 
Pay Committee’s campaign, the definition of deferred pay had been central. An emphatic 
article in the Committee’s biggest supporter, the Civil Service Gazette declared that it was  
‘absurd to regard a pension as a compassionate allowance for old age when beyond 
work, or when, from one cause or another, one is incapacitated from working. A 
pension is not a gift, and cannot by any stretch, or should not by any stretch, of 
imagination be so regarded; it is part and parcel of the conditions of remuneration under 
which employment is taken in her Majesty’s Civil Service.’119 
However, following the Courtney Commission this anxiety about definition was dropped. 
Writing to the Treasury in December 1908 Herbert Rolfe outlined seven points he felt should 
be considered when preparing a Bill to amend the current Civil Service Superannuation. 
Rolfe’s interests were to make the new provisions available to all and to safeguard some of the 
key aspects of the 1903 Courtney Commission. He wanted the new system to be optional for 
current staff and available without a medical exam, he also wanted current benefits available 
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to civil servants such as gratuities based on the number of years of service for early retirement 
on the grounds of ill-health to continue alongside the one year’s pay.120 The full amount of one 
year’s pay was demanded for all of those retiring early or dying at any point whilst in service 
and that the cash payment would be a right for all employees. Six years after giving evidence 
to the Courtney Commission, where Rolfe had emphasised the desire to have superannuation 
defined as deferred pay, it was evident that the money was more important than definition and 
it was generally felt that the good out-weighed the bad. As the final reading of the Bill and the 
creation of the Act approached, a cautious article in the Civil Service Gazette expressed its 
belief that though it was felt there was much good, the definition of the superannuation was 
still left ambiguous as it indicated that ‘in the eyes of the Treasury pensions are a favour, and 
not a right’.121 However, it was too late to push for any further change and, for the sake of their 
families, this point had to be conceded. 
Conclusion 
Through examination of Committee and Commissioner reports on government finances and 
the Civil Service from the 1870s and 1880s, it is increasingly evident that the Treasury was not 
clear on how to define superannuation. Pensions to civil servants were continually defended 
for the benefit they brought the public through longevity of service and the ability to remove 
inefficient workers. However, it was unclear how they were calculated and how they related, 
if at all, to salaries. This uncertainty gave rise to the Civil Service Deferred Pay Committee and 
a slow and steady campaign for recognition of their claim over pensions for their families based 
on the definition of deferred pay. 
Ultimately the Deferred Pay Committee lost the argument but managed to achieve real 
change to the Civil Service superannuation system. The 1903 Courtney Commission had the 
potential of increasing uncertainty as even the commissioners could not unanimously agree 
on a definition or course of action. However, it was able to increase support for making 
provisions for a civil servant’s family in the event of their death. Civil servants had based 
their claim for financial support for widows and orphans on the fact that they owned their 
pensions, it was money earned and owed to them by the state. However, in order to achieve 
recognition of their families’ needs, they were forced to surrender this claim and accept 
superannuation as compensation or reward for loyalty. The Superannuation Act was finally 
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passed in September 1909 granting the concessions civil servants had been asking for since 
the 1840s. It was passed by Hobhouse and other MPs who felt they should ‘give what you 
can to the great majority of civil servants’—their gift to loyal workers.122 
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Conclusion 
 
‘… My application, indorsed with the Secretary’s recommendation, was speedily sent 
in to the Treasury; and, on a bright morning in March 1872, exactly twenty-five years 
after I entered the service, as I opened my letters at an hotel in Falmouth, I found one 
among them informing me that my prayer was granted, and that I was a free man, with 
a pension of about 200l a year.’ 
Edmund Yates, Edmund Yates: His Recollections and Experiences, 1885 
 
Edmund Yates was a journalist and novelist; he was also, until 1872, an official at the Post 
Office.1 His postal career had predominately been in the Missing Letters Branch, where he was 
head of department for ten years until telegraph services were nationalised and absorbed into 
the Post Office, when he moved to that department.2 However, he was not in this new role for 
very long before he found himself in a position where he could take early retirement. Under 
the rules of the Civil Service superannuation, if a position was being abolished an officer could 
be offered superannuation with an extra ten years added onto his pension calculation.3 Despite 
having a second career to fall back on, this was not an easy decision for Yates to make. There 
was, firstly, the financial impact, through a pension Yates would still receive a regular income 
on ‘the first of every month’, but it would be ‘considerably reduced’.4 This in turn, would put 
more pressure on his writing income, and Yates was fully aware that the work of a writer was 
considerably less reliable and stable compared to the Civil Service. At the Post Office he was 
assured that ‘as long as the country and the Bank of England lasted’ he would have a secure 
role and steady income.5 Nevertheless, the pension on offer for an abolished office was a good 
one, and his friend and boss, Frank Scudamore, reminded him that he would have to work for 
an extra decade to hope to get the equivalent sum.6 It appeared to be an obvious decision to 
make, and Yates applied for his pension, becoming a ‘free man’.7 
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The Civil Service superannuation was unique in Britain in the nineteenth century and extremely 
influential. By developing a system of payment for workers the government was attempting to 
meet the individual needs within a growing and modernising Civil Service. It fostered a 
relationship with civil servants that held on to traditional values, such as rewarding loyalty, but 
was also modelled on changing ideas of what type of payment was acceptable in retirement. 
This influenced other organisations, by providing a model of how to calculate a pension or 
helping to create a clerking culture that expected a retirement provision. 
At the beginning of the century the British government had enacted a system of superannuation 
that was founded on principles of loyalty and length of service, as well as benevolence for the 
aged and sick, and developed a system of payment based on a calculation of length of service 
and salary.8 These were distinctly different characteristics from other occupational welfare 
systems based on friendly or benefit society principles where the money paid into a fund could 
determine later payment. The government developed this system to meet several needs. It was 
attempting to combat a system of payment through the Civil List and sinecures increasingly 
seen as corrupt and expensive.9 Secondly, providing pensions for public officials was seen as 
a public benefit: a system of salaries and pensions prevented bribes and financial 
embarrassment. Finally, it helped to ensure an efficient working government machine by 
keeping a fit and healthy workforce and enabling government to remove inefficient workers 
through the clauses related to abolition of offices.10 These values were considered so important 
that they were also imposed upon the East India Company through the 1813 Charter Act.11 Yet, 
even with this overt attempt to curtail spending at the Company, the ad hoc, discretionary 
system was maintained in parallel.12 
At the East India Company, we see the clear distinction between superannuation and pension. 
For the Company, superannuation was the government-imposed payment system for retiring 
employees, whereas the Company used pensions to grant money to anyone for a variety of 
reasons. Similarly, the Bank of England did not offer superannuation. Instead, the Court of 
Directors decided on the pension amounts to be given, although payments were given regularly 
                                                          
8 M. Raphael, Pensions and Public Servants: A Study of the Origins of the British System (Paris, 1964), p.136. 
9 P. Harling, ‘The Powers of the Victorian State’, in P. Mandler (ed.), Liberty and Authority in Victorian Britain 
(Oxford, 2006), p.26. 
10 PP 1857 Session 2 [2216] Report of commissioners appointed to inquire into the operation of the 
Superannuation Act, pp. xi. 
11 PP 1813 [93] Propositions for Renewal of Charter of East India Company, March 1813; PP 1813 [001] 
Propositions for Renewal of Charter of East India Company, May 1813. 
12 For examples of this see PP 1822 [260] Return of Pensions, Allowances and Superannuations payable by East 
India Company in Europe. 
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enough to suggest the presence of a system, though an informal one. The directors used their 
ability to grant discretionary payments to give large pensions to those it felt were most 
deserving, notably employees in the Chancellor of the Exchequer department and porters.13 A 
scale of payment was adopted in the 1830s, adapted from the Civil Service scheme, and was 
probably used to regulate and control payments, though there was little discussion of it. 
The 1870s was a watershed: occupational pensions became prolific and increasingly regulated. 
The British government had reassessed the role and organisation of the Civil Service in the 
1850s, leading to the Civil Service Commission and the 1859 Superannuation Act. Yet, for 
other organisations, a reconsideration of their relationship with their employees through their 
pension provisions did not happen until the 1870s. Competition for recruitment of clerks was 
a recurring theme. At the Bank of England an analysis of recruitment and pensions concluded 
that tighter regulation was needed to improve entrance exams and introduced detailed 
guidelines and scales for pensions to enable them to compete with the Civil Service as a 
recruiter.14 However, traditional features, such as patronage, a non-contributory pension and 
the discretion of the Court of Directors were maintained.15 Similarly, many railway companies 
felt increasing pressure from clerks for a comprehensive superannuation system to be 
installed.16 There was still plenty of disagreement over what a railway superannuation should 
look like, but it was something clerks wanted for their own security, as well as for their social 
status.17 The Railway Clearing House had attempted to install a superannuation scheme to align 
the railways with the Civil Service and Bank of England in the 1840s and 1850s, but it was not 
until the employees demanded it that it was able to take off. 
Despite the growth of occupational pensions and the widening influence of the Civil Service 
superannuation, the 1859 Superannuation Act remained unique and important because it was 
non-contributory. Over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century, many civil 
servants and a number of politicians argued for a contributory system to be reintroduced. 
However, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer George Goschen, outlined in 1888, the Civil 
Service was in a unique position and consequently should operate under unique conditions.18 
Unlike private organisations, such as railways, the government could not be subject to accurate 
                                                          
13 See Table 7 for the averages of pensions granted taken from Bank of England Archive E46/1 Pensions. 
14 BEA M6/61 Special Committee on the Examination of the Clerks and Pensions, p.1. 
15 Ibid., pp.1 and 15. 
16 The National Archives RAIL 1080/27, RCH Superintending Committee Minutes, 18 April 1872, p.275. 
17 P. Scott and J. T. Walker, ‘Demonstrating Distinction at ‘the lowest edge of the black-coated class’: The 
Family Expenditures of Edwardian Railway Clerks’, Business History, 57:4 (2015), pp.12 and 25. 
18 Hansard, HC Deb, 30 November 1888, vol. 331 cc628. 
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actuarial measurements, partly because they retained a higher percentage of employees, but 
also because public funds were essentially guaranteed. The difference was not lost on railway 
employees and much of the criticism of railway funds emulating the government framework, 
by basing superannuation on length of service and salary, was due to the fact that railway 
finances were unreliable in comparison to government finances.19 The Bank of England may 
have been in a slightly similar position to government; it was seen as reliable and steadfast and 
provided non-contributory pensions. However, it was a private institution while civil servants 
were public servants and, consequently, their grievances were fed into parliament and publicly 
debated, as well as being remunerated out of public funds. 
It was the powerful position held by civil servants that led to one of the major changes to the 
Civil Service superannuation since 1859: the Superannuation Act of 1909. This Act 
redistributed the pension to make allowances for civil servants’ families. It came about due to 
a campaign by civil servants to have their superannuation recognised as deferred pay. Private 
pensions were often described in this way and civil servants had many examples of government 
inquiries and commissions where politicians and senior civil servants had made reference to 
superannuation in a similar way.20 The superannuation scheme created in 1859 had been 
designed to instil loyalty, partly through a sense of entitlement, and by the 1890s this had 
morphed into a sense of ownership through the definition of deferred pay. Since the 1840s, 
civil servants had been campaigning for recognition of their family through the superannuation 
system.21 This had been possible through older systems of remuneration, and, unlike the Bank 
of England, there was no compulsory insurance scheme for widows and orphans.22 In the Post 
Office we can see a number of mechanisms used to generate extra financial support for the 
hundreds of workers either excluded from the superannuation system for being part of the 
unestablished workforce, or because they were paid so little they could not take private 
insurance or expect a pension large enough to support themselves or their family.23 The 1903 
                                                          
19 PP 1911 [5484] Evidence from Departmental Committee on Railway Superannuation Funds, pp.13-14. 
20 PP 1899 [48] Return of Memorial with respect to Superannuation to Treasury by Civil Servants of Crown, 
January 1899. The civil servants were asking for an inquiry into the operation of government superannuation. 
21 Civil Service Gazette, 1 January 1853, p.10. 
22 ‘Memorandum relative to the Directors’ Charitable Fund’ in BEA E18/13 – Pension and Other Fund: 
Directors’ Charitable Fund. 1851-1959. 
23 Letter from George S. Nottage, Lord Mayor and Trustee of the Rowland Hill Benevolent Fund in Daily News 
(London, England), 25 November 1884. 
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Courtney Commission did not acknowledge the pensions as deferred pay, but crucially 
acknowledged a need to include provisions for families.24 
Occupational pensions were more than a way to manage a changing workforce: they were 
loaded with meaning. This thesis has used the work of economic sociologist Viviana A. Zelizer 
to categorise payments in three ways—as a gift, a compensation and an entitlement—each 
representing a different power dynamic between employer and employee.25 As the case studies 
discussed in this thesis demonstrate, occupational pensions could be a continual tug of war 
since their definitions shifted and the relationship between employee and different employers 
changed. Sometimes this change was directed by the employer, as seen from the 1859 
Superannuation Act, and sometimes it originated with the employees, particularly after the 
1870s when institutions like the Bank of England and railway companies had to adapt to clerks’ 
demands for a defined pension scheme. However, as the campaigns of civil servants 
demonstrated, these payments were not simply about a relationship between individuals and 
institutions. Families were integral to how male employees thought about their retirement 
provision and, since the working classes could prioritise burial insurance, these white-collared 
men prioritised provisions for their families in the event of their death. Notably, though, these 
campaigns excluded women because they were not considered to have dependents while 
working and were forced to leave work once married. 
Occupational pensions have traditionally been seen as a tool used by employers to tie down 
workers and enforce loyalty, and, certainly, for the lowest paid workers in the Post Office, the 
lack of flexibility and low payments could have felt restrictive. Furthermore, many railway 
workers were sceptical about the financial management of schemes. More work needs to be 
done to understand how the women employed in the Post Office and other institutions felt about 
these provisions. The case studies in this thesis represent just some of the many organisations 
that offered occupational pensions by the twentieth century. It would be productive to extend 
this analysis by examining other companies and occupations in the future, including joint-stock 
banks, the police, local authorities and teachers. As the case studies of the Civil Service, the 
Bank of England and the Railway Clearing House demonstrate, many workers felt entitled to 
a pension, despite their employer’s best efforts to make it appear as a reward. This feeling of 
entitlement was borne out of a range of circumstances, including the definition of deferred pay, 
                                                          
24 PP 1903 [1744] Civil service superannuation. Report of the Royal Commission on Superannuation in the Civil 
Service, p.vi. 
25 V. A. Zelizer, Economic Lives: How Culture Shapes the Economy (Princeton, 2011), p.136. 
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the established custom of a pension or, even, the steadfast belief that employers had a role to 
play in granting workers the feeling that Edmund Yates had on that bright morning—a sense 
of a minimum of financial security and freedom.  
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